Ge’ez and Early Islam

By NANCY JOSEPH

Ethiopia’s Star Singer Teddy Afro Makes Plea for Openness

NYT

Image result for Teddy Afro cd

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — Teddy Afro, Ethiopia’s superstar singer, is topping the Billboard world albums chart with “Ethiopia,” which less than two weeks after its release has sold nearly 600,000 copies, a feat no other artist here has achieved.

Known for the political statements he makes in his music, an infectious mix of reggae and Ethiopian pop, the 40-year-old Tewodros Kassahun told The Associated Press that raising political issues should not be a sin.

Open debate “should be encouraged,” he said. “No one can be outside the influence of politics and political decisions.”

Ethiopia is an unlikely place for an outspoken singer to thrive. The government is accused of being heavy-handed on opposing voices.

During a visit this month, U.N. human rights chief Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein expressed concern about the state of emergency imposed in October after months of deadly anti-government protests demanding wider freedoms. Opposition and human rights groups blame security forces for hundreds of deaths, but the government says they largely used “proportionate” measures.

The human rights chief also criticized Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism laws, saying an “excessively broad” definition of terrorism may be misused against journalists and opposition members.

In “Ethiopia,” the songs highlight the diversity of the country’s 100 million people while encouraging national unity. Pointing to Ethiopia’s formative role in launching the African Union continental body in 1963, Teddy said his country should find more cohesiveness at home.

“A country that tried to bring Africans together is now unable to have a unified force and voice,” he said. “The tendency nowadays here in Ethiopia is to mobilize in ethnic lines, not ideas.”

In his new album, Teddy sings mainly in Amharic but incorporates other local languages, which has been well-received by Ethiopians as a call for national unity.

At the same time, some of his songs have been interpreted as carrying political messages against Ethiopia’s ruling elites, leading some fans to say his outspokenness has made him a target.

In 2008, the singer was sentenced to two years in prison for a hit-and-run manslaughter but was released after 18 months in jail. He said he was never inside the car, and his fans suggested it was a politically motivated harassment by the ruling party. Hundreds of Ethiopians protested outside the court during his trial in the capital, Addis Ababa.

Authorities also have frequently cancelled his concerts without explanation. “We have sustained a lot of damages. This is not right,” he said.

Asked if he has any political ambitions, the singer said: “Let me continue doing what I’m doing now and we will see what the future holds for other things.”

US doesn’t need Ethiopia in its war on terror in the Horn of Africa

US doesn't need Ethiopia in its war on terror in the Horn of Africa
© Getty
Earlier this month, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis visited the Middle East and Africa to “reaffirm key U.S. military alliances” and engage with strategic partners.” Mattis only visited the tiny nation of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa where the U.S. maintains its largest military base. Ethiopia was conspicuously absent from the “strategic partner” lineup.

In September 2014, Barack Obama underscored the vital importance of Ethiopia in the U.S. war on terrorism. He noted that cooperation with Ethiopia “is making a difference” and that the “partnerships that we have formed with countries like Ethiopia are going to be critical to our overall efforts to defeat terrorism.”

In July 2015, during his state visit, Obama called Ethiopia an “outstanding partner” in the fight against terrorism in the Horn and a “key partner” in resolving the crises in South Sudan. He praised Ethiopia for being “a major contributor to U.N. peacekeeping efforts”, and for its unique role in “contribut(ing) more (peacekeeping) troops than any other country in Africa.”

The Mattis visit to Djibouti comes as the U.S. intensifies its military pressure on al-Shabaab, the terrorist group in Somalia with ties to al-Qaeda, which has been fighting for over a decade to establish an Islamic state and force out African Union peacekeeping troops.

Late last month, President Trump ordered airstrikes against al-Shabaab and approved a Department of Defense proposal “to provide additional precision fires” to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali security forces.

U.S. military command for Africa (AFRICOM) announced last week that a contingent from the 101st Airborne Division has been deployed in Somalia, the first since 1994, to assist the Somali government with logistical and training support.

