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Why do Western states used maps that shrink the real size of Africa?

What’s the real size of Africa? How Western states used maps to downplay size of continent

(CNN)On a typical world map, Canada is a vast nation.

Home to six time zones, its endless plains spread from ocean to ocean, dominating great swathes of the northern half of the globe.

But, in reality, three Canadas would comfortably fit inside Africa.

Our world map is wildly misleading.

It’s all down to the European cartographer Geert de Kremer, better known as Mercator, and his 16th century map projection.

While a convenient way to chart the world, the map distorts the true size of countries.

“Somehow this map projection came to be used on most world maps, especially those produced for classrooms since the beginning of the 1900s,” says Menno-Jan Kraak, president of the International Cartographic Association and professor of cartography at the University of Twente, Netherlands.

“Most of us have grown up with this world image.”

Made for captains

The 1569 Mercator projection was made for navigating the seas — drawing the meridians and parallels as straight lines that cross at right angles helped sailors to navigate some of the their first treacherous voyages around the world.

Mercator initially made globes. Later transferring his map from a three-dimensional curved surface to a flat sheet of paper was problematic. Taking the equator as the logical map center left big, confusing gaps near the poles.

Mercator’s solution was to stretch out the northern and southern extremities of the globe to fill those gaps, producing an elegant and usable map.

While a revolutionary tool for captains and explorers, the projection distorts the relative size of the continents, to the advantage of the West.

The repercussions of this are still being felt today.

A map made by Europe for Europe

On the Mercator map, Africa — sitting on the equator, reasonably undistorted — is left looking much smaller than it really is.

But Canada, Russia, the United States and Europe are greatly enlarged.

The distortion is largest near the poles: Greenland, which looks about the same size as the whole of Africa on the Mercator, is a classic example. In truth, it is no bigger than the Democratic Republic of Congo.

That European and North American countries are enlarged is no accident. This system provided more space for Western cartographers to mark towns, cities, roads etc in their part of the world, Kraak says.

“If you would take a map projection with equal areas then there is almost no space on the map to display all [these details].”

There was, of course, much to map in Africa, too, but that mattered less to the cartographers up north, he adds.

A political tool?

One of the dangers of the Mercator map is that it can make enlarged countries seem unnaturally powerful and intimidating.

“The term ‘power of representation and representation of power’ sums up quite well how maps and the rise of the Western nation-state system — and with that, empire and colonialism — are linked,” says Marianne Franklin, professor of Global Media and Politics at Goldsmiths, University of London.

Was subsequent European imperialism perhaps spurred on by a map projection that reinforced the notions of self-importance held by those nations?

“The world maps that prevail today have been embedded in Western imaginations since the British empire. They continue (to prevail) despite many challenges to their fairness and accuracy because they underpin the ongoing Anglo-Euro-American presumption that the world belongs to them, and pivots around these geo-cultural axes,” Franklin says.

In more recent times, maps have been used for propaganda, adds Kraak.

Take Russia, for example.

“If you take the Mercator projection, where Russia looks huge, give it a bright red color and then compare it to the rest of Europe, you see how dangerous it can look,” says Kraak.

No perfect map

Chart of the world as per Mercator's projection, circa 1798, with the most recent discoveries.

Chart of the world as per Mercator’s projection, circa 1798, with the most recent discoveries.

Sadly, there is no such thing as a perfect map. Because the earth is a sphere — more of a potato-shape, in fact — it is impossible to map it on a flat surface without errors in proportion, explains Kraak.

Some schools have begun to use a number of alternative projections. In the US and Germany, for example, maps based on the so-called Winkel Tripel projection, which has a smaller skewness, started to replace the Mercator from the 1920s until the 1980s.

But it has never achieved the dominance of the Mercator.

A digital boost

The digital revolution has further strengthened the Mercator’s dominance.

Today the Mercator projection is being used as a template at Google Maps, OpenStreetMap and Bing, says Kraak.

From guiding 16th century explorers on the high seas to helping people find Pokemons on their smartphones, Mercator’s work continues to influence how people see the world centuries after his death.

Politics by numbers: poverty reduction discourse, contestations and regime legitimacy in Ethiopia

By Hone Mandefro

There are contradictory statistics about the number of poor people and changes in number of poor people in Ethiopia with statistics ranging from 26 to 86% of the total population in 2013. This paper analyzed how such contradictory statistics feed into national politics focusing on who uses which statistics and based on what justifications of authoritativeness. Drawing from data collected from print newspapers, blogs, websites, published articles, party publications, and interviews with four key informants and combining an actor’s centered discourse analysis (ACDA) with Van Dick’s (1997) approach of identifying and analyzing political discourses, the paper deconstructed the poverty statistics debate in Ethiopia to understand the basic contestations. Synthesis of the data shows that poverty numbers are being used as tools for, and manifestations of, ongoing power struggles in Ethiopia whereby different actors selectively use poverty statistics that promote their political agenda. While doing so, the underlying rationale of actors for choosing one statistics over another was not based on the merit of their preferred set of statistics over the others but on the suitability of the data for their political purpose. As such, the government disregards statistics except its own which portray rapid poverty decline in the country while opposition groups actively use and promote statistics coming from international organizations that depict increasing poverty or a slow rate of reduction of poverty. The paper argues that the underlying cause of such politicization of numbers is linked with the developmental statism ideology of the ruling party in Ethiopia and how it tries to justify its rule in Ethiopia – claiming that it is reducing poverty and bringing development in Ethiopia and therefore should be allowed to continue in power. Therefore, in debating poverty numbers what is being debated is not just the statistics but the legitimacy of the government, hence politics by numbers.

To access the full article please go here

Politics by numbers: poverty reduction discourse, contestations and regime legitimacy in Ethiopia

By Hone Mandefro

To access the full article please go here

Why is the Ethiopian diaspora so influential?

Africa

Ethiopians across the world have been protesting

During a year of anti-government protests throughout Ethiopia, its global diaspora, particularly that in the US, has been deeply involved – and not just vocally, writes Addis Ababa-based journalist James Jeffrey.

Twitter and Facebook have been blocked since a six-month state of emergency was imposed last month as the government tries to restore order across the country’s two most populous regions of Oromia and Amhara.

There are also internet blackouts, primarily targeting mobile phone data, which is how most Ethiopians get online – and is for many residents of the capital, Addis Ababa, the most frustrating effect of the security clamp down.

The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has singled out social media as playing a key role in the latest unrest which broke out in November 2015 and which resulted in millions of dollars’ worth of damage across Oromia, the region where the protests began.

But internet restrictions may have less to do with silencing Ethiopians at home than with stymieing influence from abroad where those in the diaspora energetically follow and respond to events.

“The diaspora have the freedom to speak freely, assemble and organise under the constitutions and laws of the countries in which they reside,” says Alemante Selassie, emeritus professor at the William and Mary Law School in the US.

“The diaspora can speak truth to power in ways that is not imaginable in their own homeland.”

‘Filling the void’

Ethiopia’s global diaspora is estimated to be two-million strong, with the highest numbers in the US, totalling anything from 250,000 up to about one million.

A federal policeman stands guard between the Oromo regional flag (left) and Ethiopia's national flag at the October ceremony marking the opening of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway — *Under the state of emergency, there is tight security around the country*

“The protesters are their brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, classmates, neighbours and former colleagues,” says Hassan Hussein, an Ethiopian academic and writer based in the US state of Minnesota.

“Most activists in the diaspora are people pushed out of the political process and into exile by the current regime in Ethiopia,” says Mohammed Ademo, an Ethiopian-born journalist in Washington DC.

“So they see themselves as stakeholders in the efforts to shape the country’s future.”

Nowadays they are joined by writers, bloggers and journalists who, along with hugely popular satellite television channels broadcast from the US, provide significant coverage about the protests.

“The Oromo has no independent voice at home, all the local media outlets, already too few, are either driven out of the country or state-owned,” Mr Hassan says.

“The diaspora is simply filling this huge void.”

