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አንድም ሦስቱም መረራ

በዘላለም ክብረት

አፍሪካ ከበደ ገና በአስራዎቹ የዕድሜ መጨረሻ ላይ ያለ ወጣት ነው፡፡ በጣም ተስፈኛ ነው፡፡ ሁሌም ለውጥ እንደሚመጣ መናገር ይወዳል፡፡ ለምን ስሙ ‹አፍሪካ› እንደተባለ ሲጠየቅ ደጋግሞ ወደ መምህር አባቱ ይጠቁማል፡፡ አባቱ ስድስት ልጆች እንዳላቸውና የመጀመሪያዋን ዓለም፣ ሁለተኛውን አፍሪካ፣ ሦስተኛውን ኢትዮጵያ፣ አራተኛዋን ኦሮሚያ፣ አምስተኛዋን ወለጋ እንዲሁም ስድስተኛዋን ደግሞ ሊሙ ብለው ስም እንዳወጡላቸው ለጠየቀው ሁሉ ፈገግ እያለ መናገር አይሰለቸውም፡፡ አፍሪካ በወጣትነት ዕድሜው የትውልድ ከተማው የምስራቅ ወለጋዋ ሊሙ ወረዳ፣ ገሊላ ከተማ ውስጥ የኦሮሞ ፌደራል ኮንግረስ (ኦፌኮ) ጽሕፈት ቤት ኃላፊ ነው፡፡ የተቃዋሚ ፓርቲ አመራር መሆን ብዙ መዘዝ በሚያስከትልበት አገር አፍሪካ በተስፋ ጽሕፈት ቤቱን በራሱ ያቋቋመው ‹የአካባቢው ሰው አማራጭ እንዲኖረው› በሚል ሐሳብ እንደሆነና፤ ከፓርቲው የማረጋጋጫ ፈቃድ ተቀብሎ በጽሕፈት ቤቱ ጊቢ ውስጥ የኦፌኮን አርማ የያዘ ሰንደቅ ዓላማ ከክልሉና ከብሔራዊው ሰንደቅ ጎን የሰቀለ እለት በወረዳዋ የተፈጠረው ትርምስን እያስታወሰ ፈገግ ይላል፡፡ ‹‹አፍሪካ የመረራን ባንዲራ ሰቀለ›› በሚል የወረዳው አመራሮች ተሰብስበው ምን ማድረግ እንዳለባቸው ተወያይተው ለጥቂት ቀናት ከታሰረ በኋላ በፓርቲው ጥረት ተፈቶ ወደስራ እንደገና አንደተመለሰ ይናገራል፡፡ ‹‹የእኛ ጽሕፈት ቤት መክፈት በወረዳው አመራሮች ለሚበደሉ ሰዎች ትልቅ ተስፋ ሁኖ ነበር›› ይላል አፍሪካ፡፡ እንዲያውም አንዳንዶች የመንግስት ሰራተኞች አለቆቻቸውን ‹‹አላሰራም የምትሉን ከሆነ አፍሪካ ጋር ሒደን እንሰራለን›› እያሉ ያስፋራሩ ነበር ይላል፡፡

ለአፍሪካ የፓርቲው መኖር ትልቁ ትርጉሙ ለዜጎች ተስፋ መስጠቱ ነበር፡፡ ከዚህ ተስፋ ጀርባ ደግሞ አንድ ስምን ደጋግሞ ያነሳል፤ መረራ ጉዲና፡፡ ‹‹ዶክተር ጋር ከደወልኩ የማንፈታው ችግር አልነበረም፡፡ የታሰሩ አባላቶቻችን በአንድ ስልክ ወዲያው ነበር የምናስፈታው›› ይላል መረራን እያወደሰ፡፡ በርግጥም አፍሪካ በወጣትነቱ ተስፋ ስለሰጡት ጎልማሳ መረራ ጉዲና አውርቶ አይጠግብም፡፡

የሦስት ጨቋኞች እስረኛ

መረራ ከ21 ዓመታት በፊት በሚያዚያ 1988 የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ኮንግረስን (ኦብኮ) ከሌሎች አጋሮቻቸው ጋር ሲመሰርቱ የሚጓዙት መንገድ ረጅም እና አስቸጋሪ ሊሆን እንደሚችል አልገመቱም ማለት አይቻልም፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ተማሪዎች እንቅስቃሴ ወቅት ከነበራቸው የፖለቲካ ተሳትፎ አንፃር እንዲሁም ኢሕአዴግ ስልጣን ከያዘበት ጊዜ ጀምሮ ለአምስት ዓመታት የኢሕአዴግ አካሔድ ትዝብታቸው ነበር ለዚህ ድምዳሜያቸው መሰረቱ፡፡

የንጉሱን አምባገነናዊ ስርዓት እንደ ዕድሜ አቻዎቻቸው በማርክሳዊ መንፈስ ተለክፈው ተቃውመው በመነሳት ገና በአስራዎቹ የዕድሜያቸው መጨረሻ ነበር በትውልድ አካባቢያቸው አምቦ ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ እስርን የቀመሱት፡፡እስራቸው አጭርና የማያስቆጭ እንደነበር ይናገራሉ፡፡ እንደማንኛውም የዘመናቸው ወጣት የሶሻሊዝምን ጠበል የተረጩት በዛው ዘመን ነበር፡፡ ‹እኔ› ማለት ትተው ‹እኛ› ማለት የጀመሩበት ዘመን፡፡ መታሰራቸው የፖለቲካ ፍላጎታቸው ጨመረው እንጅ አልቀነሰውም፡፡

መረራ ለሁለተኛ ጊዜ ሲታሰሩ አዲስ መንግስት ተቋቁሞ የእራሳቸውም የፖለቲካ ተሳትፎ በእጅጉ ከፍ ያለበት ወቅት ነበር፡፡ የመላው ኢትዮጵያ ሶሻሊስት ንቅናቄን (መኢሶንን) በዩንቨርስቲ የትምህርት ጊዜያቸው የተቀላቀሉት መረራ፤ ፓርቲያቸው ጨካኙን የደርግ ስርዓት ‹ይስተካከል ይሆናል› በሚል ተስፋ እየገሰፀ ለመደገፍ በወሰነው መሰረት ሁለት ዓመታት ያክል በስጋት ከኖረ በኋላ ደርግ ፊቱን ሲያዞርበት እርሳቸውም እንደ ማምለጥም እንደ ሽፍትነትም አሰኝቷቸው ሲሸሹ ከትውልድ ቀያቸው ብዙም ሳይርቁ ተያዙ፡፡ አሁን አልፎ ሲያስታውሱት የፓርቲያቸው አመራሮች ከመዲናዎ ወጥተው ሱሉልታ ላይ መያዛቸውን አስመልክቶ ‹‹የመኢሶን ሽፍትነት ከሱሉልታ አላለፈም›› ለሚሉት መረራ የእራሳቸው ሽፍትነት በመጠኑም ቢሆን የተሻለ ርቀት ተጉዞ ነበር፡፡

የመረራ ሁለተኛ እስር ግን እንደመጀመሪያ ቀላል አልነበረም፡፡ ከሰባት ዓመታት በላይ ታስረዋል፡፡ የታሰሩበትን ምክንያት በውሉ አልተነገራቸውም፡፡ ጓደኛቸው ‹‹ ‹ቀንደኛው ወንበዴው መረራ ጉዲና ከነሙሉ ትጥቁ በቁጥጥር ስር ዋለ› የሚል ፅሁፍ በወቅቱ አዲስ ዘመን ጋዜጣ ላይ ተፅፎ አይቻለሁ›› እያለ ይቀልድብኝ ነበር ይላሉ ስለተያዙበት ሁኔታ ሲተርኩ፡፡ በርግጥም ይህን መሰል ዜናዎች በወቅቱ በርከት ብለው ይታዩ ነበር፡፡ ‹‹ቀንደኛው ወንበዴ አሊ ፋሪስ ከግብረ አበሮቹ ጋር ተያዘ››፤ ‹‹በጢቾ ማማ አብዱልቃድር የተባለ ቀንደኛ ወንበዴ ከነመሳሪያው ተያዘ››፤ ‹‹በጀልዱ ወረዳ በ19 ወንበዴዎች ላይ አብዮታዊ እርምጃ ተወሰደ›› … የሚሉ ዜናዎች የመንግስታዊው ጋዜጣ የፊት ገፅ አድማቂዎች ነበሩ፡፡ ምንም እንኳን እርሳቸው በታሰሩበት ወቅት የታተሙትን መንግስታዊ ሕትመቶች የፊት ገፆች አስሰን ‹‹ቀንደኛው ወንበዴው መረራ ጉዲና ከነሙሉ ትጥቁ በቁጥጥር ስር ዋለ›› የሚለውን ዜና ማግኝት ባንችልም ግመታው (the claim) ከእውነታው ብዙም የራቀ ነው ማለት አንችልም፡፡

በርግጥ የመረራ የደርግ እስር ቤት የሰባት ዓመታት ቆይታ መረራን እጅግ ቀይረዋቸው ነበር፡፡ እርሳቸው እንደሚሉትም፡

ከአምቦ የተማሪዎች ንቅናቄ ተጀምሮ እዚህ አዲስ አበባ ዩኒቨርስቲም አልፌ፣ ሰባት ዓመት ታስሬ ስወጣ በጣም ካልተገፋሁ በስተቀር የጭንቀት ፖለቲካውን ትቼያለሁ፡፡ ትዝ ይለኛል ‹‹ወደድክም፤ ጠላህም መኢሶን ያሸንፋል!…›› እንዲህ ያለ ነገር በወጣትነታችን ጠንከር ባለ መንገድ ተከራክረናል፡፡ በዚያ ውስጥ የተለወጠ ህይወት ነው፡፡ አክርረህ የፈለከውን ያህል ብታቀርብ ዝም ብሎ ውሃ ልኩን አያልፍም፡፡ ስለዚህ፤ የማክረር ፖለቲካውን የተውኩት በተወሰነ ደረጃ በዚያ ሰባት ዓመት እስራት ነው፡፡ በእርግጥ፤ ብዙ ጊዜ ሞት አጋጥሞኛል፡፡ ከአምቦም፤ ደርግ ጽ/ቤትም፣ ቢያንስ ሶስት፣ አራት ግዜ ከሞት በዕድል አምልጬያለሁ፡፡ … ስለዚህ፤ በተለይ ላለፉት 40 ዓመታት የከረረ ፖለቲካችን የትም አላደረሰንም፡፡ ያ ያለፍንበት ሁለመናዬን ለውጦታል … አንዳንድ ግዜ ማክረሩን እየተውክ ስትመጣ ወደ ተፈጥሮ ትሄዳለህ፡፡

መረራ ሁሌ የሚሉት በአገራችን ፖለቲካ የጠፋውን የመሃል መንገድ ያገኙት በእስር ቤት ነበር፡፡ አክርሮ ጫፍ ላይ መቆሙ ለማንም አይጠቅምም ባዩ መረራ ከደርግ እስር የዛሬውን መረራ አገኙ፡፡ ‹‹እስር ቤት ሰውና እንስሳ ተቀራራቢ መሆናቸውን የተረዳውበት ቦታ ነው›› ለሚሉት መረራ የእስር ቤት መንፈስ ሰባሪነት ቢታያቸውም፤ ነገር ግን ስለእስራቸው ሁኔታ እየተቆጩ ሲናገሩ ብዙም አይሰሙም፡፡

ከደርግ የሰባት ዓመታት እስር ከተፈቱ ከሰላሳ አንድ ዓመታት በኋላ መረራ በድጋሚ ደርግን በተካው ኢሕአዴግ ታስረዋል፡፡ ሕገ መንግስቱ እንዲከበር ቀን ከሌት የሰሩ-የተናገሩት መረራ ‹‹ሕገ መንግስታዊ ስርዓቱን ለመናድ በመሞከር›› በሚል ክስ ቀርቦባቸው በድጋሚ ወደ እስር ተልከዋል፡፡ ‹‹ፅንፍ ይዘን እርስ በርሳችን መበላላቱ የትም አያደርሰንም››፤ ‹‹የእኔ ትውልድ የተሳሳተውን ስህተት መድገም የለብንም›› እያሉ ጠዋት ማታ የሚዘምሩት መረራ፤ ‹‹በቢሊዮን የሚቆጠር ንብረት ለመውደሙ ተጠያቂ ነህ›› ተብለው በእስር ይገኛሉ፡፡ ከትናንት እስከዛሬ በመብት ረገድ በአገሪቱ ውስጥ በመሰረታዊነት የተቀየረ ነገር ላለመኖሩ ከመረራ በላይ ማሳያ የለም፡፡

