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Donald Trump’s foreign policy on Africa is likely to be: ‘Where’s that?’

By Peter Vale Professor of Humanities and the Director of the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), University of Johannesburg

University of Johannesburg

US President elect Donald Trump greets supporters on election night in New York. Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

Africa is likely to slide down the list of foreign policy priorities of a Donald Trump administration. This is because America’s foreign policy is determined by both domestic and foreign issues.

When it comes to domestic factors Trump is not going to be open to lobbying by the African diaspora in the US which has, historically, always played an important role in pushing African policy and keeping the continent on the domestic agenda. But this constituency hasn’t helpedTrump at all in this election so there’s no need for any payback. And I think that the kind of visibility Africa had is also going to fall in social movements and society in general in the US.

Trump is also unlikely to have any tolerance for the idea that the African diaspora is part of the “sixth region” of Africa. The African Union recognises people of African decent who live outside the continent as the sixth region, in addition to southern, eastern, central, western and northern Africa.

This isn’t going to be something that is of much concern to the new president-elect.

In addition, I think that he is going to be intolerant and disinterested in issues around the domestic politics of African countries. That is unless – as he was very clear in his acceptance speech – they strongly impinge on American national interests.

For example, I don’t think he is going to be very interested in what is happening in Somalia or Ethiopia or in other parts of Africa where there may be conflict. Trump hasn’t got a great capacity for detail, so at best he will live by macro assessments.

The other break with tradition is that it’s impossible to predict who he will chose as his assistant-secretary of state for Africa. As a follower of foreign policy over the past 40 years it has been possible, in nearly all instances, to know who the new incumbent is likely to be. Examples include Chester Crocker, Hank Cohen and Susan Rice. Now with Trump, we simply have no indication.

With this in mind I think it is really important for African countries, including South Africa, to be very conscious, constructive and conspicuous in their choices of ambassador. These appointments will be crucial in opening the doors to the new Trump administration. The worst that African countries can do, however difficult it will be politically, would be to show their displeasure and hold their noses.

Security will be a major issue

Security is going to be a major issue on Trump’s foreign policy agenda. This points directly at the US African Command, which was established in 2007. Africom, as it is generally known, is one of six of the US Defence Department’s “geographic combatant commands and is responsible to the Secretary of Defence for military relations with African nations, the African Union and African regional security organisations”.

When it comes to American policy in Africa, Africom is very likely to emerge as its central piece. Given Trump’s expressed, belligerent viewson the Muslim world, Africom will be set to be the lynchpin. I think African countries should resist this because it is central to American ideology in the world and will bring African countries into conflict with China. But whether African states will in fact resist is a different issue.

In fact, I think one of the issues African leaders will have to be careful about now is how they have to manage their relationships with China and the US. The US has been a little bit lackadaisical in its approach to Africa while China has made great strides on the continent. Not all, in my view, bad. The US will in all likelihood resist the inroads China has made, an issue African leaders will have to manage with kid gloves.

Trade won’t be a given

The African Growth and Opportunity Act AGOA, which came into effect 16 years ago, is aimed at expanding US trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa. It is supposed to “stimulate economic growth, to encourage economic integration, and to facilitate sub-Saharan Africa’s integration into the global economy”.

There’s still some life left in the act. But it’s clear that Trump is protectionist. He is not going to tolerate any expansion or extension of the agreement, or any misunderstandings. This means American trade policy under Trump needs to be watched closely.

There is also likely to be a decline in aid to Africa from the US. For some African countries aid from the US is absolutely crucial. Take Malawi for example, where it is essential and necessary. As a businessman Trump will want something in return and it’s unlikely he will get his sort of returns on investment from most African countries. His possible response will be that of a reality show host – eject any errant contestants.

Another factor that will affect investment is that Trump is going to improve American infrastructure. I think he is going to borrow and he is going to use the money to rebuild the US because that is his project, to “make America great again”. He will most certainly not care if it comes at the expense of aid to or trade with a number African countries.

The next four years promise to test Africa’s place in the world. The lodestars by which we have understood politics such as rightwing, fiscal conservative, social conservative are all going to be overturned.