But diaspora influence goes well beyond media coverage. Huge amounts of money are remitted from the US back to Ethiopia.

Oromo people in Ethiopia — *The Oromo are proud of their cultural traditions and enjoy opportunities to celebrate that heritage*

“With the intensification of protests for the past 12 months, the level has probably increased considerably,” says Eloi Ficquet, former director of the French Centre for Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa.

Opposition groups in Ethiopia gain significant funding from anti-EPRDF diaspora sources because of scant local options.

Consequently, according to some, this financial dependency hinders them from attempting political compromise and engagement with the ruling party, which already makes it hard enough.

“The government suppresses the peaceful political parties in this country and people became very hopeless about peaceful political struggle,” says Lidetu Ayele, founder of the local opposition Ethiopia Democratic Party.

“So they start listening to political parties across the Atlantic.”

Bogus information

Ethiopia does not just lack effective local opposition.

Local independent media does exist – often written in Amharic, hence not noticed by many labelling Ethiopia one of the world’s most-censored countries – but remains severely hampered compared to state media.

“The government hasn’t allowed an independent media to develop so people turn to diaspora news,” commented an Ethiopian journalist with a local daily newspaper at an October government press conference.

“The government has created this problem for themselves.”

And many in Ethiopia, both locals and foreigners, agree it has become a problem because of the volume of inaccurate or bogus information channelled by social media and overseas activists, often with an all too combustible effect on the ground.

More on Ethiopia’s unrest:

Oromo mourners in Ethiopia - December 2015

Violence at the beginning of October was precipitated by overseas activists calling for “five days of rage” in response to a deadly stampede at an Oromo religious festival after police and protestors clashed.

However, others argue the protests have sprung organically from a populace bearing numerous longstanding grievances.

Map of protests and violence in Ethiopia in 2016

Image copyright BBC/OCTOBER 2016

“They feel left out of the so-called Ethiopian economic miracle that the Western press touts ad nauseam despite the grinding poverty all around the country, especially the Amhara region,” Prof Alemante says.

Among those active on Ethiopia’s social media scene, there is also exasperation at the government’s blinkered approach to the dynamics of modern communication.

“They could probably debunk about half the disinformation if they used social media to provide basic answers,” says Addis Ababa-based blogger Daniel Berhane.

But instead the government relies on its monopoly of television and radio while leaving social media uncontested, or for now blocked.

“If government does respond, usually it’s too late and the accusation has been accepted as fact,” Mr Daniel says.

Ethiopian protesters in South Africa — *Ethiopians abroad, like these protesters in South Africa, want their voices heard*

Journalists highlighting such misinformation typically face torrents of abuse on social media from those in the diaspora who accuse them of being in cahoots with the government and failing to see the bigger picture.

“Foreign correspondents mostly cover only protests in Addis Ababa,” Mr Mohammed says.

“The diaspora has been instrumental in raising awareness about atrocities taking place [elsewhere] in Ethiopia and reporting on protests,” the journalist says.

The state of emergency appears to be having the desired effect of restoring order – for now.

The EPRDF conducted a significant cabinet reshuffle at the end of October, while promising further reforms.

But the general consensus appears that no-one has a clue what may happen next.

“Ethiopia has an enormous and complex set of problems,” says Endalk Chala, one of the founders of the Ethiopian Zone 9 blogging collective.

He is currently studying in the US and remains in exile following the arrests in 2014 of several his fellow Zone 9 bloggers, some of whom are still facing trial.

“But the government embarked on prescribing simple solutions such as declaring a state of emergency and electoral reforms,” he says.

“They must bring all concerned Ethiopian opposition political groups both home and abroad to the negotiation table.”

Gondar – Home of the brave: Land of the rebels?!

By By Girma Hadas

The title of the article might suggest to you that the writer is a victim of petty thinking and parochial politics because he focused to write about a certain region (Gondar) rather than talking about the bigger Ethiopian socio-geographical area. I do not blame you. Nevertheless, I want you all to read the entirety of the note and the underlying reasons why it is presented in such a way. Since the attributes of petty thinking and parochial politics are the virus that contracted TPLF/EPRDF I am always reminded that I should refrain from being a victim. As a matter of fact my decision to defect from the Ethiopian government diplomatic service a couple of years ago and live in exile was a direct result of my refusal to be defined by petty ideas and parochial politics that TPLF/EPRDF has propagated for decades and never sleeps until it is way of life in the Ethiopian socio-political system. So, I assure you that I am not defined in linguistic, religious, regional or any superficial based categories other than being and continue to be an Ethiopian.

Currently meaningful opposition to the Ethiopian government is not coming from those worthless opposing political parties in Ethiopia. The biggest and most formidable force that sends a chill in the TPLF/EPRDF camp is the true words and critical writings of some brave hearted individuals who have no allegiance to no party or organized group. These Ethiopians conviction for the realization of freedom, equality and justice in Ethiopia by standing against TPLF/EPRDF killing machine is commendable beyond words can express. Their effort and sense of invincibility to tyranny is a great conviction we all should emulate to regain our God given rights and be treated as equal to those Meles zenawi proudly called ‘golden’ people. Because of coincidence or other reasons those individuals who are engaged in peaceful opposition against the government and are paying dearly for standing to justice, freedom and equality in Ethiopia today are born and raised in a single region of Ethiopia, the historic city of Gondar!

Tyranny is not only defeated by bullets. It can also be removed by creating public awareness and an informed generation that looks at things not based on race and religion but based on realistic and rational understanding of things. When that is the case, the leader or government will not dare to lie to the people as a tactic of covering human rights violation and unjust practices. The only reason governments lie to their people and attempt deception to perpetuate tyranny and oppression is because they believe the people are ignorant and illiterate. Therefore, it feeds the people all the garbage they think works using the media outlets it monopolizes to serve this very purpose. So, creating a generation that question things and look behind the face value of things presented by the TPLF/EPRDF regime is critical in the fight against misinformation and deception that the Ethiopian government is master of through its shameless Information Minister Bereket Simon. It is speculated that Bereket is from Gondar, as the rest of the people I raised in this topic are. But the fact of the matter is to be Gondare is to put your heart and soul in it than to look away to Eritrea or Tigray where your mother and father came from.

Here below I state the people who never put themselves in the back burner but stood out defending what is right rather than passing things by as if that is not business of their own as many people did. The Anghereb boys stood strong to promoting justice and freedom in Ethiopia against the ever-increasing TPLF/EPRDF oppressive and brutal system of control. The following people exemplify the point I raised.

Eskinder Nega,

He and his family have paid so much for expressing his opinion and the reality on the ground on the state of Ethiopian politics. His wife Serkalem has been imprisoned for years and she has even given birth to a child in her prison cell because of her opinions and reports on the Ethiopian political situation. Because TPLF is so determined to silence any media that exposes its ill-conceived ideas and misguided policies it has imprisoned Eskinder since last year based on a phony terrorism charges. The only place in the world where journalists end up in jail charged as terrorists for expressing their views is Ethiopia. So, the unfortunate Ethiopian journalists are been haunted by this baseless charge that is intended to create fear among free journalists so as to weaken their ability from reporting on the flaws and undemocratic deeds of TPLF/EPRDF. The Ethiopian kangaroo court has convicted Eskinder for 18 years on the basis of this phony charge that is mean to intimidate free press in the country.

Abebe Gellaw

True words, like bullets, cause same level of damage if directed at the right person and in the right time. One Ethiopian with words as fatal as bullet is activist and journalist Abebe Gellaw. Abebe’s open protest against Meles Zenawi in Washington D.C. in 2012 in the middle of an international meeting was remarkable. It has put Meles in shame on the stage he thought he could get appreciation and respect. Although the United States administration has appeased the plight of Ethiopians in terms of justice and freedom, Abebe has been a mouthpiece of millions of Ethiopians who are thrown in prison cells and found in very precarious situations. Among others, the messages of Abebe on the occasion that includes ‘you (Meles) have committed crimes against humanity’ and ‘Meles Zenawi is a dictator’ and the passion he used had caused Meles to panic visibly. One face book friend said ‘Yebandan lij ye arbegna lij sisedbew yimotal’ it means ‘the words of the son of a hero have a killing effect on the son of a traitor.