ከዶናልድ ሌቭን አምስት አስቆጭ የ50 ዓመታት እድሎች (five missed chances) ጋር በተመሳሳይ መረራ የአሁኗን ኢትዮጵያ ለመረዳት በተለያዩ ጽሁፎቻቸው መቶ ሃምሳ ዓመታትን ወደኋላ ተጎዘው ማየት ይመርጣሉ፡፡ መረራ ያለፉት መቶ ሃምሳ ዓመታት አገሪቱን ከማጠናከርና ሁሉም ዜጎች እኩል ዜግነት ተሰምቷቸው እንዳይኖሩ ያደረጉ አምስቱ ታላቅ ኪሳራዎች (the five grand failures) ነበሩ ይላሉ፡፡ ከቴዎድሮስ እስከ ምኒልክ፣ ከምኒልክ እስከ ጣሊያን የማይጨው ሽንፈት፣ ከጣልያን ወረራ ማግስት እስከ የዘውዳዊው አገዛዝ ማብቃት፣ የወታደራዊው መንግስት ዘመን እንዲሁም ኢሕአዴግ ስልጣን ከያዘበት ጊዜ ጀምሮ እስከአሁን ያሉትን አምስት የዘመናት ክፋዮች በተለያዩ የራሳቸው ምክንያቶች ለአገሪቱ መዳከም እና ለዜጎች ተስፋ ማጣት መሰረት ናቸው፤ ሁሉንም የአገሪቱን ልጆች ከማቀፍ (inclusiveness) ይልቅ፤ አንዱን አቅፎ ሌላውን የሚገፉ ሁነው አልፈዋል፤ አሁንም ቀጥለዋል ባይ ናቸው፡፡ ስርዓቶችን ለመተቸት የማይቸኩሉት መረራ ከነዚህ አምስት ውድቀቶች በሦስቱ በግል ደረጃ ታስረው ተሰቃይተዋል፡፡ አሁንም በእስር ቤት ከሺዎች የአምስተኛው ውድቀት ሰለባዎች ጋር የጎልማሳ እድሜያቸውን እየገፉ ነው፡፡

ሦስቱ መረራዎች: ምሁር፣ ፖለቲከኛ፣ አራማጅ

የምሑራን ፖለቲከኛነት (Intellectual Politician) ብዙ አወዛግቧል፤ እያወዛገበም ነው፡፡ ‹‹ምሁራን የፖለቲካ ተሳታፊዎች መሆን የለባቸውም›› የሚለውን ሃሳብ በዋናነት የሚያራግቡት አካላት ከስኬታማነታቸው ጋር በተያያዘ ትችታቸውን ያቀርባሉ፡፡ ምሁራን ሃሳባቸው ውስብስብ (complex) አድርገው ስለሚያቀርቡት ፖለቲካ ከሚፈልገው ከብዝሃው (irrational actors) ጋር በሚያግባባ ቋንቋ መነጋገር አይችሉም፤ መልዕክታቸውንም በሚገባ ማስተላለፍ አይችሉም፡፡ በዚህ ሁኔታ ደግሞ ስኬታማ የፖለቲካ ሕይወት አይኖራቸውም የሚለው የመጀመሪያው ነው፡፡ ትችቱ ብዙ እውነታ ቢኖረውም እንደ መረራ ያሉት ላይ ሲደርስ ውሃ የማያነሳ ሁኖ እናገኘዋለን፡፡ ‹‹አካዳሚውንም ፖለቲካውንም በሚዛናዊነት ለማስኬድ ሞክሬያለሁ›› የሚሉት መራራ በግብራቸው ሲመዘኑ ይህ አባባላቸው እጅግ እውነት እንደሆነ መረዳት ይቻላል፡፡ እርሳቸው ‹መለስተኛ ጦርነት› በሚሉት የኢሕአዴግ የምርጫ ወቅት እንደ ሰለጠነው የዴሞክራሲ አገራት ምርጫ የምርጫ ክልላቸውን በአራት አቅጣጫ እየዞሩ ሕዝብ የሚቀሰቅሱ ፖለቲከኛ፤ በምርጫ ክርክር ወቅት እንደ ምሁር እነሮበርት ዳሃልን እየጠቀሱ – እንደ ፖለቲከኛ ሰፊው መራጭ ሕዝብ በሚገባው ለዘኛ ቋንቋ (witty) እየተናገሩ መራጭ የሚጠሩ ምሁር-ፖለቲከኛ፤ አባላት ታሰሩ በተባሉ ቁጥር እንደ አራማጅ (activist) ሰልፍና ዘመቻ የሚመሩ ሰው ናቸው መረራ፡፡

‹‹በአጼው ጊዜ ድንጋይ ከሚወረውሩ ተማሪዎች አንዱ ነበርኩ›› የሚሉት መረራ አሁን ጎልማሳ ምሁር እስከሆኑበት ጊዜ ድረስ መሬት ላይ ስራ ከመስራት ውጭ መናገሩ ብቻ ለውጥ የለውም በማለት እስከታች ወርደው መቀስቀስ ማደራጀትን በዋና ግብነት ይዘው የኖሩት:: አምስቱ የኢሕአዴግ መዋቅሮች (the five-tiers of government) ማለትም፡ ፌደራል መንግስት፣ የክልል መንግስታት፣ ዞኖች፣ ወረዳዎችና እንዲሁም ቀበሌዎችን በቻሉት መጠን እንዴት ሰብሮ መግባት እንደሚቻል እንደፖለቲከኛ ሲወጥኑ እንደ አራማጅ መሬት ወርደው ሲለፉ፣ እንዲሁም እንደ ምሁር ሲጽፉ ሲናገሩ ኑረዋል–መረራ።

ኢሕአዴግ የመረራን አንድም ሶስትምነትን አልወደደውም፡፡ ለዚህም ይመስላል መረራ አንድ ነገር በተናገሩ ቁጥር ትችትና ስላቅ የሚያዘወትረው መንግስታዊው አዲስ ዘመን ጋዜጣ በተለያየ ጊዜ ምሁርነታቸው ላይ ‹‹የሻዕቢያው ባለሟል ዶክተር››፤ ‹‹ዘርጣጩ ዶክተር››፤ ‹‹ጥገኛው ዶክተር››፤ ‹‹ፊደላዊ ምሁር›› እና የመሳሰሉትን ስድብና ስላቅ ሲያወርድባቸው የሚታየው፡፡ ሌላው ቀርቶ በልፋታቸው ያገኙትን የዶክተርነት ማዕረግ እንኳን በሹማምንቱ የሚፃፉት ጽሁፎች ‹ዶክተር› የሚለውን ማዕረጋቸውን በተጠራጣሪነት በትምዕርተ-ጥቅስ ውስጥ ነው የሚጠቀሙት፡፡ በሳል (seasoned) ፖለቲከኝነታቸውን በማጣጣል ‹‹ፖለቲከኛው ኮሜዲያን››፣ ‹‹የዶክተሩን ዘፈን አንድና አንድ ብቻ ነው — ሥልጣን›› የመሳሰሉትን በማለትም የመንግስት አካላት ይዘባበቱባቸዋል፡፡

ፕሌቶ ምሁርና ፈላስፋን በለየበት መልኩ መረራ ምሁር ነው:: ምሁር እውቀቱን ለጥቅም የሚገለገል ነው ነበር የፕሌቶ የምሁር ትርጉም ከፈላስፋ አንፃር ሲቀመጥ፡፡ በሌላ አነጋገር መረራ ከምቹ የምሁር ዳተኞች (Ivory-tower Intellectuals) በተለየ መልኩ የተማሩትን እንደ ምሁር የሚያስተምሩ፣ ያወቁትን ‹ይህች መከረኛ አገራችን› የሚሏትን አገር ለማሻሻል የሚጠቀሙ እንዲሁም እንደ አራማጅ እውቀታቸውን መሬት ወርደው ለመተገበር የሚዘምቱ ናቸው፡፡ የመረራ የግማሽ ምዕተ ኣመታት ሁሉን አቀፍ ተሞክሮን አይተን ‹ዓላማቸው ስልጣን ብቻ ነው›፣ ‹ምሁርነታቸው ፊደላዊ ነው› … እያለ የሚተችን ስርዓት ከመታዘብ ባለፈ ምን ማለት እንደሚቻል ግራ አጋቢ ነው፡፡

ሦስቱ የመረራ ትዝብቶች: የፌደራል ሥርዓት፣ የብዝሃ-ፓርቲ ዴሞክራሲ፣ የነፃ ገበያ ሥርዓት

ከአርባ ዓመታት በላይ የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካን በንቃት እንደተከታተሉት መረራ የአሁኑን አሳሪያቸውን ኢሕአዴግን በሚገባ የሚያውቀው ሌላ ሰው የለም ማለት ግነት አይሆንም፡፡ መረራ ኢሕአዴግን እንዲሁ በጭፍን አልጠሉትም፡፡ ቀርበው አይተው ምን ይዞ-ምን ያስፈፅማል የሚለውን ገምግመው ነው የኢሕአዴግ ተቃውሞ-ትዝብታቸውን በተለያዩ መንገዶች የሚያቀርቡት፡፡

ኢሕአዴግን መቃወም እንዴት እንደጀመሩ ሲጠየቁ ሰከን ብለው ‹‹ጫካ እያሉ እደግፋቸው ነበር›› የሚሉት መረራ ሐሳባቸውን ሲያብራሩም ‹‹[ኢሕአዴግ ስልጣን በያዘበት ወቅት የገባው] ቃል ኪዳን ጥሩ ነበር። የብሔረሰቦችን እኩልነት እናመጣለን። ዴሞክራሲያዊ ስርዓት እናመጣለን። የእዝ ኢኮኖሚን አስወግደን በተሻለ መንገድ የገበያ ስርዓት እንድንመራ እናደርጋለን ያሏቸው ቃል ኪዳኖች [ሁሉ] በጣም ጥሩ ነበሩ›› በማለት ነው፡፡ ነገር ግን ይህ ተስፋቸው ለመጨለም ብዙም ጊዜ አልፈጀትም፡፡ በኢሕአዴግ ተከፍተው ተቃውሟቸውን ስለጀመሩበት ሁኔታ ሲናገሩ ‹‹ከኢሕአዴግ ጋር የተለያየነው ‹ከጁላዩ ኮንፈረንስ› በዃላ ነው›› ምክንያቱም ‹‹የጁላዩ ኮንፈረንስ የሚባለውም የኢሕአዴግ ሰርግ ነበር›› ይላሉ፡፡፡፡ ‹የጁላዩ ቲያትር› እያሉ በተደጋጋሚ የሚጠሩት የሽግግር መንግስቱ ጉባኤ ኢሕአዴግ ካለፉት አስከፊ ስርዓቶች የማይሻል መሆኑን ያመላከታቸው እንደሆነ ይገልፃሉ፡፡ ከዚህም ተነስተው ‹‹ከዚህ በኋላ ኢሕአዴግ የትም አይደርስም የሚል መደምደሚያ ላይ የደረስኩት ለዚህ ነው›› ይላሉ፡፡

ኢሕአዴግ የሚመራውን ስርዓት ለመታገል ወስነው ከጓዶቻቸው ጋር የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ኮንግረስን (ኦብኮ) ሲመሰርቱ ኢሕአዴግ የአምስት ዓመታት ዕድሜ አስቆጥሮ የነበረ ሲሆን የፌደራል ስርዓትና በይዘቱ ክፉ የማይባል ሕገ-መንግስት አፅድቆ ነበር፡፡ ‹‹ኢሕአዴግ በመጀመሪያዎቹ ዓመታት በሕዝብ ልብ ውስጥ ገብቶ ነበር ብለው ያምናሉ?›› ተብለው ሲጠየቁ መረራ ገላጭ በሆነ መልኩ ‹‹ተንደርድሮ ነበር ባይ ነኝ›› ይላሉ፡፡ ተንደርድሮ ሕዝብ ልብ ውስጥ ከመግባት ይልቅ ግን በሒደት እንደታዘብነው የሕዝብ ልብን የሚወጋ ስርዓት መሆኑ ነው የመረራ ተስፋን ያጨለመው፡፡