In 2017,  there have been no public statements by the Trump administration on Ethiopia’s frontline role in the fight against terrorism.  There has been no mentioned Ethiopia as ally or “strategic partner”, and no acknowledgment of Ethiopia’s role in maintaining regional stability. There has been no hint of re-opening the U.S. drone base, closed down in January 2016, used to surveil and launch strikes on al-Shabaab.  Mattis’ Djibouti visit, conspicuously avoiding Ethiopia, could suggest that the Trump Administration may not view Ethiopia as an indispensable counterterrorism partner in the Horn.

The only palpable evidence of any link between the ruling regime in Ethiopia and the Trump administration appears to be vague assurances by Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.) in February asserting, “Ethiopia is one of the strategic allies of the US in the region in peace and security and the relationship will continue under the new Trump administration.” In 2007, Inhofe zealously opposed legislation designed to promote democracy and human rights in Ethiopia.

In January, the Ethiopian regime showed its deep concern over potential changes in U.S. policy under the Trump administration by hiring SGR Government Relations, Lobbying (Washington, D.C) at a cost of $150,000 per month (for a total contract price of $1.8 million). In my letter to Trump, I argued that it made no sense for a regime whose population, some 20 million of them, is facing dire famine to spend nearly $2 million on lobbying.

Is the Trump administration signaling that Ethiopia is not a “key partner” or “critical to our overall efforts to defeat terrorism” in the Horn region?

One of the four questions on Africa the Trump transition team posed to the State Department in January may offer a glimpse into Trump’s Horn policy: “We’ve been fighting al-Shabaab for a decade, why haven’t we won?”  This manifestly simple question is pregnant with profundity.

When the regime in Ethiopia invaded Somalia in January 2007, then-leader Meles Zenawi declared that it could “take a week or a maximum of two weeks” to wipe out the Islamists, “stay there for a few days to help the transitional government in preserving stability then pull out our troops.”  The “Islamists” were “wiped out,” only to be replaced by the murderous al-Shabaab.

Ethiopian troops left Somalia in January 2009 leaving a good part of that country tightly in the hands of al-Shabaab and sundry other Islamist insurgents.

In 2014, 4,300 Ethiopian troops returned to Somalia as part of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In the summer of 2016, Ethiopia began to withdraw some 3,000 non-AMISOM soldiers out of south-central Somalia following mass uprising against the ruling regime in various part of Ethiopia.  Al-Shabaab swiftly recaptured and consolidated its control over a number of towns held by the departing Ethiopian and AU soldiers. Despite military pressure, al-Shabaab continues to attack AU bases and carry out suicide bombings.

The cost of fighting  al-Shabaab has increased from an annual $300 million in 2009 to $900 million in 2016. The African Union (AU), which has 22,000 troops deployed in Somalia drawn from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti, is scheduled to complete its mission by 2020.

President-elect Trump accused Obama of “losing the war on terrorism” and pledged to “bomb the hell out of ISIS” and other terrorist groups and armies. On April 14, Trump authorized dropping the largest non-nuclear bomb in the U.S. arsenal on ISIS targets in Afghanistan. Is al-Shabaab next?

The Trump administration would be wise to delink its counterterrorism strategy from the Ethiopian regime, which barely clings to power by a state of emergency decree. Ethiopia’s involvement in the domestic affairs of Somalia has made the military and political situation in Somalia worse, and resulted in documented large-scale war crimes and human rights violations. Ethiopia’s involvement is arguably the principal galvanizing cause for the radicalization  of large numbers of Somali youth flocking into the of al-Shabaab and other militant Islamic groups.

The Ethiopian regime has long been a beneficiary of U.S. aid largesse for its counterterrorism cooperation. But Ethiopia’s counterterrorism role has been more self-serving. If not, “We’ve been fighting al-Shabaab (with the full support of Ethiopia) for a decade, why haven’t we won?”

Alemayehu (Al) Mariam is a professor of political science at California State University, San Bernardino, a constitutional lawyer and Senior Editor of the International Journal of Ethiopian Studies.

Do Christians and Muslims worship the same God?