Andualem Arage

Among current opposing party members, the most passionate and eloquent is Andualem Arage. His undying spirit for the cause of justice and equality is beyond measure. His youth might have contributed for that. I knew him when he came from Gondar and joined our elementary school, Meskerem Hulet or Beata, as it is informally known, in 1982 or 1983 Ethiopian calendar. At the time, since he was a new comer and a good performer we noticed him immediately. He went on to join Addis Ababa University and we graduated around the same time. He studied history and I studied Political Science. I used to admire his views and political stances during debates and in his well-written articles. I hope his hands will soon be unchained and he shall make a difference in the lives of Ethiopians and the political system

Temesgen Desalegn

The other fruit of Gondar who was a victim to TPLF/EPRDF intolerant hand of coercion is journalist Temesgen Desalegn of Fitih newspaper. The crime he is alleged to have committed is writing articles that the government interpreted as “outrages against the Constitution or the Constitutional Order” (Article 238), “defamation and calumny” (Article 613), and “inciting the public through false rumors” (Article 486). The death penalty and life imprisonment are available sentences under Article 238 alone. Temesgen knows the consequence of his open criticism of the government. But, he did not allow his passion for the cause of freedom and justice be subservient to the fear of government retaliation.

Tamagn Beyene

As if Ethiopia is his own home, he has defended it whether others stood with him or not. In the range of two decades, hanging on to one principle and undying purpose is a quality only a few people are endowed with. In the twenty years period when his compatriots fell on the road and gave in to the gifts and benefits offered by TPLF/EPRDF, he stood firm. Solomon Tekalign and Neway Debebe could be mentioned in the category of people with interests rather than people with purpose. In the lows and highs of the political temperature in Ethiopia, he has always expressed his conviction for the creation of a democratic Ethiopia free of one party, one ethnic group and twisted policies of TPLF-led EPRDF buffoon’s game. It is wisdom of higher order to stand for the truth even if you are standing alone. Tamagn, as the others in this list do, belongs in this category.

Abebe Belew

Artist and journalist Abebe Belew shares not only the respect of being part of the struggle for democracy and justice in Ethiopia, he is also part of the river of rebels that flows from the hills of Gondar. His enlightening radio in the DC is an avenue for the discussion and expression of ideas that is best to Ethiopia and its citizens. He has his conscience clean by advocating truth and condemning injustice.

Shambel Belayneh and Elias Tebabal

When the artists we knew who were with us shift the camp and join the TPLF camp I felt frustrated with the low level of conviction these people exhibit. But, what makes my feeling wrong and spirit strong on the artists is people like Shambel and Elias.

As a final note,

I hope you won’t put us in shame by abandoning the true meaning of being a human, to stand for the right and to say no to injustice. Be confident that your sacrifice today as the torchbearers of Ethiopian socio-political renaissance shall create millions like you in every corner of the nation. Ethiopians who are as brave and passionate as you are will reinforce your effort of changing Ethiopian to a place where all of us have a say without being expected or suspected to act in a certain way simply because we spoke a certain language. At last, I beg your forgiveness if I miss out anybody who deserves to be here.

God bless you all and Ethiopia

TPLF woman Arrested with 3 kg of gold and $10,000 for the Second Time

DELHI: Customs officials at IGI Airport arrested an Ethiopian woman for allegedly trying to smuggle into the country over 3 kg of gold worth Rs 89 lakh, along with $10,000 in cash, on Wednesday. They also seized demonetised currency notes of Rs 1,000 amounting to Rs 60,000 from her.

Senior customs officials said that the woman, who arrived from Addis Ababa, was arrested at IGI Airport for the second time. Two months ago, she was caught with 650 grams of gold after which she was released on bail.

In the early hours of Wednesday, she landed at the Delhi airport. A team of customs officials intercepted her at the green channel. During the baggage scanning, five gold bars and jewellery were recovered from her.

“Some US and Indian currency notes were seized from her. She was arrested under Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the gold was seized under Section 110,” said a senior customs official

The customs sleuths suspect a larger racket behind the latest spate of smugglings. The woman reportedly told them she was a carrier and used to supply gold to some syndicate

Ethiopia’s crisis-Things fall apart: will the centre hold?

By RENÉ LEFORT

Things fall apart: will the centre hold?Oct.2,2016.Ethiopian soldiers try to stop protesters in Bishoftu, in the Oromia region of Ethiopia before visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.STR/Press Association. All rights reserved.Almost exactly a year ago, Ethiopia entered its worst crisis since the arrival of the regime in 1991. Last month, a state of emergency was proclaimed. These two events have generated a flood of commentary and analysis. A few key points, sometimes underplayed if not ignored, are worth closer attention.

“Mengist yelem!” – “Authority has disappeared!”

People waited in vain for the government to react other than by brute force alone to the opposition it was facing and the resulting chaos. The unrest in Oromya, Ethiopia’s most populous state with 35% of the country’s total population, began on November 12, 2015; the uprising in part of the Amhara Region, the second largest by population (27%), on July 12, 2016.

For 11 long months the government was content to quell protest and to release information in dribs and drabs, the epitome of one-sided doublespeak. A handful of cryptic press releases repeated the same platitudes ad nauseam. When in June 2016 the ruling power finally realized the severity of the crisis, launching a series of internal deliberations, these took place in total secrecy. This pseudo-communication destroyed its credibility and in turn lent credence to the sole alternative source of information, the diaspora, which itself is often hyperbolic to the point of implausibility. On both sides, the space available for information that exhibits even a degree of measure, not to say simple rationality, is shrinking alarmingly.[1]On both sides, the space available for information that exhibits even a degree of measure, not to say simple rationality, is shrinking alarmingly.

People have stopped taking notice of anything the ruling power says, seeing it as incapable of handling the situation. In short, trust has gone. “It is not even able to listen… It has lost its collective ability to reach the collective mindset of the governed”.[2] The general view is that Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn “always promises but never delivers”.

Both in central government and in the regional authorities, or between one and the other, authority has dramatically deflated. A multitude of anecdotes confirm that it is being ignored – officials simply turn their backs – or even mocked, right up to the highest levels. The man in the street could only conclude: “Mengist yelem !” – “Authority has disappeared!”. This perception, initially confined to the cities, is increasingly reaching into the rural areas as they open up more and more.

An even more serious indictment is spreading. The government’s primary role is to maintain law and order, and it has proved incapable of doing so; worse still, the violence of repression is further fueling discontent. In the end, rather than fulfilling its first duty, the ruling power has become the principal cause of revolt.In the end, rather than fulfilling its first duty, the ruling power has become the principal cause of revolt.

“Meles left with the password”

Why this impotence and loss of credibility?

Under Meles Zenawi, the all-powerful Prime Minister who died suddenly in August 2012, the system of power was like a pyramid. Meles sat enthroned at the summit, and below him, every tier – executive or legislative, political or economic, national or regional, even local – was simply a transmission belt from the top. Party and State were inextricably intertwined. This profoundly centralized and vertical system, intensifying over the years, hung on him alone.

For most observers, the smooth succession from Meles Zenawi to Hailemariam Desalegn proved the robustness of the regime and the reliability of its institutions. However, Hailemariam lacks what it takes to “fill the boots” of his predecessor. Most of his authority comes not from his own resources but has been handed down to him through a constellation of powers – baronies one might call them – characterized not just by their diversity, but also by the rivalry, or even conflict, between them. In short, Ethiopia is left with a system of power tailored for a strongman and filled accordingly, but which now lacks a strongman. “Meles left with the password”, the joke goes.

The succession couldn’t be a change of personnel only. The whole power system too needed reshaping, and this is in full swing. Hence the misfires in response to the crisis.