ያወጣውን ሕግ የማይኖረው ኢህአዴግ ከሕዝብ ጋር ለመጣላት ረጅም ጊዜ እንዳልወሰደበት የሚያትቱት መረራ በተለይም ግን በሦስት ጉዳዮች ላይ ኢሕአዴግ የተነሳበትን ዓላማ ስቶ እንደወደቀ ይገልፃሉ፡ የፌደራል ስርዓት ፣ የብዝሃ-ፓርቲ ስርዓት፣ የነፃ ገበያ ስርዓት፡፡ ለመረራ ኢሕአዴግ የፌደራል ስርዓትን በሞግዚት አስተዳደር፤ የብዝሃ-ፓርቲ ዴሞክራሲን በይስሙላ የዴሞክራሲ ስርዓት እንዲሁም የነፃ ገበያ ስርዓትን በመንግስታዊ ካፒታሊዝም ተክቶ ከሦሰት ያጣ የምርጫ አምባገነን (electoral authoritarianism) ሥርዓት ሁኗል፡፡ ለዛም ነው መረራ ከ20 ዓመታት በፊት የኢሕአዴግን በሕግና በመርህ አልገዛም ባይነት ተመልክተው ‹‹የኢሕአዴግን ልብ እግዚአብሔርም አላወቀውም ሳይንስም አልደረሰበትም›› በማለት የሥርዓቱን መርህ አልባ አይገመቴነት (unpredictability) የገለፁት፡፡

ኢሕአዴግ በየዘመናቱ ተለዋዋጭ፤ ስልጣኑን እስከ አስጠበቀለት ድረስ ምንም ከማድረግ የማይመለስ ሥርዓት ነው ባይ ናቸው መረራ፡፡ ኢሕአዴግን ሦስት አስርት ሊደፍን ጫፍ ላይ በደረሰው የሥልጣን ዘመኑ መመዘን የሚመርጡት መረራ ‹‹ኢሕአዴግ …›› ይላሉ ‹‹ኢሕአዴግ እስከ ምርጫ 97 ድረስ ‹‹ፈሪሃ እግዚአብሔር›› እንኳን ባይኖረው ‹‹ፈሪሃ ፈረንጅ›› ነበረው፣ ነውር የሚባልም ነገር ትንሽ ነበረው፡፡ ከ[97] በኋላ ግን ነውር ተወ›› ባይ ናቸው፡፡ አክለውም ከምርጫ 97 በኋላ ያለው ኢሕአዴግ የተነሳባቸውን ቀልብ የሚስቡ መርሆች ብቻ የተወ ሳይሆን በዓለም ላይ ብዙም ያልተለመዱ አዳዲስ የአፈናን ዘዴዎችን ይዞ የመጣ ሥርዓት ነው ባይ ናቸው፡፡ መረራ በፃፏቸው የተለያዩ የምርምር ሥራዎች ላይ ‹‹የኢሕአዴግ ፈጠራ›› (the EPRDF novelty) በማለት የሚጠሯቸው ዓለም ላይ ብዙም ያልተለመዱ የአገዛዝ ዘዴዎችን ይተነትናሉ፡፡

ከዚህም በመነሳት ኢሕአዴግ የፌደራል ሥርዓቱን ወደ የሞግዚት አገዛዝነት የቀየረው ባልተለመደ ሁኔታ ሕዝባዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ፓርቲዎችን (በእንግሊዝኛው People’s Democratic Organizations (PDOs) ከማዕከል ሆኖ በመፍጠር ክልሎችን በቁጥጥር ስር አድርጎ የተዘረጋው የፌደራል ሥርዓት የሞግዚት አስተዳደር እንዲሆን በማድረግ ነው ባይ ናቸው፡፡ የብዝሃ-ፓርቲ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሥርዓትን ደግሞ የምዕራቡን ዓለም ሊበራል ዴሞክራሲ መርሆዎች ወረቀት ላይ ተቀብያለሁ በማለት ከምስራቁ ዓለም አብዮታዊ ዴሞክራሲ እየማለ የትም አገር ባልተለመደ ሁኔታ እሳትና ውሃን አዳቅሎ ለመራመድ ሲሞክር የአገሪቱን ዴሞክራሲ የይስሙላ አድርጎታል ባይ ናቸው መረራ፡፡ መረራ ሦስተኛው የኢሕአዴግ ፈጠራ የሚሉት የነፃ ገበያ ሥርዓትን ተጠቅሞ ኢኮኖሚውን እንደፈለጉ ለሚጋልቡ የፓርቲ ስሪት ነጋዴዎች አስረክቦ ካፒታሊዝምን የሚዘመር፤ ግን የእዝ ኢኮኖሚ የሚተገብር ቢሮክራሲ መፍጠሩን ነው፡፡ ኢሕአዴግ እነዚህን ድቅል ባህሪያቱን መተውን የሚጠራጠሩት መረራ፤ እነዚህን ባህሪዎች የያዘ ስርዓት ደግሞ አገሪቱንና ሕዝቧን ዘላቂ ሰላምና ዴሞክራሲ ያመጣላታል ብለው አያምኑም፡፡

ሁሌም ቢሆን ‹‹ኢሕአዴግ ዳኛም ተጫዋችም ነው›› የሚሉት መረራ፤ ሥርዓቱ በቃሉ የማይውል መሆኑን ሲገልፁ ‹‹እግዚአብሔር ከሰማይ ወርዶ ለሕዝቡ ‹‹ኢሕአዴግን እመን›› ብሎ ቢናገር እንኳ ሕዝቡ የሚያምን አይመስለኝም›› የሚል ብይን ይሰጣሉ፡፡ ከመታሰራቸው ከጥቂት ሳምንታት በፊት መንግስታዊው አዲስ ዘመን ጋዜጣ ‹‹በውጭ አገር ያሉ ፖለቲከኞች ይሄን ይሄን ብለዋል›› ምን ይላሉ በሚል ለትንኮሳ በጠየቃቸው ወቅት የሚታገሉትን አካል በሚገባ የሚያውቁት መረራ «አንድ ሰው […] ኢትዮጵያ ትበታተናለች ስላለ ኢትዮጵያ አትበታተንም። ኢትዮጵያ ከተበተነች ኃላፊነቱ በዋናነት ደግሞ የኢሕአዴግ ነው» በማለት ለገዥው ሥርዓት ተጠያቂነትን አዙረው መስጠትን ያውቁበታል መረራ፡፡ ‹‹ለቲያትር የሚሰለጥኑ›› የሚሏቸውን የኢሕአዴግ ካድሬዎችም ሆነ ራሱ ኢሕአዴግን ሲተቹ ዘልቆ በሚያቃጥል ቋንቋ ነው፡፡ ፓርቲያቸው በመሬት ባለቤትነት ጉዳይ ያለውን አቋም አስመልክቶ ‹‹መሬት በሕዝቡና በመንግሥት ይተዳደር ማለታችሁ ከኢህአዴግ ጋር ያመሳስላችኋል ማለት ነው?›› ተብለው ሲጠየቁ እድል የማያባክኑት መረራ በፍጥነት ‹‹ይህ ቢሆንም ኢህአዴግ ግን መሬትን ለካድሬዎች ነው ያደረገው›› ብለው ነገሮችን ቶሎ ወደ ኢሕአዴግ ሥርዓት ይገፉታል፡፡ ይህን የመረራን አይበገሬ የረጅም ዘመን ተቃውሞ ለማጣጣል በሚመስል መልኩ የገዥው ስርዓት የተለያዩ ድምፆች ‹ምላሳቸው ወጌሻ ያስፈልገዋል›፣ ‹ያገኙትን ቃላት በመመለጠፍ የሚታወቁትና ያልተገራ ምላስ ባለቤት›፣ ‹ዘርጣጩ ዶክተር› እና የመሳሰሉትን ተራ ስድቦች በመንግስታዊ ሚዲያዎች ሲያዘንቡባቸው ይታያል፡፡

ኢሕአዴግ ደርግን ማስወገዱን በመልካም የሚወስዱት መረራ ‹‹ቢያንስ ቢያንስ ግን ደርግን ስንታገል ለነበርነው ኃይሎች ደርግን ማስወገዳቸው በየትኛውም ሚዛን ትልቅ ድል ነው›› ይላሉ፡፡ ‹‹[ነገር] ግን ደርግ የሰራውን ስህተት በቪዲዮ እያየ እሱኑ መድገሙ ትልቅ ወንጀል ነው። ይህን ስህተት ካላረመ [ኢሕአዴግ] ከደርግ የተሻለ የታሪክ ስፍራ ይኖረዋል የሚል ግምት ለመስጠት ያስቸግራል›› በማለት ኢሕአዴግን ይበይኑታል፡፡ የኢትዮጵያን ያለፉት አርባ ዓመታት የፖለቲካ ታሪክ ለሚከታተል ሰው ከዚህ የመረራ ፍርድ የተሻለ ፍትሃዊ ፍርድ ለመፍረድ ያስቸግራል፡፡

መራራ የሚማፀኗቸው ሦስት አይነት ልኂቃን

በአንድ አገር ውስጥ ለሚፈጠረው በጎም ሆነ መጥፎ ነገር እንደ አገሪቱ ልኂቃን (elites) ወሳኝ ሚና የሚጫወት የሕብረተሰብ ክፍል እንደሌለ መረራ አበክረው የሚናገሩ-የሚፅፉበት ርዕሰ-ጉዳይ ነው፡፡ በዚህ ረገድ ገዥውን ስርዓት ከመንቀፍ-መውቀሳቸው ባለፈ በአገሪቱ እጣ ፋንታ ላይ ወሳኝ ሚና ይጫወታሉ/እየተጫወቱ ነው ብለው የሚያምኗቸውን የሦሰት ዘውግ ልኂቃንን አገሪቱ ለገባችበት ማጥ ተጠያቂ ያደርጋሉ፡፡

‹‹እውነት እንነጋገር ከተባለ›› በማለት የሚጀምሩት መረራ በመጀመሪያ ‹‹የትግራይ ልኂቃን … የሚባሉት፤ ሰማይ ምድር ገብተው [አሁን የያዙትን ስልጣን] ለመጠበቅ እንደሚንቀሳቀሱ ይታወቃል፡፡ እግዚአብሔር ይወቀው እንጂ ለዛሬው እሱ ነው ዋናው ስራቸው›› የሚሉት መረራ የትግራይ ልኂቃን አሁን ያላቸውን የበላይነት ላለማሰነጠቅ ግብግብ ውስጥ እንደሆኑ ይገልጻሉ፡፡ አስከትለውም ‹‹የኦሮሞ ልኂቃን የሚባሉት አሁንም ቢሆን ብዙ ቦታ ኢትዮጵያ የምትባለውን መስማት አይፈልጉም፡፡ ኢትዮጵያ የምትባለውን በሀገር ደረጃ ለውጦ ለሁላችንም የምትሆን ኢትዮጵያን ለመፍጠር ሲንቀሳቀሱ አይታዩም›› በማለት ‹‹የኦሮሞ ልኂቃን በአገሪቱ ሁኔታ ላይ አኩርፈው እሰከመቼ ይዘልቃሉ;›› በሚል ይጠይቃሉ፡፡ መረራ በልኂቃኑ ላይ ያላቸውን ትችስ ሲያሰልሱም ‹‹የአማራ ልኂቃን የሚባሉት ደግሞ ‹‹ኢትዮጵያን የፈጠርኩ እኔ ነኝ›› በሚል አይነት፤ ከዚያም፤ ከላይም፤ ከታችም፤ ከዚህም፤ ከሁሉም ቦታ ‹‹እኛ የፈጠርናት ኢትዮጵያ ልትጠፋብን ነው›› ወደሚል፤ አንዳንድ ጊዜም ‹‹የኢትዮጵያዊነት ሠርተፍኬት ሰጪና ከልካይ እኔ ነኝ›› ብሎ፤ ራሱን ሰይሞ ማዶ ቆሟል›› በማለት ‹‹የአማራ ልኂቃን ‹አገሪቱ የእኛ ናት ብለው› እስከመቼ ነው የሚቀጥሉት?›› ብለው ይጠይቃሉ፡፡