The disciplining of a professor raises an old philosophical question

The conundrum of whether Christians and Muslims revere the same God

EVERY so often a question that seems purely abstract and philosophical passes into the realm of hard reality where people’s lives and destinies are determined. One such conundrum is whether or not Christians and Muslims can be said to worship the same God.

For nearly a decade, the question has preoccupied judges, politicians and ordinary folk in Malaysia, a country where Islam is the most widely-followed faith but large minorities follow other faiths, including Christianity. In 2007, a court ruled that non-Muslims (and Christians in particular) could not use the word “Allah” although that happens to be the Malay or Bahasa word for God. The Islamic authorities reasoned that Muslims might be confused, and tempted to go astray, if they came across people of other persuasions addressing a deity which only Muslims fully understood. In the course of many legal battles, this view has prevailed; Christian printed matter using the word “Allah” has often been impounded as a result.

In 1965, the Roman Catholic church approached the question in a very different spirit, in its landmark treatise, Nostra Aetate. A key passage states:

The Church regards with esteem also the Muslims. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself, merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly even to His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God.

But when Larycia Hawkins, an African-American assistant professor at Wheaton College, an evangelical campus near Chicago, voiced similar views last month, she created a firestorm. She was suspended from teaching, and procedures which could lead to her dismissal were initiated. It all started with a Facebook posting in which she declared her intention, as an act of friendship with stigmatised Muslims, to wear a hijab to work in the run-up to Christmas, and added: “I stand in religious solidarity with Muslims because they, like me, a Christian, are people of the book. As Pope Francis stated last week, we worship the same God.”

When challenged by the college authorities about what she believed, she replied with a statement of stricter theological orthodoxy than many a liberal or “mainline” Protestant cleric would be able to make: “I believe in one sovereign God, eternally existing in three Persons: the everlasting Father, his only-begotten Son Jesus Christ our Lord, and the Holy Spirit, the giver of life…”  On the commonality between the two monotheisms, she had something more enigmatic to say. After citing various Catholic and Protestant sources, including Nostra Aetate, she added:

Like them I acknowledge that the statement “we worship the same God” is a simultaneous “yes” and “no” to the question of whether Christians and Muslims (as well as Jews) turn to the same object of worship…

Yes and No? That’s where philosophy may be able to help. In 1905, the great British philosopher Bertrand Russell started a century of discussion by penning a famous essay showing how an apparently simple statement can in fact be asserting many things at once. Specifically, to say, “the king of France is bald” is to imply both that i) there is a king of France, and only one of them and ii) that sovereign has a hairless scalp.

Compared with that assertion about the royal pate, the statement that “Christians and Muslims worship the same God” is much more complex and multi-layered, and it means entirely different things on the lips of different people. If you are an atheist and think that all “gods” are human constructs, then it is true, in a sense, that every worshipper’s god is different, because slightly different constructs are being made. If you are a monotheist, convinced there is only one transcendent deity, then discussion about “the same” God or different ones doesn’t make much sense. God is God whether or not people have the right ideas about Him. If you are a polytheist, then it is logically possible to discuss whether two groups of people worship the same god; but on that view, both Christians and Muslims must be radically mistaken.

In the philosophical debate about the royal pate, everybody agrees on an important background fact: with due respect to claimants from the House of Bourbon, there is no king of France. So the statement about his scalp is false. But there is no consensus on the crucial “background fact” in the Christian-Muslim question: do one or more gods exist? For that reason, it is almost impossible to discuss; and certainly not an appropriate yardstick to assess the suitability of a professor.

“የኦሮሚያ ክልል በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ላይ ያለውን ሕገ-መንግስታዊ ልዩ ጥቅም ለመወሰን የወጣ አዋጅ”-PDF

የኦሮሚያ-ክልል-በአዲስ-አበባ-ላይ-ያለው-ልዩ-መብት-አዋጅ-Edited-PDF

የኦሮሚያ ክልል በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ላይ ያለውን ሕገ-መንግስታዊ ልዩ ጥቅም ለመወሰን የወጣ አዋጅ

በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ-መንግስት መግቢያ ላይ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔር፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች መጪው የጋራ እድላችን መመስረት ያለበት ከታሪካችን የወረስነውን የተዛባ ግንኙነት በማረምና የጋራ ጥቅማችንን በማሳደግ ላይ መሆኑን በመቀበላቸው፣

ሕገ-መንግስቱ ለብሔር፣ ብሔረሰቦችና ሕዝቦች ፖለቲካዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊ፣ ማህበራዊና ባህላዊ መብቶች እውቅና የሰጠ፣ አንድ የፖለቲካና ኢኮኖሚ ማህበረሰብ ለመፍጠር የህዝቦች ተጠቃሚነት ከተረጋገጠላቸው ብሔሮች መካከል አንዱ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ በመሆኑ፣

የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ-መንግስት በአንቀፅ 49 ንዑስ አንቀፅ (5) የኦሮሚያ ክልል የአገልግሎት አቅርቦት ወይም የተፈጥሮ ሐብት አጠቃቀምንና የመሳሰሉትን ጉዳዮች በተመለከተ፣ እንዲሁም አዲስ አበባ በኦሮሚያ ክልል አካል በመሆኑ የሚነሱ ሁለቱን የሚያስተሳስሩ አስተዳደራዊ ጉዳዮችን በተመለከተ ያለውን ልዩ ጥቅም እንደሚጠበቅለት በመደንገጉ፣

የኦሮሚያ ክልል በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ላይ ያለውን ልዩ ጥቅም ዝርዝር በሕግ እንደሚወሰን በሕገ-መንግስቱ አንቀፅ 49 ንዑስ አንቀፅ (5) ስለሚደነግግና ይህንን ሕግ ማውጣት አስፈላጊ ሆኖ በመገኘቱ፣

በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ-መንግስት አንቀፅ 55 ንዑስ አንቀፅ (1) መሠረት የሚከተለው ታውጇል፣

ክፍል አንድ:- ጠቅላላ ድንጋጌ

1/ አጭር ርዕስ

ይህ አዋጅ “የኦሮሚያ ክልል በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ላይ ያለውን ህገ-መንግሥታዊ ልዩ ጥቅም ለመወሰን የወጣ አዋጅ ቁጥር ____/2009” ተብሎ ሊጠቀስ ይችላል፡፡

2/ ትርጓሜ

በዚህ አዋጅ ውስጥ የቃሉ አግባብ ሌላ ትርጉም የሚሰጠው ካልሆነ በስተቀር ፡-

1) “ሕገ-መንግስት” ማለት የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ- መንግስት አዋጅ ቁጥር 1/1987 ማለት ነው፡፡

2) “ክልል” ማለት የኦሮሚያ ክልል ማለት ነው፡፡

3) “መንግስት” ማለት የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስት ነው፡፡

4) “ጨፌ ኦሮሚያ” ማለት የኦሮሚያ ክልል የህግ አውጭ አካል ማለት ነው፡፡

5) “ልዩ ጥቅም” ማለት በሕገ መንግስቱ ውስጥ እውቅና ያገኙ የኢኮኖሚ፣ ማህበራዊ ፣ የባህል፣ የቋንቋ፣ አስተዳደራዊ፣ የልማት፣ የፖለቲካ፣ የአካባቢ ደህንነት፣ የንብረት መብቶች የመሳሰሉትን በልዩ ሁኔታ የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስት በአዲስ አበባ ላይ የሚያገኘዉ ጥቅም ማለት ነው፡፡

6) “አስተዳደር” ማለት የአዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር ማለት ነው ፡፡

7) “የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች” ማለት የአዲስ አበባ ከተማ ከመመስረቱ በፊት ጀምሮ ነባር ነዋሪ የነበሩ ወይም አሁንም በከተማው ነዋሪ የሆኑ ኦሮሞዎች ማለት ነው፡፡

8) “ሰው” ማለት ማንኛውም የተፈጥሮ ሰው ወይም ሕጋዊ የሰውነት መብት ያለው አካል ነው፡፡

3/ የተፈጻሚነት ወሰን

ይህ አዋጅ በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር ዉስጥ ተፈጻሚነት ይኖረዋል፡፡