What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa

By Mark Anderson and Nicholas Norbrook | The Africa Report

Image result for dictator donald trump

Donald Trump has been elected the 45th president of the United States. Here’s what his presidency could mean for Africa:

Slowing economic growth

Africa’s economies are already struggling with the downturn. If Trump’s nationalist rhetoric on trade is translated into action, expect, “a global recession, with no end in sight”, according to economist Paul Krugman. The recently re-signed AGOA trade deal between Africa and the US, worth some $50bn, is under threat. More seriously, if Trump holds good to his promise to pick a trade war with China, the aggregate demand for commodities will plummet further – one of the key drivers of many African economies.

Upon news of Trump’s election, stock futures fell in Asia and Europe and the Dow Jones dropped 800 points. Financial markets see Trump as an uncertainty. He has suggested that the US should buy back some of its $20tn debt – at a discount of course.

Empowering dictators

Trump is known to be fond of the leadership styles of Saddam Hussein and Vladimir Putin. The US president-elect has already been congratulated by two members of Africa’s third term club: Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza and Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni.

Trump has publicly supported torture and called for the killing of the families of terrorists. He also supports the continuing use of the notorious Guantanamo Bay facility in Cuba. Incumbent President Barack Obama had promised to close that facility during his presidency.

Slashing development aid

The US is the world’s biggest bilateral aid donor. Last year Washington spent $31bn on overseas development assistance, with much of those funds going to Africa. In an interview with the Washington Post, Trump said his presidency will focus on internal programmes rather than overseas aid. “We have no money for education because we can’t build in our own country,” he said. “And at what point do you say hey, we have to take care of ourselves. So, you know, I know the outer world exists and I’ll be very cognizant of that but at the same time, our country is disintegrating, large sections of it, especially in the inner cities.”

Trump has, however, spoken out in support of the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which was former President George W. Bush’s main Africa-focused initiative during his presidency between 2000 and 2008.

Extremist recruitment

Trump’s calls for a temporary ban on muslim immigrants into the US was heavily criticised as xenophobic and divisive. Somali terror group Al Shabaab has cells in the US, most notably in Minnesota where there is a large Somali population. On Monday, Trump spoke out against the Somali community during a visit to Minnesota. “You’ve seen first-hand the problems caused with faulty refugee vetting, with very large numbers of Somali refugees coming into your state without your knowledge, without your support or approval,” he told a cheering crowd. “Some of them [are] joining Isis and spreading their extremist views all over our country and all over the world.” These comments are likely to make more young men feel marginalised, driving them into the arms of terror organisations.

Climate change

Trump’s victory will land as a bombshell in Marrakech, where politicians and activists are gathering to continue implementation of the landmark climate deal signed in Paris last year. But many of Trump’s supporters are climate change skeptics. For the many Africans living on coasts threatened by rising seawaters – 20 million people in Nigeria alone – this is bad news. Likewise the two in three people on the continent who rely on agriculture, and are threatened by drought and water shortages.

European repercussions

And with elections scheduled across Europe in 2017 – France, Germany, Italy – might far-right forces like the Front Nationale feel the wind at their back? Should a populist wave crash across Europe, migrants already under siege will face tougher pressures. Already in post-Brexit Britain, racists have been emboldened in their physical confrontations with migrants. Identity checks, internment camps, populist-inspired violence, closed borders: europeans may have uncomfortable flashbacks to the 1930s.

Read the original article on Theafricareport.com : What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa | International
Follow us: @theafricareport on Twitter | theafricareport on Facebook

What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa

By Mark Anderson and Nicholas Norbrook | The Africa Report

Image result for dictator donald trump

Donald Trump has been elected the 45th president of the United States. Here’s what his presidency could mean for Africa:

Slowing economic growth

Empowering dictators

Slashing development aid

Extremist recruitment

Climate change

European repercussions

Read the original article on Theafricareport.com : What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa | International
Follow us: @theafricareport on Twitter | theafricareport on Facebook

Tedros Adhanom and WHO questions

Why is Morocco Returning to African Union?

By Joseph Rwagatare

Two countries are making determined efforts to return to Africa. One is, in fact, an African country. Morocco left the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 32 years ago over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) to the continental body.

Morocco considers SADR (Western Sahara), until 1976 a Spanish colony, one of its provinces.

That quarrel has not ended, but it appears Morocco sees it in its best interest to return to the fold. There are several probable reasons for this change.