የአገሪቱን ውጣ ውረድ የበዛበት ታሪክ ከሰፊው ሕዝብ አኗኗር ይልቅ በየዘመኑ የሕዝብ ወኪል ነን ብለው በወጡ ልኂቃን መነጽር ለሚመለከቱት መረራ የነዚህ ሦስት ልኂቃን እሰጥ አገባ የሁሌም ጭንቀታቸው ነው፡፡ ‹‹በግልፅ ቋንቋ …›› ይላሉ መረራ ሐሳባቸውን ሲያጠናክሩ፤ ‹‹በግልፅ ቋንቋ የትግራይ ልኂቃን ስልጣኑን የሙጥኝ ካሉ፣ የአማራ ልሂቃን ‹ትናንትን እመልሳለሁ› የሚሉ ከሆነ፣ እንዲሁም የኦሮሞ ልኂቃን ‹ከኢትዮጵያ እገነጠላለሁ› እያሉ የሚቀጥሉ ከሆነ ለልጆቻችን ስቃይን ነው የምናወርሳቸው›› በማለት መጭው ዘመን የነዚህ ሦስት ዘውግ ልኂቃን ግንኙነት ላይ የሚመሰረት እንደሆነ አጽንኦት ይሰጣሉ፡፡ የአገሪቱ የቅርብ ዓመታት የታሪክ ዕዳም የነዚህ ልኂቃን ቁርሾ እንደሆነ ይናገራሉ መረራ፡ ‹‹[በእኔ እምነት] ኢትዮጵያ አስቸጋሪ ችግር ውስጥ የገባችው […] ከሁሉም በላይ በእነዚህ ሦስቱ የትግራይ፣ የአማራና የኦሮሞ ሊኂቃን በሚፈጥሩት ፍጭትና ግጭት ነው፡፡ አገሪቷን ወደሌላ አቅጣጫ እንጂ የጋራ አቅጣጫን ወደምንገፋበት አላመጣንም፡፡ ላለፉት 40 ዓመታት በእሱ ላይ ነው የኖርነው […] [በዚህም ምክንያት] ስለወደፊቷም ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ አመለካከት ለመያዝና መፍትሔውም ላይ አንድ መሆን አልቻለንም፡፡››

መረራ ያላቸውን ተስፋ ከነዚህ ተፎካካሪ (competing) ልኂቃን ውጭ ይመስላል፡፡ ለዛም ነው ‹‹በእውነት ለመናገር የደቡብ ሊኂቃን ላይ ብዙ ችግር አላይባቸውም›› የሚሉት፡፡ የኢትዮጵያ ልኂቃን የፖለቲካ አሰላለፍ በትግራይ ልኂቃን የበላይ ነን (hegemonic) ባይነት፣ በአማራ ልኂቃና ትናንት ናፋቂነት (nostalgic) እንዲሁም በኦሮሞ ልኂቃን እገነጠላለሁ (secessionist) ባይነት ምክንያት መታለፍ ያለበትን ወንዝ መሻገር ባለመቻሉ ወንዙ ከጊዜ ወደጊዜ እየሞላ መሻገር የማይቻል እንዳይሆን የመረራ ስጋት ነው፡፡

መረራ መፍትሔ ነው ብለው ለረጅም ጊዜያት የያዙት ‹የመሀል መንገድ ፖለቲካም› የሚቀዳው ከዚህ ለረጅም ጊዜ አብሯቸው ካለ ፍራቻ እና ስጋት ይመስላል፡፡ ለዛም ነው ሁሉም ወደ መሀል መጥቶ ‹‹ … አንዱ ሌላውን ለመግዛት ያለውን ሕልም ካላቆመ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሥርዓትን በኢትዮጵያ ለመገንባት የሚደረገው ትግል ከሕልምነት የሚያልፍ አይመስለኝም›› የሚሉት፡፡ የሦስቱ ዘውጎች ልኂቃን ወደመሃል መጥተው በሚያኗኑሯቸው ጉዳዮች ላይ ተስማምተው ካልቀጠሉ ያገሪቱ ሕልውና ያሳስባቸዋል፡፡ እርሳቸው በሚወክሉት የኦሮሞ ሕዝብ መሃል ባሉ ተፎካካሪ ኃይላት መካከል ሳይቀር የመሃል መንገድ ጠፍቷል በማለት ፓርቲያቸውን እንደመሰረቱት ነው የሚገልጹት፡፡

ይሄን የኦሮሞ ፖለቲካ ውስጥ ያላቸውን የመሃል መንገድነት ሲያስረዱም ‹‹የኦሮሞ ፖለቲካ ውስጥም ሁለት ጫፎች አሉ፡፡ እኛ እዚህ መሐል ነን፡፡ መሐሉን እንዲሰፋ ደግሞ እየገፋን ነን›› በማለት ነው፡፡ ይሄም ማለት ‹‹በአንድ በኩል የመንግስት የገዥው ፓርቲ አሽከር ነው የምንለው ወይም የኦሮሞ ህዝብ አብዛኛው የሚለው ‹‹ኦህዴድ›› አለ፡፡ ጠዋትና ማታ የሚያስበው ኢህአዴግን ማገልገልና ኢህአዴግ ሥልጣን ላይ እንዴት ይቆይ እንጂ የኦሮሞ ጥያቄ የሚባለውን፤ መጀመሪያውንም ያንን ይዞ መፈጠሩን እርግጠኛ አይደለሁም፡፡ አሁንም ቢሆን ያንን እየገፋ አይደለም›› በማለት ገዥውን ኦሕዴድ አምርረው የሚተቹት መረራ፤ ‹‹በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ …›› ይላሉ፤ ‹‹በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ የኦሮሞ ብሔርተኞች ኦነግን ጨምሮ ሌሎች አሉ፡፡ እነሱ ደግሞ ‹‹ኢትዮጵያዊ›› የሚባለውን የጋራ የፖለቲካ አጀንዳ መያዝ አቅቷቸዋል፡፡ ያንን የጋራ የፖለቲካ አጀንዳ ይዞ ለኦሮሞውም፣ ለተቀረውም የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ የሚሻል የጋራ አጀንዳ መግፋትም አልተሳካላቸውም›› ብለው ይተቻሉ፡፡ ሐሳባቸውን የሚያሳርጉት ‹‹እኛ (ፓርቲያቸውን ማለታቸው ነው) እዚህ መሐል ነው ያለነው›› በማለት ነው፡፡

መረራ ‹‹አመቻማች የመሃል መንገድ መርጣችሁ በሰላማዊ ትግል ስም ለገዥው ሥርዓት ቅቡልነት ከመፍጠር ያለፈ ምንም እየሰራችሁ አይደለም›› ሲባሉ፤ ‹‹በርግጥ አንዳንዶች ሠላማዊ ትግል እያላችሁ፤ ሠላማዊ እንቅልፍ ላይ ናችሁ›› ይሉናል በማለት በራሳቸው ላይ እየቀለዱ፤ ነገር ግን ‹‹የፅንፍ ፖለቲካ የአገሪቱ ያለፈው ግማሽ ምዕተ ዓመት እዳ ሁኖ ቆይቷል ከዛ መውጣት መጀመር አለብን›› እያሉ ከመናገር አይቦዝኑም፡፡ የሚማፀኗቸው የሦስት ዘውግ የፖለቲካ ልኂቃን ተስማምተው ማየት የዘወትር ሕልማቸው ነው፡፡ እውን መሆኑ ግን እራሳቸውን ጨምሮ ለብዙዎች አስጨናቂ ጉዳይ ነው፡፡

የመረራ ሦስት መፍትሔዎች: ዴሞክራሲ፣ ‹ሃቅ›፣ ትብብር

ይሔን ጽሑፍ ስጽፍ መረራ በሕይወት ዘመናቸው የፃፏቸውን ከአስር በላይ ‹አካዳሚያዊ› ፅሁፎች፤ አራቱን መጽሐፎቻቸውን እንዲሁም ባለፉት ሐያ ዓመታት ውስጥ በተለያዩ ሁኔታዎች የሰጧቸውን ከሐያ በላይ ቃለ-ምልልሶች ለማየት ሞክሬያለሁ፡፡ መረራ የፃፏው አካዳሚያዊ ፅሁፎችም ሆኑ በተለያዩ መድረኮች ያቀረቧቸው ጽሑፎች ከሶስቱ ውጭ (ሁለት የኦሮሞ የፖለቲካ ኃይሎችን የተመለከቱ እንዲሁም አንድ የጉራጌ ባሕላዊ ተቋማትን የተመለከተ) ሁሉም ጽሑፎቻቸው ባንድም ሆነ በሌላ መንገድ የሚያተኩሩት በዴሞክራሲ፣ ምርጫ እና የሽግግር ጉዳዩች ላይ ነው፡፡ በጽሑፎቻቸው እና በቃለ-ምልልሶቻቸው አንድ መረዳት የሚቻለው ነገር የመረራን እውናዊነት (Realist) ነው፡፡ በጽሑፎቻቸው የሚያዘወትሯት ‘modus operandi’ የተባለች የላቲን ሐረግ የሰውየውን የትኩረት አቅጣጫ አመላካች ነች፡፡ የፖለቲካ ጉዳዮች ላይ ከመብሰልሰል ይልቅ ለተግባራዊ መፍትሔ የሚተጉ ናቸው፡፡ ምሁሩ መረራ ፖለቲከኛው መረራን ለተግባራዊነት የሚረዱ ናቸው፡፡

የአገሪቱን የፖለቲካ ሒደት ስለማስተካከል በማሰብ መረራ በሐሳብ ደረጃ በሥራዎቻቸው ሁሉ የሚያተኩሩባቸው ሦስት መሠረታዊ ነጥቦችን ነው፡፡ ዴሞክራሲ፣ ሃቅ፣ እና ትብብር፡፡ ይህን ሐሳባቸውን በአንድ አንቀጽ ሲጠቀልሉት ‹‹ፖለቲካ በአጠቃላይና የአገራችን ፖለቲካ በተለይ እስከገባኝ ድረስ፣ የአገራችን ፖለቲካ ከገባበት ቅርቃር ውስጥ የሚወጣው ወይ እኛ ኢሕአዴግን ከገባበት ቅርቃር ለማስወጣት የሚያስችል የተባበረ ትግል ውስጥ በቁርጠኝነትና በሐቅ መግባት አለብን፣ ወይ የኢሕአዴግ መሪዎች ከንጉሡም፣ ከደርግም ተምረው ከሌሎች ኃይሎች ጋር ብሔራዊ መግባባት ፈጥረው አገሪቷንና ሕዝቦቿን ለመታደግ የፖለቲካ ቁርጠኝነት በማሳየት እውነተኛ ዴሞክራሲን ሲያሰፍኑ ነው›› በማለት ነው፡፡

መረራ ዴሞክራሲ ሲሉ በዋናነት ኢሕአዴግ በወረቀት ቃል ገብቶ በተግባር የወደቀበትን በአገሪቱ የዴሞክራሲ መሠረት መዘርጋትን ነው፡፡ የቱንም ያክል የኢሕአዴግ መሪዎችና ሰነዶች ዴሞክራሲ ዴሞክራሲ ቢሉም በተግባር ግን ፈላጭ ቆራጭ እስከሆኑ ድረስ የራሳቸውን ወንበር አስጠብቀው ለራሳቸው ልጆች የተዳከመችና ኢ-ዴሞክራሲያዊ አገር አስረክበው ነው የሚያልፉት ባይ ናቸው መረራ፡፡ ሌላው መረራ ዴሞክራሲን በመፍትሔነት የሚያቀርቡለት አካል የተቃውሞ ኃይሉን ነው፡፡ የተቃውሞ ኃይሉ ሊለወጡ ከማይችሉ/ከሚያስቸግሩ የልዩነት ወንዞች ተሻግሮ ዴሞክራሲን በሐሳብ ደረጃ እንደ ግብ ቢይዝ ልዩነቶችን ማጥበብና ገዥውን ሥርዓት መግፋት አይሳነውም ይላሉ፡፡