People used to say that Ethiopia was like a plane on autopilot, controlled by the Meles software (“Meles legacy”). To pursue the metaphor in current circumstances, the more turbulence the plane encounters, the more ineffective the software has proved to be. It is noteworthy that constant references to that legacy have practically disappeared from official rhetoric. So the software has been disconnected, but no pilot – whether individual or collective – has been able to take over the controls.

Three big sources of the crisis

The weakening of central authority – Addis Ababa – has thus released centrifugal – regional – forces that had been steadily stifled in Meles Zenawi’s iron grip. The first source of the current crisis is the trial of strength between central authority and the peripheral powers that it originally created – a sort of bid for emancipation from the father – as well as between the peripheral powers.

At stake is the sharing of powers and resources, notably between the regions and Addis Ababa, where Tigrayans are perceived to be overrepresented, wrongly in their view, quite obviously according to all the other ethnicities.

In other words, what is at stake is the place that should be assigned to the “people’s fundamental freedoms and rights” enshrined in the constitution, collective rights. How can the country make the transition from a bogus and ethnically weighted federalism to real decentralization, which would bring about a more authentic and ethnically fairer federalism, or even confederalism? The immemorial “national question” remains as acute as ever: what will the name Ethiopia come to refer to? In other words, why should and how can an Ethiopian state exist, and on what basis?What will the name Ethiopia come to refer to?

This question has deep historical roots. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the economic centre of gravity shifted from the North – Abyssinia – towards the Centre. But power always remained Abyssinian. At stake in the current crisis is a historic break that would also shift power to the Centre, i.e. to Oromya. Despite their internal divisions, this claim unites the vast majority of Oromo, justified by their numbers and their major contribution to the economy. It is generally agreed that a genuine application of the constitution would be sufficient for this claim to be satisfied.

For the Amhara, whose elite dominated Abyssinian power for more than a century, the challenge is to revamp their identity. They have to say farewell to their historical ascendancy and accept that their place in the Ethiopian state should reflect their numerical and economic importance, no more, no less. In other words, the only way out of the undoubted ostracism they suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo. The assertion of “Amhara-ness” – legitimate as it is – cannot become a cover for the aspiration for a return to an “Ethiopianness” based around Amhara, with the other ethnicities in a lesser role. This metamorphosis is under way, but not yet complete. Nonetheless, many Oromo and even more Tigrayans deny that anything has changed, convinced that this elite has not abandoned its “chauvinism” and “revanchism”,and that the federal system that they defend tooth and nail could therefore never satisfy its deeply cherished ambition.The only way out of the undoubted ostracism [the Amhara] suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo.

These ethno-nationalisms have become inflamed and even paranoid. Today, “all the politics is revolving around ethnicity”, a former senior TPLF official told me, and in a previous remark: “what I see now dominantly… is the proliferation of racial or ethnic hatred”.[3] It is focused on the Tigrayans, not only because of the major role of the Tigrayan Peoples’s Liberation Front (TPLF), but because both Oromo and Amhara equate Tigrayan silence in the face of repression with approval. “The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here”, opines one social scientist, a man familiar with the grass roots of the country.

The second source of the crisis relates to what might be called “democratic aspiration”. In this respect, Ethiopia’s leaders are right to talk about the price of success. Economic growth has brought the emergence of a new middle class, not just urban but also in the countryside, which has seen the rapid enrichment of an upper tier of farmers. In parallel, education has dramatically expanded. This upper tier has opened up to the outside world, in particular through social media. However, the aspiration for “individual rights” runs up against a system of power which, everywhere in Ethiopia, from the summit of the state to the lowliest levels of authority, from the capital to the smallest village, shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization.

Finally, the third source of the crisis relates to collateral damage from super-rapid growth. Such damage is inevitable, but has been exacerbated by the type and methods of development pursued. First, forced imposition through ultra-centralized and secretive decision-making, and brutal execution. “Land grabbing”, and more generally almost instant evictions with absurd levels of compensation, are commonplace. Second, the overwhelming role of the ruling power through the “developmental state” has produced an ever more powerful and arrogant oligarchy embedded in the Party-State. The stakes in the crisis are not only political: they directly concern the mobilization, distribution and therefore the accumulation of resources in the hands of the ruling power, and hence the division of the cake between central and peripheral authorities and/or oligarchies, but also between these oligarchies and the population in general.

The present crisis is particularly acute because these three factors reinforce each other. The demonstrators chant “we want justice” and “we want freedom”, but also “Oromya is not for sale” and “we want self rule” or, in Gondar, the historic capital of the Amhara, “respect for Amhara-ness”.[4]“The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here.”

“Alarmists” and “complacents”

In this poisonous climate, the vigour and scale of the protest accentuated the “crisis of leadership”.[5] It was the first factor responsible for the government’s paralysis, as confirmed by one participant in the last meeting of the Central Committee of the TPLF, in early October. He ascribes it first of all to pure and simple “power struggles”, leading to a tussle that is all the more confused in that these conflicts run through every regional party, the relations between those parties, and between those parties and the centre, while on the same time the centre originates from the peripheries: the supreme decision-making body is the Executive Committee of the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), composed equally of representatives of the TPLF, ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation) and SPDM (Southern People’s Democratic Movement).

These conflicts are first of all personal in nature, based on local affinities, religious solidarities, family connections, not to mention business interests. However, the crisis triggered a new and crucial division, between “alarmists” and “complacents”, the former advocating a rapid shift from the status quo, the latter seeing neither its necessity nor its urgency.

The “old guard” is the backbone of the “alarmists”. It consists of the survivors of the founding group of the TPLF, including the heads of the army and the security services, Samora Yunus and Getachew Assefa, plus some old comrades in arms such as Berket Simon, guiding light of the ANDM. They became involved in politics in the early 1970s, within the student protest movement against Haile Selassie. Their long journey together gives them an experience, a maturity, and a cohesion greater than that of any current within the EPRDF. Concentrated in the centre, in Addis Ababa, most of them were sidelined from official positions as Meles imposed generational change. Returning in force behind the scenes after his death, they are the strongest backers of Hailemariam Dessalegn

They ascribe the crisis to the breaking of the bonds between “the people” and the party. In their view, those most responsible are the regional parties, starting with their new leaders. The urgent priority is to restore those bonds and to reinforce central power, to compensate for the failures of the regional authorities.Everywhere in Ethiopia… shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization.

Hailemariam expressed the anxiety of this group when he said that the issues facing the regime are a matter of “life or death”,[6] and that Ethiopia is “sliding towards ethnic conflict similar to that in neighbouring countries”.[7] Abay Tsehaye, said to be the most political head of the TPLF, raised the specter of a genocide even worse than Rwanda’s.[8] Bereket Simon warned the leadership of his party that the country was sliding towards the abyss. In vain.

In contrast, Debretsion Gebremichael, member of the Politburo of the TPLF and until recently Deputy Prime Minister, one of the foremost of the second generation of leaders, retorted that there had simply been a few, geographically limited “disturbances”, that they did not reflect the overall situation in the country, that “there is no mobilization against Tigrayans anywhere”. And even, dogmatically: “It is not possible to have people to people [i.e. ethnic] conflict in Ethiopia”.[9]

The “complacents” are usually described as “technocrats” and “careerists”. They are considered to be “apparatchiks”, lacking any political fibre, owing their position and the privileges and advantages – often undeserved – that they enjoy, entirely to it.

They will only be able to conceal and perpetuate those benefits as long as the Party remains a bunker. Any opening up, any movement towards a little good governance, transparency, and accountability, would be the end of them. They are also haunted by the implacable rule of “winner takes all” that has accompanied every previous regime change. However, their attitude is ambivalent. On the one hand, they are tooth and nail defenders of the EPRDF’s monopoly of power, and therefore equally implicated in the repression.The ‘complacents’ will only be able to conceal and perpetuate those benefits as long as the Party remains a bunker.