Although the African Union (AU) and some other countries recognise SADR, the reality on the ground has remained unchanged for the past three decades. SADR controls about 25% of the territory while Morocco controls the rest.

The political and diplomatic situation is a stalemate, but one in which Morocco has a stronger hand. So there is probably no strong reason for Morocco to remain in the cold.

Besides, staying out of the African Union isolates Morocco from a growing market. Africa’s economies are growing and its people are increasingly earning higher incomes.

And with this comes a more visible and bigger role in international affairs. So there are economic and diplomatic benefits to be gained from closer engagement.

To show that they mean business and want to be actively involved with the rest of Africa, Morocco is not going about its return the old-fashioned way – sending diplomatic feelers or envoys to make its case. They are going about it in a businesslike manner, with business proposals and economic projects.

The king, no less, is visiting East Africa, a region of the continent where Morocco hardly has a presence. But he is not calling on the leaders and making the usual nice statements about cherished ties and brotherhood, and so on.

In fact on his just ended visit to Rwanda, he made no speeches. Perhaps that is royal protocol. Or it was not necessary because he came armed with many agreements that made a loud enough statement.

It is not the number of agreements alone that is significant, but the type as well. On such state visits, it is common for agreements to be signed between states. They are usually of a general nature about cooperation and are rarely implemented.

This time they are more specific and wide ranging, covering agriculture, finance, housing, manufacturing, energy, health and education, among others.

It is likely similar agreements will be signed in Tanzania and Ethiopia where the king and his large delegation will be next.

The Moroccans’ current visit to East Africa marks a serious intent to enter the region and widen their interests in Africa. Until recently the Arab north of Africa has had very little to do in this region.

Their interests have been mainly in West Africa. Only Gadaffi’s Libya, perhaps because of its leader’s interest in becoming the de facto leader of Africa, had financial and commercial interests in the region. Lately Egypt has been making trade inroads. Now Morocco is following suit.

From all this, it is clear is that Morocco is determined to return, and indeed has already made the necessary requests to do so.

The other country making a diplomatic comeback in Africa is Israel. The majority of African countries broke relations with Israel in 1973 following the Yom Kippur war. For many it was an expression of solidarity with Egypt and the Palestinians.

What did Africa reap from severing ties with Israel? Not much. In fact the continent suffered heavily from a petrol crisis fuelled by OPEC immediately after the 1973 war.

In terms of development cooperation, the Arabs did not fill the gap left by the Israelis. Yes, there were some loans and grants from a number of Arab Development Banks, but little else.

Instead there was a proliferation of Islamic NGOs and missionary organisations in much of Africa. Because these groups represented different factions within Islam, they brought their differences and created divisions within African Muslims. A more dangerous result was radicalisation of Muslims which has led many of them into joining terrorist organisations.

All along, however, discreet relations between some African countries and Israel remained. In recent times Israel and African countries have been slowly re-engaging. It is perhaps time these contacts came into the open.

Why now and what benefits are there for Africans? Israel continues to be a leader in matters of security, technology and agriculture. Africa needs this expertise.

For the Israelis too, improved relations with Africa are beneficial both economically and diplomatically. In any case, with the political mess in the Middle East, particularly the weakening of Syria and Iraq, the threat to Israel will likely take on another form that requires a different kind of response. Yes, the existential threat remains, but in different configurations.

So two countries are returning to Africa, and this is a reflection of the changing times. Solutions to many conflicts are increasingly to be found in establishing common ground than in maintaining a stand-off.

Collaboration is crucial because the alternative leads only to division and instability. Finally realpolitik and not sentiment is informing diplomatic decisions.

IS International Criminal Court Too Focused on Africa?

By Noah Feldman

The new South Africa has been a bastion of respect for human rights, and its decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court is a sign that something is terribly wrong with the tribunal. And it’s no secret: Since 2005, when it first issued arrest warrants, the court has indicted 39 people, every one of them African.

There are various explanations for this, some of them defensible. But the bottom line is that it was an inexcusable mistake for the court not to pursue other cases. It wouldn’t have been tokenism, because there are, unfortunately, plenty of non-African war criminals. Yet even if it were, the tokenism would have been justified to show that the court is more than the imperialist agent of regime change that many Africans consider it.