ሌላው የመረራ የመፍትሄ ሐሳብ ደግሞ ፖለቲካ ከሚተገበርበት አግባብ አኳያ የሚያቀርቡት ሐሳብ ነው፡፡ መረራ በተለያዩ ሥራዎቻችውና ቃለምልልሶቻቸው ‹ሃቅ› የምትል ቃል ሲጠቀሙ ይስተዋላል፡፡ ሐቀኛ ዴሞክራሲ፣ ሐቀኛ ፌደራሊዝም፣ ሐቀኛ ምርጫ፣ ሐቀኛ ተቃዋሚ … የመሳሰሉት፡፡ አንድ ሐሳብ ምን መልካም መስሎ ቢታይ ስለእውነት በእውነት የማይተገበር ከሆነና ሕዝብን ለማታለያነት የሚውል ከሆነ በረጅም ጊዜ ሂደት እጅግ አደገኛ መዘዝ ይዞ ይመጣል ባይ ናቸው መረራ፡፡ አዘውትረው ‹‹ዩጎስላቪያ የተበተነቸው እኮ በውሸት ፌደራሊዝም እና በውሽት ዴሞክራሲ ጦስ ነው›› ለሚሉት መረራ ፖለቲካ ያለሐቅ በጣም አደገኛ እንደሆነ ከመናገር ተቆጥበው አያውቁም፡፡

በሦስተኝነት መረራ እንደመፍትሔ በተደጋጋሚ ሲጠቅሱ የሚታዩት የመተባበርን ጠቀሜታ ነው፡፡ ‹‹ለእኔ ርዕዮተዓለም ያን ያህል አያስጨንቀኝም›› ለሚሉት መረራ በሚያግባቡ መሠረታዊ ጉዳዮች ላይ ከማንም ጋር አብረው የመስራት አስፈላጊነት ለነገ የሚባል ጉዳይ አይደለም፡፡ ለዚህ ጥሩ ማሳያ ይሆን ዘንድ ከተመሰረተ አስር ዓመት ገደማ ያስቆጠረውን የእርሳቸው ፓርቲ በአሁኑ ወቅት አባል የሆነበትን የኢትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዴሚክራሲያዊ አንድነት መድረክን (መድረክ) እንደምሳሌ ያነሳሉ፡፡ ‹‹መድረክ ውስጥ….›› ይላሉ መረራ መድረክ ውስጥ […] ‹ሶሻል ዴሞክራት ነን› የሚሉ አሉ፤ ‹ሊበራል ዴሞክራት ነን› የሚሉ አሉ፡፡ ‹ሁሉንም አንቀበልም› የምንለው[ም] አለን››፡፡ በመሆኑም ለመተባበር በሁሉም ጉዳዮች ላይ የግድ ተመሳሳይ አስተሳሰቦች እንዲኖሩ አይጠበቅም ባይ ናቸው፡፡

ይሄን ሐሳባቸውን ሲያጠናክሩም ‹‹የሁላችንም የፖለቲካ መንግሥተ ሰማያት ሁላችንንም በእኩልነት የምታስተናግድ ዴሞክራሲያዊት ኢትዮጵያን ለመፍጠር ለነገ የምንለው መሆን የለበትም። የጋራ የታሪክ ፈተናችን ለማለፍና የጋራ ሕልማችን ዕውን ለማድረግ የሰከነ፣ በአቅም ላይ የተመሠረተ፣ የተደራጀ እና የተባበረ ትግል ውስጥ በሐቅ፣ በፍጥነትና በቁርጠኝነት መግባት አለብን›› ይላሉ፡፡ እንዴትና የት የሚለው ጥያቄ አብሮ በመሥራት የሚመለሱ ጉዳዩች እንደሆኑ ያስራዳሉ መረራ፡፡

መራራ ጉዲና ከአርባ ዓመታት ለላቀ ጊዜ የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ውስጥ ቀጥተኛ ተሳታፊ ሆነው እንደ ምሁር፣ ፖለቲከኛ እና አራማጅ እርሳቸው እንደሚሉት ‹በገባቸው መጠን› መጭው ዘመን ጥሩ እንዲሆን ለፍተዋል፡፡ መረራ ስለመታሰር በተደጋጋሚ ሲጠየቁ ‹‹ኢሕአዴግ እኔን አስሮ ምን ይጠቀማል›› እያሉ በቀልድ፤ ‹‹እኔ ብታሰር የታገልኩለት ሕዝብ ትግሉን ያስቀጥለዋል›› በማለት በቁም ነገር ይመልሳሉ፡፡ አሁን በሠላማዊ ትግል የቆረቡት መረራ ከብር 1.4 ቢሊዮን በላይ ንብረት መውደምና የሰው ህይወት መጥፋት ምክንያት የሆነ ነውጥ አስነስተዋል ተብለው ታስረው ከባድ ፍርድ ከፊታቸው ይጠብቃቸዋል፡፡ በርግጥም እርሳቸው አርአያ ሆነዋቸው በአስቸጋሪ ሁኔታ ውስጥ የሰለጠነ የፖለቲካ ሒደትን ገና በለጋ ዕድሜያቸው ለመምራት ለተቀላቀሉት እንደ አፍሪካ ከበደ ላሉ የነገ የአገሪቱ ተስፋዎች የመረራ እስር ልብ የሚሰብር ነው፡፡ መረራ በአንድ ወቅት ከፖለቲካውስ ራስዎን የሚያገሉት መቼ ነው? ተብለው ሲጠየቁም የሰጡት ምላሽ እንደ አፍሪካ አይነት ወጣቶችን ለማን ትቼ? በሚል መልኩ ‹‹አሁንም ቢሆንም ከፖለቲካው ጡረታ ብወጣ አልጠላም፡፡ ነገር ግን እኔን አምነው እዚህ ትግል ውስጥ የገቡ ሰዎች በተለይ ወጣቶች አሉ፡፡ አንዳንዶቹም እስር ቤት ነው ያሉት፡፡ እኔ ኑሮ አልተመቸኝም ብዬ ጥያቸው አልሄድም›› ነበር ያሉት፡፡ አሁን መረራ ‹‹ኑሮ አልተመቸኝም ብዬ ጥያቸው አልሄድም›› በማለት ቃል የገቡላቸውን ወጣቶች በእስር ቤት ተቀላቅለዋል፡፡ ነገር ግን በአይበገሬነት ሰላምንና ለውጥን ለሚሰብኩትና ለሚኖሩት መረራ እስራቸው የአካል ነው፡፡ ሐሳባቸውማ ዛሬ ብቻ ሳይሆን ነገም አገሪቱን የሚያክማት መድሃኒት ነው፡፡

***

ለዚህ ጽሑፍ በቀጥታና በተዘዋዋሪ የተጠቀምኳቸው መጽኃፍት፣ አካዳሚያዊ ጽሑፎች፣ እንዲሁም ቃለ-መጠይቆች እንደ ጊዜ ቅደም ተከተላቸው የሚከተሉት ናቸው:

መጽኃፍት

1. Ethiopia Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy (2003)

2. Ethiopia: from Autocracy to Revolutionary Democracy, 1960s-2011, (2011)

3. የኢትዮጵያ ፖለቲካ ምስቅልቅል ጉዞና የሕይወቴ ትዝታዎች: ከኢትዮጵያ ተማሪዎች ንቅናቄ እስከ ኢሕአዴግ (2005)

4. የኢትዮጵያ የታሪክ ፈተናዎች እና የሚጋጬ ሕልሞች (2008)

‹አካዳሚያዊ› የምርምር ስራዎች

1. The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy, Book Review (1994)

2. The Elite and the Quest for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Ethiopia: Lessons to be learnt (2001)

3. Ethiopia: a Transition without Democratization (2003)

4. The Problematic of Democratizing a Multi-cultural Society: The Ethiopian Experience (2007)

5. Ethnicity, Democratisation, and Decentralization in Ethiopia: The Case of Oromia (2007)

6. The Ethiopian State and the Future of the Oromos: ‘Self-Rule vs. Shared-Rule’ (2008)

7. Civil Society and Transition Politics in Ethiopia (2009)

8. Party Politics, Political Polarization and the Future of Ethiopian Democracy (2010)

9. Traditional Institutions of the Gurage people (2010)

10. Elections and democratization in Ethiopia, 1991–2010 (2011)

11. የኢትዮጵያ የታሪክ ፈተናዎች፤ አልታረቅ ያሉ ሕልሞችና የኢሕአዴግ ቆርጦ-ቀጥል ፖለቲካ (2016)

ቃለ-መጠይቆች

1. ‹‹ቃለ – መጠይቅ ከአቶ መረራ ጉዲና ጋር›› – ጦቢያ ፤ መስከረም 1991

2. ‹‹ብሄራዊ እርቅን መሸሽ እንደ መንግስቱ ኃይለማርያም ለመጥፋት ካልሆነ በቀር …›› – ኢትኦጵ፤ ጥር 1992

3. “Hiber Radio Exclusive Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina” – Hiber Radio, September 2013

4. ‹‹Dr. Merera Gudina talks about his new book “Ethiopia’s chaotic political journey and my memoirs: from the Ethiopian students’ movement up to EPRDF›› – SBS Amharic, November 2013

5. ‹‹ከፕ/ር መረራ ጉዲና ከኢትዮ-ቻናል ጋር ያደረጉት ቃለ ምልልስ›› – ኢትዮ-ቻናል መጋቢት 2005

6. ‹‹ዜጐች የተሰደዱት መንግስት የሥራ ዕድል ባለመፍጠሩ ነው›› – አዲስ አድማስ፤ ሕዳር 2006

7. ‹‹ሥልጣን ወይም ሞት’ ተብሎ የሚገፋበት መንገድ ማንንም አልጠቀመም›› – ዕንቁ መፅሔት፤ ሕዳር 2006

8. ‹‹ግድቡ አይሳካም፣ ተቃዋሚዎች ከግብጽ ሊተባበሩ ይችላሉ›› – አዲስ ዘመን፤ ሐምሌ 2006

9. ‹‹ከመድረክ መሪ ዶ/ር መረራ ጉዲና ጋር የተደረገ ቃለ-መጠይቅ›› – ቪኦኤ፤ ሐምሌ 2006

10. ‹‹ኢሳት ጠመንጃ የለውም፣ የትጥቅ ትግልም እያካሄደ አይደለም›› – አዲስ አድማስ፤ ሕዳር 2007

11. ‹‹ከኦሮሚያ አንፃር፤ ከኢሕዴአግ ደርግ ይሻላል›› – ሰንደቅ፤ ታሕሳስ 2007

12. ‹‹ለ6 ወር ያስተማርኩበት ደሞዝ አልተከፈለኝም›› – አዲስ አድማስ፤ ጥር 2007

13. ‹‹ወጣቱ ትውልድ ፖለቲካውን መነገጃ እንዳያደርገው ሥጋት አለኝ›› – ሪፖርተር፤ ሚያዚያ 2007

14. ‹‹እድገት እየተባለ የሚለፈለፈው ካድሬ በሚሠራው ቤትና በሚያስገነባው ሕንጻ ቁጥር ነው፤ ሕዝቡ አንድ ክረምትም ያለችግር ማለፍ አልቻለም›› – የቀለም ቀንድ፤ ጥቅምት 2008

15. ‹‹በበኩሌ ከዚህ በኋላ ለማየት የምጓጓው ኦሕዴድ የሚባለው ድርጅት ከኦሮሞ ሕዝብ ጋር እንዴት እንደሚኖር ነው›› – የቀለም ቀንድ፤ ታሕሳስ 2008

16. ‹‹ከሁሉ በፊት ይህን ሁሉ አገራዊ ምስቅልቅል የፈጠሩት አካላት ተጠያቂ መሆን አለባቸው›› – የቀለም ቀንድ፤ መጋቢት 2008

17. ‹‹ዶ/ር መረራ ጉዲና፤ ስለ አዲሱ መጽሐፋቸው “የኢትዮጵያ የታሪክ ፈተናዎች እና የሚጋጩ ሕልሞች” ይናገራሉ›› – ኤስቢኤስ አምሃሪክ፤ ሚያዚያ 2008

18. ‹‹ኢሳት በዚህ ሳምንት፡ ዶር መረራ ጉዲና›› – ኢሳት፤ ሐምሌ 2008

19. “EthioTube አፈርሳታ – Oromo Federalist Congress Chairman Dr. Merera Gudina” – EthioTube, August 2008

20. «ለተቃዋሚ ፓርቲዎች መዳከም ምክንያቱ የኢህአዴግ ስውር እጆች ናቸው» – አዲስ ዘመን፤ ሕዳር 2009

Why did Qatar leave the Djibouti-Eritrea border?