On the other hand, they ascribe responsibility for the crisis to excessive central power, claiming that it hinders regional authority. In order to reverse this imbalance, and thereby strengthen their own positions, they are taking advantage of the outbreaks of ethno-nationalisms, notably by attempting to exploit the corresponding popular demands to their own advantage, up to and including the serious slide into anti-Tigrayan sentiment.

**“The fate of Ethiopia would be determined by its periphery”**

In Oromya, at least part of the OPDO, right up to leadership level, encouraged the opposition to the Addis Ababa Master Plan, the scheme to extend the capital’s administrative scope into adjacent areas of Oromya, which triggered near universal unrest across the whole State.

The same actors then did everything they could to prevent Oromya being placed under military command from Addis Ababa and then, having failed, to put a stop to it. At least locally, the authorities – necessarily members of OPDO – and the militias – under their sole control – went so far as to lend the protesters a hand.

This ethno-nationalist outbreak contributed to the appointment of Lemma Megersa and Workneh Gebeyehu to the leadership of the OPDO, after the forced resignation of numbers one and two Muktar Kedir and Aster Mamo, who were seen as puppets of Addis Ababa. The new duo are long-time members of the security services, but are said to be protégés of Abadula Gemadah, the OPDO’s only strongman, hence formerly sidelined by Meles Zenawi. The main thing is that the OPDO was able to assert its autonomy by electing leaders without external pressure or diktat.

In the Amhara region, it is equally unquestionable that the big initial demonstrations, though officially banned, were held with the support or tacit approval of part of the ANDM. At least at local level, the authorities and the security forces allowed “ethnic cleansing” against Tigrayans to take place, prompting 8000 to flee to Tigray.[10] Gedu Andergatchew, ANDM strongman, who is accused of having at least turned a blind eye, is still in place.

Even in Tigray, the regional authorities – “TPLF Mekele” – are playing the nationalist card. Abay Woldu, President of the region and Chairman of the TPLF, went so far as to declare that the integrity of Tigray was non negotiable, in a clear allusion to Tigray’s retention of the Wolkait area, whose restoration is demanded by some Amhara, and despite Addis Ababa’s call for the Amhara and Tigrayan governments to negotiate this long standing issue.

This firmness played a big part in the shift in at least part of Tigrayan opinion, expressed with rare vehemence by some circles. They vilified the “TPLF Mekele”, despised for its lack of education and impotence. They placed all their hopes in the Tigrayan old guard, “TPLF Addis”. According to them, only this old guard could bring about the democratization essential to the survival of the regime and, in the long term, the Tigrayan minority’s control over its own affairs. The same old guard, they now complain, has doubly betrayed the Tigrayan people: by evolving into an oligarchy that neglects the latter’s economic aspirations; and by turning its back on their national interests.

On the first point, they rightly emphasize that Tigray still lags behind in terms of development. But at the same time Tigrayan businessmen are said to earn exorbitant profits from undeserved privileges. In fact, the paradox is only apparent: there is so little potential in Tigray that they invest elsewhere.

Regarding the “national betrayal”, these critics highlight the old guard’s loyalty to its Marxist past, claiming that they remain “internationalist”, “cosmopolitan”, and “universalist” out of political ambition and material interest. Addis Ababa offers positions and advantages that Tigray, poor and small as it is, would be hard put to provide. The more the balance between centre and periphery shifts towards the centre, the more attractive these positions and advantages become. In short, the view is that the old guard has yielded to a centuries-old tradition of Ethiopian history: letting itself be “assimilated” by the centre and prioritizing the latter’s interests over those of the periphery. As the historian Haggai Erlich has written, “a central position” in Addis Ababa has always been preferable to remaining a “chief in a remote province”.[11]The more the balance between centre and periphery shifts towards the centre, the more attractive these positions and advantages become.

In consequence, these Tigrayans feel they have no other choice than to take charge of their own destiny and count only on themselves, i.e. something like building a “fortress Tigray”. It is up to the new generation to take over from the old, which has given up, even if this means embracing the “narrow nationalism”of which its critics accuse it. This goes as far as to see a re-emergence of the hope of reunifying Tigrayans on both sides of the Ethiopia/Eritrea border into a single nation state.

In this view, the other regions’ demands for self-rule should therefore be heard. Central government should be content with “regulating”, “balancing”, “moderating”, “arbitrating”, “coordinating”, etc. That it should be headed by an Oromo prime minister would be in the natural order of things, since Ormoya has the largest population, and would help to calm feelings in the region. In short, one Tigrayan intellectual has joked, a new Age of the Princes would be established, but one in which the Princes did not fight amongst themselves,[12]more seriously going on to express the wish that, for the first time in history, “the fate of Ethiopia would be determined by its periphery”.

State of emergency

The indignation aroused by the carnage in Bishoftu during the traditional Oromo annual festival (October 2),[13] the widespread destruction that followed the call for “five days of rage” in response, made the ruling power’s paralysis even more untenable. At the same time, the series of internal consultations within the EPRDF was coming to an end. The package of measures announced on October 9 reflects the shakiness of the snatched compromise. However acute their lack of mutual trust, the political currents and/or the ethnic components of the EPRDF had to arrive at an agreement: they knew that they had “to work together or else to sink together”.

The state of emergency was proclaimed in order “to deal with anti-peace elements that… are jeopardising the peace and security of the country”.[14]Commentators see it as evidence that the regime was “overwhelmed”. But it adds little, whether to the existing legislative arsenal,[15] or to the operational capacities of the security forces since, in practice, they have never seen themselves as severely restricted by the law.

The first objective is to instil fear and uncertainty, especially as several provisions are so vague that they can be interpreted in almost any way. They are now in everyone’s mind. For example, for the first time, long-standing informants have cancelled interviews because of the potential risk.The first objective is to instil fear and uncertainty.

The second objective is to give the military the legal sanction that army chief Samora Yunus was demanding as a condition of continuing to maintain internal order.

However, this proclamation also demonstrates that the centre has won a round in its trial of strength with the peripheries. The state of emergency places all the forces of order under the authority of a federal Command Post, with Hailemariam Dessalegn at its head and the Minister of Defense as its secretary. They thus control the mono-ethnic Special Regional Police in each state, who with 80,000 members far outnumber the Federal Police (around 40,000), and even more so the Army Special Force (the famous Agazi red berets, around 4000). The 500,000 or so militiamen also come under their authority. That is why the proclamation encountered ferocious opposition within the OPDO and ANDM.

Essentially, however, the state of emergency is a show of strength. Not only to try to reassure increasingly nervous foreign investors,[16] but above all to convince the population of the regime’s determination to recover total control of the entire country by any means – the obsession of any Ethiopian ruling power worthy of the name – and, at the same time, to make its promise of reforms credible. Otherwise, it would have been perceived as a capitulation. Sebhat Nega, patriarch of the TPLF, explained that the purpose of the state of emergency was “to create a situation to make us able to reform”.[17]

Ultimately, the aim of the compromise reached within the party was to drive a wedge between the “violent, extremist and armed struggle” – to be repressed through the state of emergency – and the “democratic peaceful engagement” expressed by so many demonstrators – holding out a hand via reform.[18]

“Leadership has miserably failed”

Interviews with senior officials cast light on the analysis that the leadership as a whole finally agreed upon. Emollient though it may be, they are all now sticking by it and keeping their previous disagreements to themselves.[19]

The analysis goes as follows: the spirit and letter of the constitution are perfect, as are therefore the federal structure, the format of the institutions, the political line. The latter is not “based on ideology but on the natural laws of development”, as it previously was on Marxist “science”. “Show me a developing country anywhere in the world which has a political strategy and guidelines as well articulated as Ethiopia!” This perfection has accomplished “miracles”. The current crisis is simply “the price of our successes”. It was preceded and will be followed by others, because it is nothing more than a stage, unremarkable and inevitable, on the path that will undoubtedly culminate in the nation catching up with developed countries in the next few decades.

However, this stage, like any other, requires “adjustments”, especially as the society – richer, more educated, more mature – has become a “demanding society”. The young in particular, the spearhead of protest, are making demands that are socio-economic rather than political. The regime is facing “challenges” for having failed to make these adjustments in time.