International Criminal Court

South Africa’s unexpected — and devastating — decision last weekto withdraw from the court is not based on any immediate fear that South African leaders would be prosecuted. In that sense, the decision differs sharply from that of Burundi, which was the first nation to initiate withdrawal, just a few days before the South African announcement.

Burundi’s motivation was the prospect of an ICC investigation of the political violence that has plagued the country in the last year, since President Pierre Nkurunziza declared his intention of running for a third term. Of 110 Burundian lawmakers, 94 had voted for the withdrawal, suggesting, if nothing else, consolidation of the political class against the possibility of an investigation that would probably have focused on the president himself.

It’s not terribly surprising that a president in that position would seek to avoid the ICCs jurisdiction by withdrawing. It’s much more surprising that a stable democracy like South Africa, which has a range of international obligations written into its state-of-the-art constitution, would send such a strong message of rejection.

The South African minister of justice, Michael Masutha, offered the explanation that South Africa considered the obligation to turn over foreign diplomats charged by the court to be a violation of its domestic laws that guarantee diplomatic immunity. In June 2015, the South African government failed to turn over Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who was visiting for an African Union summit, even after a South African court ordered it to do so.

But the minister’s formalistic explanation rings hollow. South Africa’s constitution incorporates international legal obligations into domestic law, and would certainly be interpreted by South Africa’s progressive courts to trump any domestic requirements of diplomatic immunity.

What makes more sense is that the South African government is consolidating its position of regional and continental leadership by taking a stance that is sure to please other African heads of state. It’s precisely those heads of state who are most vulnerable to ICC prosecution. By weakening the court — and providing thick cover for any other African countries that wish to follow suit — South Africa is giving those leaders a tremendous diplomatic gift.

In other words, the statement that South Africa wants to respect the diplomatic immunity of other heads of state is a way of saying that South Africa wants to do business with African leaders.

The ICC worries African heads of state because it has adopted a prosecutorial policy of going after leaders whom it accuses of being responsible for political violence in violation of international law. Targeting a head of state or government is an attractive and admirable idea for an international body committed to enforcing human rights. In the case of authoritarian or autocratic governments, the leader often does bear moral responsibility for violence. And it would be deeply dissatisfying for an international criminal court to prosecute primarily lower officials who may have committed crimes but did not plan or direct them.

If the court is going to go after government leaders, however, it must confront the concern that, as South Africa’s Masutha put it, it is producing a “scenario of forced regime change by one country on another.” When the prosecution comes from a European geographical base and a court staffed mostly by non-Africans, the regime change has the further feature of seeming “imperialist,” the word used by the chief party whip of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress.

The simple solution for the ICC would have been to prosecute some — any — non-Africans. It’s not like the problem hasn’t been noticed. The ICC itself has held an online symposium of invited experts on what it rather delicately called “the Africa question.”

It must been noted in the ICC’s defense that six African cases brought to it from outside, four by the countries where the violations had occurred and two by reference from the United Nations Security Council. The first four were nondiscretionary, meaning the court had to investigate under its own rules. And in the other two, Sudan and Libya, there were strong grounds to commence investigation.

But that excuse explains why the court has pursued the cases it has — not why it hasn’t pursued others. Admittedly complex rules govern the court’s reach, and it can’t proceed where there are adequate domestic legal processes under way.

Nonetheless, the court’s prosecutors needed to reach more broadly. Initial investigations of cases involving Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Honduras and South Korea could have proceeded more rapidly. The idea that Iraq would be free of crimes against humanity or that the Iraqi legal system could adequately treat them seems highly implausible on its face.

The lesson here is that tokenism isn’t always a bad thing. When it comes to demonstrating the legitimacy of a new and powerful international legal entity, a basic requirement is not only to be balanced but also to appear so.

South Africa’s decision is unfortunate, but the ICC opened the door, and it deserves the primary blame. The court in The Hague stands for the admirable aspiration to hold the worst criminals in the world responsible for their wrongs. But trying to achieve that ideal without pragmatic realism about what seems fair in international politics is a hopeless task.

South Africa’s constitutional court was supposed to hold hearings on this issue in November, but the government will now drop its appeal.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Noah Feldman at nfeldman7@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Stacey Shick at sshick@bloomberg.net

IS International Criminal Court Too Focused on Africa?