The renewed Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute is the first ripple effect of the Gulf crisis in Africa.

Maintaining the 500-strong presence of Qatari armed troops in a remote area was a costly and largely thankless endeavour write Barakat and Milton [AP]

by Sansom Milton

@SansomMilton

Sansom Milton is a senior research fellow at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

The media has been quick to associate Qatar’s decision to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the disputed Djibouti-Eritrea border with the Gulf crisis. This connection was most likely made because Qatar’s decision came only days after both Djibouti and Eritrea announced that they are siding with Saudi Arabia in the diplomatic rift and downgraded their diplomatic relations with Qatar.

WATCH: Djibouti’s strategic position draws world’s armies (2:37)

The withdrawal of troops, if understood as a knee-jerk reaction, contrasts markedly with how Qatar has been operating since the start of the crisis. Qatar has not reciprocated the harsh, punitive moves of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in a tit-for-tat spiral of vindictiveness. Nor has it reacted to countries which have reduced diplomatic relations, such as Jordan, by taking retaliatory measures against its thousands of nationals working in Qatar.

While Qatar Airways offices have been sealed off in Abu Dhabi and its senior staff harassed, no such measures have been taken by Doha. Furthermore, while food supplies through Saudi Arabia and the UAE were cut, Qatar continues to supply the latter with around 57 million cubic metres of gas daily. This shows that Qatar continues to play the long game by taking the moral high ground – a strategy that looks to have paid off given the number of international diplomatic capitals that have refused to cave into the intense lobbying of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to vilify Qatar.

Given what we know about how Qatar has operated during the crisis, the explanation that the troop withdrawal is purely a knee-jerk reaction to the downgrading of diplomatic ties does not add up. Doubtlessly, with downgraded relations, Qatar finds itself in a difficult position as a mediator and peacekeeper between the two nations. No mediator can operate effectively with reduced representation, both on a practical and reputational level. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the decision has been made in a retaliatory manner. Rather, there are three less evident reasons for why the decision to withdraw has been on the cards for some time and why it is now impossible for anyone in Qatar to advocate for maintaining the peacekeeping force.

The potential fallout of the crisis could have ripple waves spiralling out of the border dispute to the much larger Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict and the rest of the Horn of Africa at a time when the sub-region is facing a massive humanitarian crisis.

First of all, a fundamental principle of conflict mediation is that any third party must maintain a credible threat to walk away if the conflicting parties are not committed to reaching a negotiated settlement. Qatari troops have, for the past seven years, been stationed in the dusty uninhabited border region between the two East African countries to monitor the implementation of the terms of a ceasefire agreement brokered by Qatar in June 2010.

Despite consistent attempts to turn the ceasefire into a peace agreement, little progress has been made. A minor breakthrough was achieved in March 2016 when, in a deal mediated by Qatar, Eritrea released four prisoners from Djibouti’s armed forces who were captured in June 2008 during border clashes. However, in the past year, the Eritrean negotiating team has disengaged from the mediation process despite the United Nations Security Council mandated-arms embargo on Eritrea being re-approved in November 2016, demanding that Eritrea release all missing prisoners and allow UN monitors to enter the country.

The two states, particularly Eritrea, have not heeded calls for border demarcation and have gone into denial by refusing to refer to the border conflict as a serious issue. The presence of the Qatari peacekeepers had allowed both parties to grow accustomed to the status quo of a mutually beneficial stalemate.

Second, Djibouti and Eritrea consistently engage in a geostrategic game of shifting alliances. When Qatar entered the fray, the Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute was a minor conflict with very few international actors showing an appetite for mediation. Since then Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti has expanded to become the largest US military base in the region, China has also entered Djibouti, while, in April 2015, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea signed a security cooperation agreement and the UAE is currently completing the construction of a military base north of the port city of Assab in Eritrea from where its armed forces have been operating in the military campaign in Yemen. This particular corner of the Horn of Africa is by now far too crowded for a small nation like Qatar to justify its military presence as a buffer.

Third, maintaining the 500-strong presence of Qatari troops in a remote area is a costly and largely thankless endeavour. While the withdrawal was doubtlessly hastened by the changes in diplomatic relations with Eritrea and Djibouti, this has more to do with the infiltration of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia into Eritrea. This military presence clearly renders Qatari troops stationed thousands of miles away in an isolated area a soft target for direct or indirect retaliation. Moreover, 500 troops represent a significant investment of military manpower for an armed forces of around 12,000 during the most urgent crisis the country has faced in its history.

With Eritrea moving its forces into the contested Dumeira Mountain and Dumeira Islands, the temperature of the conflict has been increased and the situation is now more explosive than ever before, for all actors involved. The rapid development of the situation demonstrates the important stabilising role that Qatar had played under the radar for many years.

Moreover, the potential fallout of the crisis could have ripple waves spiralling out of the border dispute to the much larger Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict and the rest of the Horn of Africa at a time when the sub-region is facing a massive humanitarian crisis. This should serve as a cautionary note for the potential of escalation in other places where Qatari assistance has been keeping the lid on conflict, in particular, the Gaza Strip, where as a result of the increased isolation of Qatar by its Gulf neighbours we may see the end of the single most important donor to the reconstruction of the besieged territory to date. This should focus the minds of world leaders on the need to resolve the Gulf crisis amicably as soon as possible.

Professor Sultan Barakat is the director of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and professor in the Department of Politics at the University of York.

Dr Sansom Milton is a senior research fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

China sends troops to Djibouti, establishes first overseas military base

By Brad Lendon and Steve George, CNN

Story highlights

“This base can support Chinese Navy to go farther,” Chinese paper says
Djibouti has become host to several foreign military powers

(CNN)China has dispatched troops to Djibouti in advance of formally establishing the country’s first overseas military base.

Two Chinese Navy warships left the port of Zhanjiang on Tuesday, taking an undisclosed number of military personnel on the journey across the Indian Ocean.

An editorial Wednesday in the state-run Global Times stressed the importance of the new Djibouti facility — in the strategically located Horn of Africa — to the Chinese military.

“Certainly this is the People’s Liberation Army’s first overseas base and we will base troops there. It’s not a commercial resupply point… This base can support Chinese Navy to go farther, so it means a lot,” said the paper.

The Global Times said the main role of the base would be to support Chinese warships operating in the region in anti-piracy and humanitarian operations.

“It’s not about seeking to control the world,” said the editorial.

Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy troops march in Djibouti’s independence day parade on June 27, marking 40 years since the end of French rule in the Horn of Africa country.

Chinese military presence

At a regular press briefing Wednesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang described the base as part of ongoing efforts to help bring peace and security to the region.

“China has been deploying naval ships to waters off Somalia in the Gulf of Aden to conduct escorting missions since 2008,” said Geng. “The completion and operation of the base will help China better fulfill its international obligations in conducting escorting missions and humanitarian assistance … It will also help promote economic and social development in Djibouti.”

China has expanded its military ties across Africa in recent years. According to a report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), cooperation with Africa on peace and security is now an “explicit part of Beijing’s foreign policy.”

In 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping committed 8,000 troops to the UN peacekeeping standby force — one fifth of the 40,000 total troops committed by 50 nations — China also pledged $100 million to the African Union standby force and $1 billion to establish the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.

More than 2,500 Chinese combat-ready soldiers and police officers are now deployed in blue-helmet missions across the African continent, with the largest deployments in South Sudan (1,051), Liberia (666), and Mali (402), according to the ECFR.

“Blue-helmet deployments give the PLA a chance to build up field experience abroad — and to help secure Chinese economic interests in places such as South Sudan,” said the ECFR report.

Africa is home to an estimated one million Chinese nationals, with many employed in infrastructure projects backed by the Chinese government.

“China’s involvement in African security is a product of a wider transformation of China’s national defense policy. It is taking on a global outlook … and incorporating new concepts such as the protection of overseas interests and open seas protection,” said the report.

US ‘strategic interests’

China joins the US, France and Japan, among others, with permanent bases in Djibouti, a former French colony with a population of less than one million residents.

Though small in both population and size, Djibouti’s position on the tip of the Horn of Africa offers strategic access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The strait, which is only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, connects the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean beyond.

One of the world’s most important sea lanes, millions of barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through the strait daily, according to GlobalSecurity.org.

US Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, stressed Djibouti’s location during a visit to the US Camp Lemonnier garrison there earlier this year.

“This particular piece of geography is very, very important to our strategic interests,” Waldhauser said in joint appearance with US Defense Secretary James Mattis.

The US military has some 4,000 troops at Camp Lemonnier, a 100-acre base for which it signed a 10-year, $630 million lease in 2014, according to media reports.

Elsewhere in Djibouti, the US military operates the Chabelley Airfield, from which the Pentagon stages drone airstrikes, likely into Somalia and across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait into Yemen, according to the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College in New York. The Pentagon is investing millions in the base, and satellite photos show several construction projects, the center reported last year.

US Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys prepare to land at a landing zone during training conducted in Djibouti on January 10.

‘Get-rich-quick scheme’

Japan, which has seen tense relations with China over disputed islands in the East China Sea, has established what it calls an “activity facility” to support its anti-piracy efforts there.

A spokesperson for the Japan Self Defense Forces said 170 troops are at its 30-acre facility in Djibouti.

Lease terms would not be released, but Japan will spend about $9 million to operate the facility this fiscal year, the spokesperson said.

Edward Paice, director of the London-based Africa Research Institute, said a base in Djibouti makes a lot of sense for China, just as it does for Japan or the US.

“It (China) has cited its desire to play a greater role in peacekeeping, and it has combat troops in both South Sudan and Mali. It’s logical that it needs an actual base somewhere in Africa, which is really no different from the Americans saying that they need Camp Lemonnier as a headquarters for operations in Africa, whether in peacekeeping or counterterror or whatever,” Paice said on The Cipher Brief website.

Picture taken on May 5, 2015, shows work in progress on the new railway tracks linking Djibouti with Addis Ababa.

Paice points out that China made a substantial investment in Djibouti — about $500 million, according to reports — to build the Djibouti portion of a rail line to the capital of neighboring Ethiopia.

“It’s a confluence of these factors — trade, military, and stability in the host country’s government” that brought China to Djibouti, Paice said.

Meanwhile, for Djibouti, it’s all about money, Paice said. “This is a fantastic get-rich-quick scheme — to rent bits of desert to foreign powers. It’s as simple as that.”

CNN’s Serenitie Wang, Daisy Lee and Junko Ogura contributed to this report.

Teddy Afro: ‘Because of our government, our country is divided’

The Guardian

The musician’s latest album, with songs hailing Ethiopia’s glorious past, is the fastest-selling record in the country’s history. But his political views have made him enemies at home

Teddy Afro … somewhat unintentionally, a flag-waver for the Ethiopian opposition. Photograph: Mulugeta Ayene/AP

Tewodros Kassahun’s manager meets me on a quiet suburban road inside a gated compound. With their neoclassical mansions, manicured lawns and white picket fences, compounds such as this are a rarity in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and this one is as grand as it gets. Still, I’m underwhelmed as we turn in to the driveway of the house, which, by contrast with its neighbours, is relatively modest. This is, after all, the home of the biggest star in Ethiopian musical history: Teddy Afro.

He greets me in the living room, padding around in a tracksuit and socks. The house is in a bit of a mess, and he apologises – they’re clearing up the remains of an album launch party over the weekend. He and his manager are in high spirits. Three days earlier, they released Ethiopia, his fifth studio album; it had a record $650,000 recording budget, was the fastest-selling record in the country’s history, and topped Billboard’s world albums chart. Teddy’s relief is palpable – the release was beset by delays – as he settles into a chair and begins outlining his philosophy. “Art is closer to magic than logic,” he says, beaming cheerfully.

It is difficult to overstate Teddy Afro’s popularity and importance in Ethiopia today. “His level of celebrity is simply unprecedented,” says Heruy Arefe-Aine, the organiser of the country’s Ethiopian Music festival.