The main problem is deficiencies in implementation. In sum, things have gone off the rails because of human failings. Yielding to corruption, bad governance, lack of accountability, etc., “leadership at various levels of the government structure has miserably failed to fully and timely[sic] address the demands made and the questions raised by the people”.[20] The response to the crisis must therefore take two forms. First a massive purge at all levels of the Party, regional governments, the administration. Then, “to delineate” – the new watchword – the Party from the government, from the Assemblies, from justice, etc. in order to develop a system of checks and balances, since the self-correcting mechanisms within the Party have proved inadequate.The essential thing is “to discuss… with all stakeholders” in all possible and imaginable “debating platforms”, “assemblies”, “fora”, but with no specific goal or timetable, and under the sole authority of the EPRDF.

For youth employment, a “Mobile Youth Fund” funded to the tune of 500 million dollars – some 4% of the annual budget – will be created, though the details are vague and it will take several years before its effects are felt. Above all, it is part of a largely endogenous strategy of industrialization, focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) on the edge of the rural areas, whereas heated debate continues within the leadership with those who advocate prioritizing foreign investment in “Industrial Parks”.

Angela Merkel and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn at the national palace in Addis Ababa, Oct. 11, 2016. The German Chancellor visited Ethiopia to discuss the country’s newly declared state of emergency. Mulugeta Ayene/Press Association. All rights reserved.In strictly political terms, “our democratization process is still nascent. It is moving in the right direction, but it has not yet come up with inclusive engagement”, stated the PM.[21] Electoral law will be reformed to introduce an element of proportional representation into majority rule. However, the next elections are in 2020, and the dozens of opposition MPs present before the 2005 elections could do almost nothing to temper the authoritarianism of the regime. The essential thing is “to discuss… with all stakeholders” in all possible and imaginable “debating platforms”, “assemblies”, “fora”, but with no specific goal or timetable, and under the sole authority of the EPRDF. A promise reiterated year after year, without impact. One of the essential causes of the crisis, its federal dimension, is covered in a single short sentence in the 15 pages of President Mulatu’s speech: “more should be done for the effective implementation of the federal system”. In any case, “Ethiopia is an idol… and exemplary for the world for peaceful [interethnic] coexistence”, declares the State Minister for Federal Affairs.[22]

Anticipating the worst

What emerges from all the interviews with nonofficial contacts is that the expectation of a symbolic gesture, one that would be significant and have immediate impact, proving that the regime had grasped the essence of the crisis and wishes sincerely to address it, has not been met.

According to them, the regime is relying first on repression, and on reforms only as a “footnote”. Merera Gudina, a long-standing leader of the opposition, sums up the general sentiment: “too little, too late”.[23] Nothing has been done to reach out to either the main opposition forces, even the legal opposition, nor the civil society or the media, quite the contrary. This could be envisaged only after the end of the state of emergency, Hailemariam is said to have told one figure from the international community.

These interlocutors share the dark pessimism of an editorial in the Washington Post: “the state of emergency will bottle up the pressures even more, increasing the likelihood they will explode anew… It won’t work”.[24] According to this view, the chances of a genuine opening up on the part of the regime are so small that there is a high probability that the worst will happen: a threat to the very survival of the country, the only question being when this dislocation would occur.Washington Post: “the state of emergency … It won’t work”

While the official media bang on about the “strong commitment” of the leadership “to make its promise of deep reform a reality”,[25] interviews with top officials provide hints of the form and scope of reform, which remain consistent with the official analysis of the crisis.

Focus on “service delivery”

There is no urgency: change will be “an ongoing endless process”. The first specific deadline is in seven months, in June 2017, to report back on the purge and examine a document currently in preparation, on what the EPRDF should become in the next ten years.

In this view, the crisis is not systemic. So neither the constitution, nor the institutions, nor the political line will be touched. How could the latter be challenged since it obeys universal “laws”? For that reason, regardless of all the promised “discussions”, no convincing reasons are given for the much touted opening up to entail any restructuring of the political arena.

The EPRDF alone, as sectarian as ever, has understood and applies these “laws”, whereas the opposition parties oppose or reject them. The EPRDF alone has the near monopoly of skills needed to implement them, skills that the other parties lack. In short, the opposition is still not “constructive”. If the regime needs to become more inclusive, it is essentially in material terms, by sharing the cake more fairly through improvements in “service delivery”.

To do this, it is necessary and sufficient to put an end to individual erring through the self-reform of the EPRDF, i.e. reform by and for the Party itself. To achieve the famous “delineation”, MPs, judges, ministers, civil servants, etc. would split themselves in two, remaining obedient to the Party but putting their mission first. Why would they do this, given that they never have before? “Because they have become aware of the crisis”, is the explanation. So responding to the crisis requires no systemic reshaping through the establishment of independent counterforces. A U-turn in individual behaviour will be enough.Why would they do this, given that they never have before?

The EPRDF sticks to the same age-old paradigm. Since Ethiopia is still at a precapitalist stage, the intelligentsia is the only social group capable of setting the path to follow and leading the way. The EPRDF contains its best elements. Ethnic identities continue to be society’s main structuring factor. The EPRDF alone represents them. As one senior official confirmed, it is not until the country enters a capitalist stage that pluralism will imposed itself: with the emergence of social classes, each will construct its own political party to express its interests. What the EPRDF is still seeking is not simultaneous development AND democracy, but development THEN democracy.

In this respect, the arrival of technocrats – brandishing the indispensable PhD and with no major party position – was widely interpreted as evidence of a new openness in the cabinet reshuffle. Yet it perpetuates the monopoly rule of the “intellocracy”.

The paradox of the strongman

The consensus reached on October 9 is fragile and hence precarious. Nothing proves that the “reformers” have won the long-term game, though they have scored a point. Deep down, they do not share the same views. They lack a standout personality to act as a leader.

They have a clear view of where they want to go, which is to apply the constitution to the letter, but over a very long timescale and with no precise and concerted idea of the steps needed to get there. As for their rank-and-file adherents, they make no secret of still embracing the same paradox: we need reforms, but we need a new strongman to manage and impose them, for fear that they will otherwise lead to chaos.We need reforms, but we need a new strongman to manage and impose them.

On the opposition side, all the Oromo we spoke to emphasized the generational gap between the educated youth, broadly aged 16 to 25, spearhead of the protests notably in Oromya, and their elders. The latter are ambivalent. They feel a sincere empathy for the grievances and aspirations of the younger generation, but have reservations, even hostility, regarding the violent methods sometimes employed. In some cases they even physically opposed attempts at destruction during the “five days of rage”.[26] They remain traumatized by the Civil War under the previous regime, the Derg. Then they acquired military know-how that the young activists don’t have.

The latter also lack coordination and leadership. For all these reasons, a historian of armed popular uprisings in Ethiopia in the twentieth century has concluded that it is unlikely that the protests could become a significant guerrilla campaign, or that a sustained armed peasant upsurge – a “jacquerie” could occur.

As for the pockets of insurrection that have appeared in the Amhara region, they mainly affect areas where the authorities’ control has always been weak, even essentially formal.

Ethiopian history teaches that a regime only falls if its forces of repression, or at least part of them, turn against it. Today, apart from a few unconfirmed incidents, cohesion seems to be holding, say experts close to them. It might only break down if the EPRDF became divided to the point of being torn apart by centrifugal forces. However, the military command has always let it be known that it would intervene before this happened, as ultimate saviour of the regime. Under these circumstances, steady deterioration – a kind of rotting, seems a possible scenario.

Under these circumstances, steady deterioration – a kind of rotting, seems a possible scenario. Without any substantive resolution, the regime could re-establish law and order, as the first effects of the state of emergency seem to suggest. The reforms would not tackle the core problems. The ruling power would remain contested and delegitimized but, in the absence of an alternative, Ethiopians would toe the line. Investors would remain cautious, not to say skittish, affecting economic growth. But neither of the two opposing camps would gain the upper hand, any more than they would reach a constructive compromise. Ultimately, what might possibly occur is a classic scenario in Ethiopian history: the demise of one strongman, followed by a period of great disorder until a new strongman takes up the reins.