By Noah Feldman

International Criminal Court

In other words, the statement that South Africa wants to respect the diplomatic immunity of other heads of state is a way of saying that South Africa wants to do business with African leaders.

South Africa’s constitutional court was supposed to hold hearings on this issue in November, but the government will now drop its appeal.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Noah Feldman at nfeldman7@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Stacey Shick at sshick@bloomberg.net

Why German Chancellor Angela Merkel Visit Ethiopia during State of Emergency?

Image result for Merkel Visiting Ethiopia as State of Emergency Unfolds

By ELIAS MESERET, ASSOCIATED PRESS

German Chancellor Angela Merkel signaled support for protesters demanding wider freedoms in Ethiopia during a visit to the country on Tuesday, saying “a vibrant civil society is part and parcel of a developing country.”

After meeting with Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Merkel said Germany has offered to train Ethiopia’s police to deal with the sometimes deadly demonstrations that have caused one of Africa’s best-performing economies to declare its first state of emergency in 25 years.

“We are already working in Oromia to de-escalate the situation there by offering mediation between groups,” she said, referring to the region where protests have simmered for nearly a year.

“I would always argue for allowing people of a different political opinion … to engage with them and allow them to express their views because, after all, a democratic experience shows that out of these discussions good solutions usually come,” Merkel said.

The Ethiopian prime minister responded by suggesting his government may increase dialogue. “We have shortcomings in our fledgling democracy, so we want to go further in opening up the political space and engagement with different groups of the society,” he said, noting that the East African country’s huge youth population has created “dissatisfaction and desperation.”

But the prime minister also sounded a note of defiance. “Ethiopia is committed to have a multi-party democracy as per our constitution. And Ethiopia is committed to have human rights observed. … But Ethiopia is also against any violent extremist armed struggling groups,” he said.

Ethiopia declared a state of emergency Sunday, faced with widespread anti-government protests. More than 50 people died last week in a stampede after police tried to disperse protesters. The incident set off a week of demonstrations in which both foreign and local businesses with suspected government ties were burned, and one American was killed in a rock attack.

Merkel said the German business community has criticized the business climate in Ethiopia, and she expressed hope that the government will discuss the criticism openly.

At least 500 people have been killed in anti-government protests over the past year, according to Human Rights Watch. The protesters demand more freedoms from a government accused of being increasingly authoritarian.

The United States and others have called on the government to use restraint against protesters, and the U.N. human rights office has asked for access to allow independent observers into the troubled Oromia region.

On Monday, Ethiopia’s president announced during a Parliament session that the country’s election law would be amended to accommodate more political parties and opposing views.

But the country’s internet service continues to be largely blacked out after last week’s unrest.

Merkel’s African tour, with stops earlier this week in Mali and Niger, is also meant to highlight the global migration crisis and security issues. Ethiopia is one of the world’s largest hosts of refugees, with an estimated 780,000 from nearby Somalia, South Sudan and elsewhere.

Ethiopia’s prime minister appealed for German support.

Merkel also inaugurated the new African Union Peace and Security Council building in the capital, Addis Ababa, constructed with German funding of 27 million euros. It is expected to be the base for coordination of peacekeeping missions.

Why German Chancellor Angela Merkel Visit Ethiopia during State of Emergency?

Image result for Merkel Visiting Ethiopia as State of Emergency Unfolds

By ELIAS MESERET, ASSOCIATED PRESS

“We are already working in Oromia to de-escalate the situation there by offering mediation between groups,” she said, referring to the region where protests have simmered for nearly a year.

Merkel said the German business community has criticized the business climate in Ethiopia, and she expressed hope that the government will discuss the criticism openly.

On Monday, Ethiopia’s president announced during a Parliament session that the country’s election law would be amended to accommodate more political parties and opposing views.

But the country’s internet service continues to be largely blacked out after last week’s unrest.

Ethiopia’s prime minister appealed for German support.

Does EU need a new approach on Ethiopia?