Teddy Afro – Ethiopia

Ethiopia has long had a remarkably unified pop music culture – a national canon heard on buses and in bars across the country – but even in this context, Teddy stands out. He is the only artist of his generation to have risen to the level of Mahmoud Ahmed and Aster Aweke, the two greats of post-1960 Ethiopian pop, but at home at least he has comfortably outrun them both. Moreover, his significance reaches well beyond national borders: his popularity among the 2-million-strong Ethiopian diaspora, especially in the US, is unparalleled. The Ethio-Canadian R&B singer the Weeknd has cited him as a major influence.

But he is also a controversial figure. In 2008, he was imprisoned for a hit-and-run offence, which he has always denied he was responsible for. Many regard the jail sentence as a politically motivated move by Ethiopia’s authoritarian government, and a reaction to his 2005 album Yasteseryal, released in the year of a hotly disputed election. The lead single, whose video featured archive footage of the former emperor Haile Selassie and the bloody revolution that followed his reign, was interpreted by many as an indictment of everything that followed the emperor’s demise, including the current regime.

He became, perhaps somewhat unintentionally, a flag-waver for the Ethiopian opposition, a reputation he has maintained. The song is still, for all practical purposes, banned.

He makes for an unlikely political radical, and indeed his manager makes clear from the outset that politics is off the agenda. But he is nonetheless keen to explain the new album’s message. Lyrics are everything in Ethiopian music, and his – rich in idiom, allusion and wordplay – have excited his fans ever since he broke on to the scene in the early 00s. He argues that the country, under a state of emergency after violent anti-government protests last year, is slipping backwards. “We used to be a model for Africa,” he says, “but, because of our government, our country is divided.” The album is a call for unity and the rehabilitation of Ethiopia’s glorious past. “This younger generation is in a dilemma about their history,” he continues. “I feel a responsibility to teach them about the good things from their history. They should be proud of their achievements.”

Teddy Afro on stage in New York. Photograph: Jack Vartoogian/Getty Images

Glancing references to the government aside, this is fairly inoffensive stuff. But in fact the politics are tricky. At the centre of the album is the story of Emperor Tewodros II, a 19th-century warrior-king whose rule is often seen as marking the beginning of modern Ethiopian history. “He fought and died for this country,” says Teddy, gesturing at a painting of the monarch on the living room wall, and pointing out that they share the same name. But the problem for many of Teddy’s critics is that his is a fiercely disputed view of that history. To many modern Ethiopians, Tewodros represents feudalism and imperialism. To some, his rule was characterised by the conquest and subjugation of other ethnic groups. But to his supporters, he united the country and resisted European colonialism.

Teddy’s previous album, Tikur Sew, released in 2012, did something similar for an even more controversial figure, Emperor Menelik II, hero of the Battle of Adwa in 1896, which saw the defeat of the invading Italians, but also the man responsible for the conquest of much of modern-day Ethiopia. Teddy, like Tewodros, Menelik and Selassie, hails from the Amhara region; his critics see him as peddling a sort of nostalgic Amhara nationalism. His living room also contains an original sword belonging to Menelik, the old imperial flag, and a photograph of Selassie. “The younger generation need to know what our fathers did for this country,” he says. “It is clear that Menelik fought for Ethiopia, for unity, and against colonialism.”

Teddy Afro – Semberé

Although the album Ethiopia contains an eclectic mix of influences (the second track, Semberé, could be by Manu Chao), and lyrics in several of Ethiopia’s 88 languages, Teddy remains in many ways an Amhara musician. He recalls sitting as a young child on the knee of Hirut Bekele, a popular Amhara vocalist from the 60s and 70s, as she performed in small clubs in Addis Ababa. “She was like a queen,” he remembers. His early work was reggae-infused but in his recent albums he has returned to a more recognisably Ethiopian sound, though funkier and insistently catchy. Traditional vibrato vocals, the itchy triplets of traditional Amharan rhythms, highly polished synth-heavy production: all this is the language of modern Ethiopian pop.

The latter has often been a source of frustration to Ethiopia’s musical old guard, who lament the lack of instrumentation among the younger generation, although Teddy points out that a live band plays on the album’s final track. He is a child of two musicians – his mother was a dancer who toured the world, his father a songwriter for a police orchestra in 50s Addis Ababa – but he came of age in the 80s under the military regime known as the Derg, when live music all but disappeared as a result of a strict overnight curfew that lasted for 16 years. Like most pop stars of his generation who began their career amid the heady post-Derg optimism of the late-90s club circuit, Teddy sings and plays keyboard.

It is perhaps for this reason that Teddy is almost unheard of beyond Ethiopia and its diaspora. Despite its distinctly Ethiopian vernacular, his music is still pop: cosmopolitan and perfect for dancing to. Musicians such as Mahmoud Ahmed or Mulatu Astatke (the father of Ethiopian jazz) appeal to western audiences drawn to a more exotic sound, complete with live bands. Teddy doesn’t offer that. But in any case, his focus is closer to home. “This is a dangerous time,” he says. “My priority now is Ethiopia.”

WHY IS EPRDF APPEASING THE OROMO EXTREMIST ELITES?

By Yared Gizaw

The Oromo extremist elites have repeatedly told us that their vision for Ethiopia is as follows:

Option 1: Recreate/restructure Ethiopia under the domination of Oromos’ in which:

– Oromo language and culture to be dominant with “Wake Fatah” as dominant religion.

– New name and flag for Ethiopia

– Addis Ababa (Finfine) the center for Oromia

– Every Ethiopian to be under their dominion

Option 2: Free/independent Oromia (including Finfine) after disintegrating Ethiopia -this is a fall back scenario, if they could not achieve Option 1

As they know very well that Option 2 is impractical and not feasible, they are working very hard to realize Option 1 in an incremental manner. More than 20 years ago, they secured the “Oromo land” with Latin alphabet written language and they have been busy to create a unique non-Ethiopian identity for themselves. Their next move is to strengthen their foothold on Addis Ababa, wait for an opportune time when the Federal Government is destabilized/weak, and declare their dominance. They have been asking for our arms and legs so far but they will not be satisfied until they fully swallowed all of our body. Actually, the Oromo extremist elites are never satisfied until they “Oromize” the whole Ethiopia.

The Oromo extremist elites have the following myths and false concepts in their mindset, which have shaped their vision of their future role/position in Ethiopia.

They perceive themselves as a majority ethnic group( that is not true they need at least 51% share among the Ethiopian population to be majority even in that case it is unconstitutional to claim dominance )
They contribute higher share to the GDP( that is true but they are also getting the biggest share of the Federal Government Budget support and Foreign Direct Investment and the Oromo population have been enjoying better economic dividend than other regions as most of investments and job creation are around Addis Ababa). However, as industrialization and economic development expands throughout the country and natural resources(such as oil and gas) start to be exploited in various regions, the GDP variation among the regions will narrow
They claim that they have been marginalized economically, socially and politically( that may have been true until Emperor Haile Selassie time but after that it is not true, actually EPRDF allowed them to have their own territory ( 1st time in their history, under unified Oromia) and they were allowed to freely develop their language, culture and religious practices over the last 26 years(including the recent registration of Irrecha annual anniversary by UNESCO as intangible asset)
They feel that they have higher negotiation power than other regions on the Federal government and they should use that to arm-twist the Federal government to achieve their Option 1 vision (They have the myth that Ethiopia cannot survive without Oromia or if Oromos’ revolt Ethiopia will be paralyzed). However, the fact is that even though they have tried to paralyze Ethiopia over the last two years, they have failed and they shall continue fail.

They have the victim mindset claiming that Emperor Menelik had killed huge number of Oromos’ who resisted his expansion agenda, however they tend to forget the atrocities committed by their nomadic ancestors on the original citizens of today Oromia, some 400 and 500 years ago. It is recorded in history that the nomadic Oromos’ expanded their ‘territories to the northern part of Ethiopia through war and domination but failed to fully dominate it ( actually they were ultimately swallowed and melted into the Ethiopian time tested and sophisticated governance system). It looks the Oromo extremist elites are again trying to fulfill the unrealized dream of their ancestors to dominate Ethiopia.
For those Ethiopians who may feel my views, I reflected above on Oromo extremists are too exaggerated or not true, below is the front picture of the Oromia Cultural Center in Addis Ababa, which was inaugurated about two years ago, as proof. See how the widely spoken and constitutionally recognized working language of Ethiopia is written intentionally below both the Oromifa and English and with very small letters. This is the reflection of what they intend to do to anything non-Oromia Ethiopian assets and heritages. For your information if you write Amharic name of your business over/prior to the Oromifa name in the Oromia State, you will be immediately forced to change it. Why did the Addis Ababa city administration and the Federal Government have given blind eye to this gross violation of the constitution on the naming of the Oromo Cultural Center? Could it be to appease the Oromo extremist elites?

As a conclusion I strongly oppose most of the Council of Ministers approved draft legislation on Oromos rights on Addis Ababa, as summarized below

Provision in Draft Law

Reason for Rejection/Opposing

Culture, language and arts:● To ensure that Oromo residents in the city can benefit from the “special interest” provisions stipulated in this proclamation, Afaan Oromo shall serve as a working language of the City Administration.

● To reflect Oromo people’s identity and to commemorate historical events relevant to the region’s people, the original names of public squares, roads and neighborhoods.

● The city administration will facilitate conditions for the construction and promotion of theaters, entertainment venues, and cultural and art centers that reflect Oromo culture and history in the city.

● The city administration will work with Oromia state authorities to make sure that museums in the city carrybooks and other artifacts on Oromo history and culture.

● With relation to Oromia state, the city’s previous Oromo name, Finfine, will have equal legal recognition as the name Addis Ababa. The particulars on the usage of the two names will be determined by a regulation

Land provision:

● The Oromia state will be given land on which it can erect buildings for government activities and public services free of lease payment.

Job opportunity:

● Youth residents of Oromia towns and rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa will be made beneficiaries of the job opportunities in the city.

● Youth residents of Oromia towns and rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa will be made beneficiaries of the job opportunities that arise from water development, waste disposal, recycling, basin development, transport services and the likes.

● Health care: Oromo residents of towns and rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa shall be entitled to access health care services at government hospitals and medical facilities like any resident of the city.

Provision of Market places:

● The city administration shall establish market places, covering the cost, where farmers’ cooperatives from Oromia can sell their produce.

Condominium housing provision:

● Officials and employees of Oromia will be included, having a certain quota, in the lottery drawings of government-owned condominium housing in Addis Ababa.

Compensation and permanent rehabilitation

● Farmers in the city administration, who are displaced due to development activities, shall be entitled to compensation adequate for “permanent rehabilitation”.

– What if other citizens in Addis Ababa ask to be served in their languages, we need to minimize issues that divide us rather than expand them. What about the rights of non-Oromo speaking but majority population in Adama (Nathret), Bishoftu (Debre Zeit) etc?

– It is clear that this provision has no any historical merit, as there were no squares, roads and other sites in Addis Ababa during Minilik time. This decision will further bring division and conflict.

– We have only 20% of the population in Addis Ababa as Oromo. What about the history, heritage and culture of the remaining 80% population who have worked hard to bring Addis Ababa where it is today?

– Same as above

– Using two legal names for Addis Ababa (Addis Ababa is a unifying melting pot for all Ethiopians and an anchor for the Federal government) will be confusing and no need to give it two names/brands. Imposed change of name/brand will be the source of perpetual conflict. If required, Oromia state could issue a law to recognize Finfine equal to Addis Ababa in it own territory.

– As of today, Oromia has no constitutional right to use Addis Ababa as its base.

– Unless the Ethiopian government is unknowingly facilitating the creation of an apartheid system, job opportunities anywhere in Ethiopia should be available equally to all Ethiopians based on competency. This provision is against the Constitution.

– Does that mean Ethiopians form other than Addis Ababa & its surrounding will be discriminated?

– What about Farmers Cooperatives from other parts of Ethiopia (Southern Ethiopia, Gojjam, Afar, Debre Berhan etc). This will create an apartheid system where one Ethnic group having undue comparative/competitive advantage. A potential for conflict!

– Officials in Oromia have been acquiring and selling lands in different parts of Oromia. This is an additional gateway for corruption.(The practice have been an Oromia official from Bishoftu/Dukem will swap land with an Oromo official in Shashemene or Adama and through that arrangement so many of the Oromia officials are now investors).

How Egypt Is Slowly Losing Its Hold Over the Nile River?