[1] See for example Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ethiopia/2016-11-07/twitter-hurting-ethiopia

[2] Unless otherwise specified, all quotations are taken from interviews conducted in October 2016 in Addis Ababa and Mekele, with people who, for obvious reasons, wished to remain anonymous.

[3] Interview, Addis Ababa, October 2016 and Addis Standard, September 28, 2016, http://addisstandard.com/ethiopias-gradual-journey-verge-crisis/

[4] Tigray On Line, July 31 2016, http://hornaffairs.com/en/2016/07/31/ethiopia-massive-protest-gondar/

[5] See René Lefort, Open Democracy, July 4, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%c3%a9-lefort/ethiopia-leadership-in-disarray

[6] Walta, August 30, 2015, www.waltainfo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20802:eprdf-determines-to-cease-talking-but-deliver-good-governanace&catid=71:editors-pick&Itemid=396

[7] BBC, August 3, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-36883387

[8] Ethiomedia, September 10, 2016, http://www.ethiomedia.com/1016notes/7451.html

[9] AlMariam, September 25, 2016, http://almariam.com/2016/09/25/disinformation-in-t-tplf-land-of-living-lies-pinocchio-preaches-truth-against-perception-in-ethiopia/

[10] Tigray Online, October 10, 2016, http://www.tigraionline.com/articles/tigraians-victims-inamara.html

[11] Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula, Ras Seyum, Tigre and Ethiopia integrity, p. 364, Proceedings of the Eight International Conference on Ethiopia Studies, Vol. 1, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, Froebenius Institute, Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 1988.

[12] During the Age of the Princes (1769-1855), the Emperor’s power was purely nominal, and local warlords, in constant conflict, ruled the provinces.

[13] Human Rigths Watch has published the most exhaustive narrative of this event but with some omissions, which put its balance into question. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/08/qa-recent-events-and-deaths-irreecha-festival-ethiopia

[14] Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, October 9, 2016, cited by http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia-declares-state-emergency-protests-161009110506730.html

[15] Addis Standard, November 2, 2016, http://addisstandard.com/why-ethiopias-freewheeling-regime-does-need-a-state-of-emergency/

[16] See for example Washington Post, November 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/investors-shy-away-from-ethiopia-in-the-wake-of-violent-protests/2016/11/01/2d998788-9cae-11e6-b552-b1f85e484086_story.html

[17] Interview, Addis Ababa, October 2016.

[18] Ethiopian News Agency, October 11, 2016, http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/politics/item/2082-pm-reaffirms-government-s-commitment-to-democratization

[19] Unless otherwise stated, the quotations that follow are taken from these interviews.

[20] Speech by President of the Republic Mulatu Teshome before both Houses, October 10, 2016.

[21] Ethiopian News Agency, October 11, 2016, http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/politics/item/2082-pm-reaffirms-government-s-commitment-to-democratization.

[22] Walta, November 7, 2016, http://www.waltainfo.com/index.php/news/detail/25576

[23] AFP, October 11, 2016, http://en.rfi.fr/wire/20161011-ethiopia-pm-seeks-reform-electoral-system-after-protests

[24] Washington Post, October 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ethiopia-meets-protests-with-bullets/2016/10/11/0f54aa02-8f14-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html

[25] Walta, November 5, 2016, http://www.waltainfo.com/index.php/news/editors_pick/detail?cid=25549

[26] See for example Washington Post, November 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/investors-shy-away-from-ethiopia-in-the-wake-of-violent-protests/2016/11/01/2d998788-9cae-11e6-b552-b1f85e484086_story.html

How Africa Would Look Like If It Wasn’t Colonized by the Europeans?

BigThink

What if the Black Plague had killed off almost all Europeans? Then the Reconquista never happens. Spain and Portugal don’t kickstart Europe’s colonization of other continents. And this is what Africa might have looked like.

The map – upside down, to skew our traditional eurocentric point of view – shows an Africa dominated by Islamic states, and native kingdoms and federations. All have at least some basis in history, linguistics or ethnography. None of their borders is concurrent with any of the straight lines imposed on the continent by European powers, during the 1884-85 Berlin Conference and in the subsequent Scramble for Africa. By 1914, Europeans controlled 90% of Africa’s land mass. Only the Abyssinian Empire (modern-day Ethiopia) and Liberia (founded in 1847 as a haven for freed African-American slaves) remained independent.

This map is the result of an entirely different course of history. The continent depicted here isn’t even called Africa [1] but Alkebu-Lan, supposedly Arabic for ‘Land of the Blacks’ [2]. That name is sometimes used by those who reject even the name ‘Africa’ as a European imposition. It is therefore an ideal title for this thought experiment by Swedish artist Nikolaj Cyon. Essentially, it formulates a cartographic answer to the question: What would Africa have looked like if Europe hadn’t become a colonizing power?

To arrive at this map, Cyon constructed an alternative timeline. Its difference from our own starts in the mid-14th century. The point of divergence: the deadliness of the Plague. In our own timeline, over the course of the half dozen years from 1346 to 1353, the Black Death [3] wiped out between 30 and 60% of Europe’s population. It would take the continent more than a century to reach pre-Plague population levels. That was terrible enough. But what if Europe had suffered an even more catastrophic extermination – one from which it could not recover?

Allohistorical Africa, seen from our North-up perspective. The continent’s superstates (at least size-wise): Al-Maghrib, Al-Misr, Songhai, Ethiopia, Kongo and Katanga.

European colonies in Africa in ‘our’ 1913. Blue: France, pink: Britain, light green: Germany, dark green: Italy, light purple: Spain, dark purple: Portugal, yellow: Belgium, white: independent. Lines reflect current borders.

Cyon borrowed this counterfactual hypothesis from The Years of Rice and Salt, an alternate history novel by Kim Stanley Robinson. The book, first published in 2002, explores how the depopulation of Europe would have altered world history. Robinson speculates that Europe would have been colonized by Muslims from the 14th century onwards, and that the 20th century would see a world war between a sprawling Muslim alliance on the one side, and the Chinese empire and the Indian and native American federations on the other.

Cyon focuses on Africa – or rather, Alkebu-Lan – which in his version of events doesn’t suffer the ignomy and injustice of the European slave trade and subsequent colonization. In our timeline, Europe’s domination of Africa obscured the latter continent’s rich history and many cultural achievements. On the map of Cyon’s Africa, a many-splendored landscape of nations and empires, all native to the continent itself, gives the lie to the 19th- and 20th-century European presumption that Africa merely was a ‘dark continent’ to be enlightened, or a ‘blank page’ for someone else to write upon.

Basing himself on Unesco’s General History of Africa, Cyon built his map around historical empires, linguistic regions and natural boundaries. His snapshot is taken in 1844 (or 1260 Anno Hegirae), also the date of a map of tribal and political units in Unesco’s multi-volume General History.

Al-Andalus, in this timeline still a dependency of Al-Maghrib; and the Emirate of Sicily to the left of the map.

Zooming in on the northern (bottom) part of the map, we see an ironic reversal of the present situation: in our timeline, Spain is still holding on to Ceuta, Melilla and other plazas de soberania in Northern Africa. In Cyon’s world, most of the Iberian peninsula still called Al-Andalus, and is an overseas part of Al-Maghrib, a counterfactual Moroccan superstate covering a huge swathe of northwestern Africa. Sicily, which we consider to be part of Europe, is colored in as African, and goes by the name of Siqilliyya Imārat (Emirate of Sicily).

The Arabic is no accident. Absent the European imprint, Islam has left an even more visible mark on large swathes of North, West and East Africa than it has today. Numerous states carry the nomenclature Sultānat, Khilāfator Imārat. The difference between a Caliphate, Sultanate and Emirate?