Addis Abeba. As a valuable friend, the EU needs to push Ethiopia to respect divergent views, and rein in forces who rapidly turn to bullets, beatings, and mass arrests. (Photo: Henrik Berger Jorgensen)

By FELIX HORNE EU Obserrver

In January, the European Parliament passed a 19-point resolution condemning the Ethiopian government’s brutal crackdown on protests that had left more than a hundred dead. Many Ethiopians rejoiced at the resolution. I read it to some Ethiopian friends, who cried.

They had assumed Ethiopia was part of an international order in which no Western institution would dare criticise a trusted ally despite the government’s brutal repression. They hoped the resolution would be a watershed in Europe’s relationship with Ethiopia.

But in the nine months since, the European Parliament’s outrage has not been matched by the European Union or its member countries. This despite the hundreds more Ethiopians killed throughout the country, the detention of tens of thousands, and widespread torture in detention, as we have documented.

Instead, on the sidelines of EU Development Days in June, High Representative Frederica Mogherini and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn worked on a joint declaration “Towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement” that proclaimed business as usual. While demonstrators were being shot, journalists and opposition members locked up, and peaceful activists punished, the EU was silently signing the cheques.

EU officials are quick to point to rare but tepid statements expressing concern for Ethiopia’s human rights situation but it’s not enough. The October 12 European parliamentary hearing on Ethiopia could be the catalyst for much stronger action —built on a willingness to use the considerable leverage that comes with providing various forms of support to the Ethiopian government, including €745 million in European aid for 2014-2020.

Ethiopia’s protests began last November in the largest region, Oromia, over the government’s development plans. Protests soon spread to the Amhara region where grievances focused on complex questions of ethnic identity and the dominance in economic and political affairs of people with ties to the ruling party.

Perfect storm

Security forces have shown no intention of changing their heavy-handed tactics, and the government hasn’t been willing to discuss the issues. The cycle of demonstrations and brutal government responses is feeding Ethiopia’s biggest political and human rights crisis in decades.

How this plays out could jeopardise Europe’s long-term interests in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia’s current crisis came as a surprise to many European policymakers, but it follows years of systematic government attacks on fundamental rights and freedoms, cutting off dissent.

Despite widespread frustration with the government, the ruling party is able to hold every one of the seats in the federal and regional parliaments. The courts have shown little independence on politically sensitive cases, misusing an anti-terrorism law to punish peaceful dissent.

There is little scrutiny of abusive security forces in part because of restrictions on independent media and NGOs. All of this has contributed to the complete closure of political space, creating the perfect storm.

An international investigation is needed

The EU is among many donors that have historically been silent about Ethiopia’s human rights abuses, afraid to risk strategic partnerships on development, migration, peacekeeping, and security.

Foreign diplomats and development organisations working in Ethiopia understand that you limit public criticism in exchange for access. The EU claims that “quiet diplomacy” is the most effective way to push Ethiopia in the right direction.

But given the dramatic deterioration in Ethiopia’s human rights record it’s hard to argue that this approach works.

Offering government benefits in exchange for silence is something many Ethiopians, particularly in rural areas, have known for years.

Ethiopia’s government carefully controls access to the benefits of development– including seeds, fertilisers, food aid, and jobs, much of it funded by the EU and its members.

To their credit, some African institutions have broken rank and expressed concern over the killings, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Union. And the United States, a key ally of Ethiopia, has been stronger than usual in condemning the use of lethal force, with forceful resolutions introduced in the US House and Senate.

Last month the UN’s top human rights official, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, said an international investigation is needed. A recent EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva echoed his call for an investigation, an important step that needs follow-up.

Investigate the killings

The EU needs a new approach to Ethiopia. Strategic relationships will become obsolete if Ethiopia plunges further into crisis, and all the signs are there. As a valuable friend, the EU needs to push Ethiopia to respect divergent views, and rein in forces who rapidly turn to bullets, beatings, and mass arrests.

Ethiopia’s current approach to dissent guarantees future unrest and makes it less likely that the government will be able to find a way back to gain the trust of its citizens, all of which jeopardises the EU’s long term interests in the Horn.

The EU and its member states should continue to push for an international investigation into the killings, press the government to grant the UN access to investigate, and urge the government to hold to account security force members responsible for abuses.

By taking these steps, the EU and its member states can improve the potential for Ethiopians to be stable long-term partners.

Felix Horne is the senior Ethiopia researcher at Human Rights Watch.