WPR

By Julian Hattem

For millennia, the Nile River has served as the backbone of Egypt, the lifeblood of its people. Gradually, though, the land of the pharaohs is losing its grip.

Late last month, Uganda hosted the first ever heads-of-state summit aimed at resolving disagreements over the waters of the Nile. But it produced no major breakthrough and appeared to be a flop. In coming months, the opening of a major dam in Ethiopia will truly test Egypt’s anxieties that countries upstream are refusing to bow to its demands. The dam’s opening will reveal just how much leverage Egypt has lost.

Egypt has a strong historical and legal claim to the Nile dating back to the colonial era, but that framework is being undercut by rapid development and population growth upstream. Currently, more than 430 million people live across the 11 countries that make up the Nile Basin: Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Eritrea. The population of the Nile Basin is likely to jump to nearly 1 billion by 2050.

The upstream countries “can’t wait forever for Egypt to get onboard,” says Aaron Wolf, a professor of geosciences at Oregon State University. At the same time, he adds, the river is being valued less for its water supply and more as a means of producing electricity. “That whole conversation is shifting both the power balance and the interest to upstream states.”

Under a 1959 agreement, rights to virtually all of the Nile’s water was split between Egypt, which is entitled to 55.5 billion cubic meters, and Sudan, with 18.5 billion. Egyptians and Sudanese depend on the water much more than their upstream neighbors; Egypt in particular receives practically no rainfall, and relies on the mighty river for 97 percent of its water. But over the years, upstream countries have taken issue with the terms of that decades-old agreement, to which they were never parties.

In 1999, nine riparian countries formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try and manage the waters. South Sudan became the 10th member after it gained independence in 2011; Eritrea sits as an observer. The initiative began work on a new framework for governing the river, but Egypt and Sudan refused to sign on to a deal reached by other nations in 2010, known as the Entebbe Agreement. Egypt subsequently froze its participation in the initiative and has held out ever since, insisting it won’t return unless it is guaranteed notification before the construction of any new project on the river and until all decisions are made by consensus.

Other nations are loath to give Cairo de facto veto power over their domestic infrastructure plans. But to hear Egypt tell it, any major change to the framework and its historical water rights could leave it dying of thirst.

Sissi has made a noticeable push toward greater engagement with his African neighbors south of the Sahara, but the dispute over the Nile is proving to be a stubborn obstacle.

That position inspired Egypt’s initial opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is scheduled to open along the Blue Nile at some point in the next three or four months. Ethiopians view the dam, which will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric facility, as a source of national pride that they hope will power the continent’s fastest-growing economy. When construction is complete, the dam will stand more than a mile wide and 570 feet tall, and will more than double the country’s current capacity to generate energy. Waters from the Blue Nile comprise roughly 80 percent of the river that traces its way into Egypt.

For decades, Egyptian politicians have discussed any interference with the Nile’s waters as an existential threat. In 2013, Egyptian politicians unknowingly mused about sabotaging the Ethiopian dam on live television. Before construction began in 2011, Egypt reportedly considered a military response to block Ethiopia from interfering with the river’s flow. Decades earlier, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat declared that water was “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again.”

Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan—where the Blue and White Niles meet to form the great river—signed a deal to resolve their dispute in 2015. Egypt has since offered grumbling support for the dam, suggesting it recognizes the need to support upstream nations’ demands. Once the dam opens, no one expects Egypt to take a rash step and follow up on Sadat’s old threat.

But Egypt’s internal politics have made it difficult to back down entirely, so some amount of posturing is likely. Yet Cairo has few cards to play.

The more apocalyptic predictions about the dam’s impact on Egypt’s waters are likely overstated, says Kevin Wheeler of Oxford University’s Environmental Change Institute. “There’s a lot of hyperbole, ranging from some believing it’ll do nothing, to others claiming that it will devastate Egypt,” Wheeler says. “Neither of those two extremes are accurate, and there’s a lot of space in the middle for reality.” If anything, the dam could help regulate water flowing into Egypt and keep the country supplied during times of drought.

The biggest test will be in the first few years, as Ethiopia plugs up the Blue Nile to fill a vast new reservoir. If Egypt and Ethiopia are on the same page, Wheeler says, they will be best positioned to mitigate any droughts or water shortages. After that, water is likely to flow downstream at a constant pace.

The Ethiopian dam was not explicitly on the agenda during the recent Nile summit. But Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi were the only two foreign leaders who bothered to show up, suggesting that other nations want them to resolve their differences before anything else can be accomplished.

The summit began inauspiciously, when presidential guards for Sissi and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni got into a shoving match inside the State House, Uganda’s presidential residence. It didn’t get much better when technical teams from multiple countries reportedly walked out at one point during the discussions. Analysts said little of consequence had been achieved.

Sissi has made a noticeable push toward greater engagement with his African neighbors south of the Sahara, but the dispute over the Nile is proving to be a stubborn obstacle. Still, his presence in Kampala suggests that he recognizes Egypt’s changing position and is trying to maintain some authority.

With Egypt’s population set to grow by nearly 30 million by 2030, its own demand for water will increase. All the while, climate change will increase the variability of the river’s flow by 50 percent, according to a recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Nile’s volume is likely to rise by 10 to 15 percent, researchers predict, but there will also be more years of drought as well as years of surplus. All that instability might make it more appealing to rely on a system of dams that regularize and control the river’s flow.

The passage of time will force Egypt into signing on to a new or modified river management agreement, predicts Salman M. A. Salman, a consultant and former water law adviser for the World Bank. “Egypt will look right and left and will find that the dam is completed, that Ethiopia is trying to build other dams and the only alternative left for them is to cooperate,” Salman says. “Time is not on their side.”

Julian Hattem is a journalist based in Kampala, Uganda. You can follow him on Twitter at @jmhattem.

Former President Mubarak considered using Tu-160 to destroy Ethiopian dam

Egyptindependent

An unverified voice recording attributed to Egypt’s Former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak has generated great controversy among Egyptian social media users.

The recording, which surfaced on a Facebook page titled ‘Ana Asef Ya Rais’ [‘I’m sorry Mr. President’], featured statements from Mubarak on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ‘GERD’.

Mubarak relinquished power in 2011 following the 25 January Revolution and has been subjected to judicial trials since.

In the unverified voice clip, Mubarak said that Ethiopia did not dare to establish GERD during his era, adding that he had the ability to destroy it with Russian-made Tupolev Tu-160 fighters, if it had.

Mubarak also asserted in the recording that Egypt is currently considered a weak country, unlike in the past when the world saw it as powerful one.

Egypt Independent made several attempts to reach administrators of the Facebook page that broadcast the voice recording of Mubarak.

Why did Qatar leave the Djibouti-Eritrea border?

The renewed Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute is the first ripple effect of the Gulf crisis in Africa.

Maintaining the 500-strong presence of Qatari armed troops in a remote area was a costly and largely thankless endeavour write Barakat and Milton [AP]

by Sultan Barakat

@BARAKAT_Sultan

Sultan Barakat is the director of Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute.

by Sansom Milton

@SansomMilton

Sansom Milton is a senior research fellow at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

WATCH: Djibouti’s strategic position draws world’s armies (2:37)

Dr Sansom Milton is a senior research fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

WHY THERE’S A STATUE OF BOB MARLEY IN ETHIOPIA?

Fun fact: the Rasta movement arose in Ethiopia, not Jamaica.

By Bill Wiatrak |Houstoniamag

WHEN YOU THINK OF JAMAICA, you’re likely to conjure a mental picture of Bob Marley before you think of anything else. There’s no other country in the world where one musician seems to represent the embodiment of an entire culture like Marley is to Jamaica. The dreadlocks and the red/green/yellow color scheme seems sooooo Jamaican. But is it?

The answer might surprise you: Look no further than the Ethiopian flag. Does it look familiar? That’s because the Rasta movement arose in Ethiopia, not Jamaica.

Ethiopia is the only African country never colonized by Europeans. Countries like Kenya and Egypt were controlled by the British; the Belgians took the Congo; and much of North Africa was seized by the French. Every European country seemed to want a piece of the “dark continent,” but Ethiopia always avoided colonization—including two failed attempts by the Italians in 1895 and later in 1935.

During the latter attempt, a prominent figure emerged: a king who claimed to be from the lineage of Queen Sheba and King Solomon. His name was Haile Selassie, who became revered far beyond his country as “The Lion of Judah.”

Haile had other names, too, partly because of the different languages he spoke (including French and the native Amharic and Ge’ez languages of Ethiopia). Tafari was his given name at birth, meaning “one who is respected or feared.” Later, as governor of the walled city of Harer, he was given the ranking title of Ras, or “prince.” If you haven’t already figured it out, Haile Selassie was also known as Ras Tafari. Sound familiar?

A few years prior, in the 1920s, a popular Jamaican political leader named Marcus Garvey predicted that one day a black man would be crowned king in Africa. This king would be a divine being that would bring deliverance to the people of Africa and the rest of the world. In 1930, when Selassie was crowned emperor of Ethiopia following a coup d’etat, this prophecy appeared to be coming true.

To the poor Jamaican population, Tafari was more than just an Ethiopian king. He appeared to them to be the chosen one. Jamaicans, like many other former slaves, had been robbed of their culture and sense of belonging. The idea of going back to Africa and redefining and reasserting their native roots was very appealing. The home continent of Africa became known as “Zion” by the Jamaicans, while the white man’s world was called “Babylon.”

The people who idolized Tafari embraced many of the Ethiopian traditions: An Ethiopian vegan lifestyle without alcohol or salt was adopted; the colors of the Ethiopian flag were embraced; dreadlocks became a symbol of a lion’s mane as well as the idea of roots connecting man to God. Long hair is also strongly associated with the biblical story of Sampson and other Old Testament scripture. The Jamaicans accepted many traditional biblical teachings but felt like white men had altered the sacred text to make African slaves more subservient to their masters.

Selassie explained to his followers that he was not the Messiah. In spite of his protests, many were certain that was the chosen one. The new cult took Tafari’s name: They became the Ras Tafarians.

This small cult never really gained worldwide acceptance until Robert Marley popularized it. Born Catholic, Marley converted in the 1960s, grew his dreadlocks and began writing songs with spiritual elements. When asked about his religious beliefs, the singer once mentioned, “I would say to the people, Be still, and know that His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia is the Almighty…. I don’t see how much more reveal our people want. Wha’ dem want? A white God, well God come black. True true.” Many of Bob Marley’s songs are about reuniting Africa and deal with other Rastafarian beliefs. Many casual listeners don’t really listen to the words, the reggae melodies instead invoking thoughts of tropical vacations and beaches.

In 1966, Selassie visited Jamaica to an ecstatic crowd of thousands. He appropriated 500 acres of land of his country to Jamaicans or other people of African descent who wished to move to Ethiopia. Bob Marley visited Ethiopia in 1978 and stayed in Shashamane, the village formed by those who had taken Selassie’s offer. It was thought that a large percentage of the one million adherents might move to “Zion,” but that never really happened. Fifty-plus years later, roughly 800 Rastafarians live in the town. For all the songs about moving back to Africa, hardly anyone actually did it—including Marley himself. Shashamane remains an eccentric little enclave in Ethiopia peopled by Rasta followers. Ganja, ironically enough, is illegal in Ethiopia, though it’s tolerated in that community to a certain extent.

Bob Marley died in 1981 of skin cancer that began on one of his toes. He refused to treat it because of his religious beliefs. Like Marilyn Monroe, Elvis and James Dean, Marley has become more of a brand than the person he really was. He symbolizes Caribbean music, smoking weed, and the red, green and yellow colors of the Ethiopian flag.

In 2015, a statue of Marley was installed in Addis Ababa for Bob’s 70th birthday celebration. In 2005, Rita Marley, Bob Marley’s widow announced she would be moving his body to be reburied in Ethiopia, though that never happened; the famous singer still rests in tomb in his home in Nine Mile, Jamaica. Marley’s music, meanwhile, continues to inspire the world from the Americas to Africa—even if many folks are only listening to the melodies.

Africa, Unite
’Cause we’re moving right out of Babylon
And we’re going to our father’s land

How good and how pleasant it would be
Before God and man, yeah
To see the unification of all Africans, yeah
As it’s been said already let it be done, yeah
We are the children of the Rastaman
We are the children of the Higher Man