A Caliph claims supreme religious and political leadership as the successor (caliph) to Muhammad, ideally over all Muslims. I spot two Caliphates on the map: Hafsid (centered on Tunis, but much larger than Tunisia), and Sokoto in West Africa (nowadays: northwest Nigeria).

Sokoto, Dahomey, Benin and other states in country-rich West Africa.

A Sultan is an independent Islamic ruler who does not claim spiritual leadership. Five states in the greater Somalia region are Sultanates, for example: Majerteen, Hiraab, Geledi, Adāl and Warsangele. Others include Az-Zarqa (in present-day Sudan), Misr (Egypt, but also virtually all of today’s Israel), and Tarābulus (capital: Tripoli, in our Libya).

An Emir is a prince or a governor of a province, implying some suzerainity to a higher power. There’s a cluster of them in West Africa: Trarza, Tagant, Brakna, all south of Al-Maghrib. But they are elsewhere too: Kano and Katsina, just north of Sokoto.

Islam of course did not originate in Africa, and some would claim that its dominance of large areas of Africa, at the expense of pre-existing belief systems, is as much an example of foreign cultural imperialism as the spread of Western religions and languages is in our day. But that is material for another thought experiment. This one aims to filter out the European influence.

Neither European nor Arab influence is in evidence in the southern part of Africa – although some toponyms relate directly to states in our timeline: BaTswana is Botswana, Wene wa Kongo refers to the two countries bearing that name. Umoja wa Falme za Katanga is echoed in the name of the DR Congo’s giant inland province, Katanga. Rundi, Banyarwanda and Buganda, squeezed in between the Great Lakes, are alternative versions of ‘our’ Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.

Some familiar-sounding names around the Great Lakes.

There is an interesting parallel to the Africa/Alkebu-Lan dichotomy in the toponymic ebb and flow of Congo and Zaïre as names for the former Belgian colony at the center of the continent. Congo, denoting both the stream and the two countries on either of its lower banks [4], derives from 16th- and 17th-century Bantu kingdoms such as Esikongo, Manikongo and Kakongo near the mouth of the river.

The name was taken up by European cartographers and the territory it covered eventually reached deep inland. But because of its long association with colonialism, and also to fix his own imprint on the country, Congo’s dictator Mobutu in 1971 changed the name of the country and the stream to Zaïre. The name-change was part of a campaign for local authenticity which also entailed the Africanisation of the names of persons and cities [5], and the introduction of the abacos [6] – a local alternative to European formal and businesswear.

Curiously for a campaign trying to rid the country of European influences, the name Zaïre actually was a Portuguese corruption of Nzadi o Nzere, a local term meaning ‘River that Swallows Rivers’. Zaïre was the Portuguese name for the Congo stream in the 16th and 17th centuries, but gradually lost ground to Congo before being picked up again by Mobutu.

After the ouster and death of Mobutu, the country reverted to its former name, but chose the predicate Democratic Republic to distinguish itself from the Republic of Congo across the eponymous river.

Kongo – a coastal superstate in the alternative timeline.

This particular tug of war is emblematic for the symbolism attached to place names, especially in Africa, where many either refer to a precolonial past (e.g. Ghana and Benin, named after ancient kingdoms), represent the vestiges of the colonial era (e.g. Lüderitz, in Namibia), or attempt to build a postcolonial consensus (e.g. Tanzania, a portmanteau name for Tanganyika and Zanzibar).

By taking the colonial trauma out of the equation, this map offers a uniquely a-colonial perspective on the continent, whether it is called Africa or Alkebu-Lan.

Map of Alkebu-Lan and excerpts thereof reproduced by kind permission of Nikolaj Cyon. See it in full resolution on this page of his website. Map of Africa in 1913 by Eric Gaba (Wikimedia Commons User: Sting), found here on Wikimedia Commons.

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Strange Maps #688

[1] A name popularized by the Romans. It is of uncertain origin, possibly meaning ‘sunny’, ‘dusty’ or ‘cave-y’.

[2] The origin and meaning of the toponym are disputed. The Arabic for ‘Land of the Blacks’ would be Bilad as-Sudan, which is how the present-day country of Sudan got its name.Other translations offered for Alkebu-Lan (also rendered as Al-Kebulan or Alkebulan) are ‘Garden of Life’, ‘Cradle of Life’, or simply ‘the Motherland’. Although supposedly of ancient origin, the term was popularized by the academic Yosef A.A. Ben-Jochannan (b. 1918). The term is not a 20th-century invention, however. Its first traceable use is in La Iberiada (1813), an epic poem from 1813 by Ramón Valvidares y Longo. In the index, where the origin of ‘Africa’ is explained, it reads: “Han dado las naciones á este pais diversos nombres, llamándole Ephrikia los Turcos, Alkebulan los Arabes, Besecath los Indios, y los pueblos del territorio Iphrikia ó Aphrikia: los Griegos, en fin, le apellidaron Libia, y despues Africa, cuyo nombre han adoptado los Españoles, Italianos, Latinos, Ingleses y algunos otros pueblos de la Europa”.

[3] A.k.a. the Plague, a very contagious and highly deadly disease caused by Yersinia pestis. That bacterium infested the fleas that lived on the rats coming over from Crimea to Europe on Genoese merchant ships.

[4] In fact, Brazzaville and Kinshasa, capitals of the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo respectively, are positioned across from each other on the banks of the Congo River – the only example in the world of two national capitals adjacent to each other.

[5] The ‘founder-president’ himself changed his name from Joseph-Désiré Mobutu to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa za Banga. The capital Léopoldville was renamed Kinshasa, after an ancient village on the same site.

[6] Despite the African-sounding name, abacos is an acronym of à bas costumes, or: ‘Down with (Western) suits’.

Only China, Syria, and Iran rank worse in internet freedom than Ethiopia

By Quartz

Ethiopia’s internet is among the least free in the world. According to a new index released by the nonprofit Freedom House, Ethiopia ranked ahead of only Iran, Syria, and China, out of 65 countries in terms of access to the internet, censorship, and freedom of information. It ranked the worst of any country in Africa.

This isn’t surprising. Anti-government protests have gripped the country over the last year, gaining extra global attention when Ethiopian marathoner Feyisa Lilesa held his hands up, crossed at the wrist–an anti-government gesture used by protesters—at the Olympics. In response, Ethiopian authorities have intermittently shut down mobile phone and internet connections. They have also blocked social media like Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter.

Last month, a six-month state of emergency was declared, making it illegal to post or access information about the protests on social media as well as communicate with “outside forces.” Social media is also used to implicate dissidents and critics. Charges against protesters and opposition leaders often rely on evidence taken from social media, according to Freedom House.

The situation is likely to continue. In recent weeks, authorities have detained four journalists, including two bloggers from the Zone 9 collective that was charged and later acquitted under the anti-terrorism last year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).Ethiopia’s heavy-handed approach to the internet goes further back than this last year. The country has passed counter-terrorism laws over the last five years that make it easier to pressure journalists and bloggers. The blogger Zelalem Workagenehu was sentenced to five yearsin prison this spring for running a course on digital security that authorities said was a cover for terrorist activities. Authorities have blocked news sites reporting on topics aside from the protests, like a severe drought that has left 18 million people in need of food and water supplies.

Government-owned EthioTelecom has a monopoly on internet access. Only 12% of the population has internet access and few people can afford it, given mobile access costs $85 a month compared to $30 a month in neighboring countries like Uganda or Kenya. Telecommunication infrastructure in rural areas, where most of Ethiopia’s population lives, is almost entirely absent.

Nor has the government opened the sector to competition. Chinese telecom firms ZTE and Huawei have been contracted to upgrade broadband and other networks in the country. But critics worry that Chinese investment is only helping EthioTelecom maintain its hold on the sector and continue censoring and surveilling citizens.

One bright spot is the growing network of bloggers and journalists in the Ethiopian diaspora who have been using their contacts within the country provide coverage of the country. “Silencing those who criticize the government’s handling of protests will not bring stability,” said Angela Quintal, the Africa program coordinator for CPJ.