4/ የፆታ አገላለጽ

በዚህ አዋጅ በወንድ ፆታ የተገለፀው የሴት ፆታንም ይጨምራል፡፡

5/ ስያሜ

1) የከተማው ስም ፊንፊኔ ከአዲስ አበባ ጋር እኩል መጠሪያ ይሆናል፡፡

2) የከተማው ሕጋዊ ስም በፅሁፍ ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ተብሎ ጥቅም ላይ መዋል ይኖርበታል፡፡

6/ ወሰን

1) የከተማው ወሰን የከተማው አስተዳደርና የክልሉ መንግስት በሚያደርጉት የጋራ ስምምነት ይወሰናል፡፡ የወሰን ምልክትም ይደረግበታል፡፡

2) በዚህ አንቀፅ ንዑስ አንቀፅ (1) በተደነገገው መሰረት የተቀመጠውን የወሰን ምልክት ከተደረገበት በኋላ በማናቸውም ምክንያት መስፋት የማይቻል ሲሆን ወሰኑንም ክልሉ እና አስተዳደሩ የማክበር ግዴታ አለባቸው፡፡

3) ይህ አዋጅ ተግባራዊ መሆን ከጀመረበት ጊዜ ጀምሮ በ6 ወራት ጊዜ ውስጥ ወሰን ተከልሎ ምልክት መደረግ ይኖርበታል፡፡

7/ የስራ ቋንቋ

የከተማው አስተዳደር የስራና ኦፊሴላዊ ቋንቋ አማርኛ እና አፋን ኦሮሞ ነው፡፡

8/ የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች መብት

1) በከተማው አስተዳደር ነዋሪ የሆኑ የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች በኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ-መንግስት እና በሌሎች የሀገሪቱ ሕጎች የተከበሩ መብቶች በከተማው ውስጥ የመጠቀም ሙሉ መብት አላቸው፡፡

2) የከተማ አስተዳደሩም ይህንን መብት የማክበር ግዴታ ይኖርበታል፡፡

ክፍል ሁለት:- የኦሮሚያ ክልል በከተማው አስተዳደሩ ላይ የሚኖረው ልዩ ጥቅሞች

9/ ጠቅላላ

በዚህ አዋጅ ውስጥ የተጠቀሱት ዝርዝር የክልሉ መብቶችና ልዩ ጥቅሞች በህገ- መንግሥቱ አንቀፅ 49 ንዑስ አንቀፅ (5) ላይ የተገለፀውን አጠቃላይ አነጋገር የሚገድበው አይሆንም፡፡

10/ የልዩ ጥቅሙ መርሆዎች

1) የከተማ አስተዳደሩ የሚያወጣቸው ፖሊሲዎች፣ ስትራቴጂዎች፣ ሕጎችና ዕቅዶች የከተማው ነዋሪ የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች ፖለቲካዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊ፣ ማህበራዊና ባህላዊ ሕገ መንግስታዊ መብቶች የሚያስከብር መሆናቸውን ማረጋገጥ ይገባል፡፡

2) የከተማ አስተዳደሩ የሚያወጣቸው ፖሊሲዎች፣ ስትራቴጂዎች፣ ሕጎችና ዕቅዶች የነዋሪ የኦሮሞ ተወላጆችን ጥቅሞችና ፍላጎቶች ግምት ውስጥ ያስገባና መብቶቻቸውን የሚያስከብር መሆኑን ማረጋገጥ ይኖርበታል፡፡

3) የመስተዳድሩ ምክር ቤት ከክልሉ መብቶችና ጥቅሞች ጋር በሚያያዙ ጉዳዮች ላይ በሚሰጠው ውሣኔ የክልሉን ጥቅሞች ከግምት ውስጥ በማስገባት ይወስናል፡፡

11/ ስለ አስተዳደራዊ ጥቅሞች

1) በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ ነዋሪ የሆነው የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች የራሳቸውን እድል በራሳቸው የመወሰን መብት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

2) በከተማው መስተዳደር ም/ቤት ውስጥ የኦሮሞ ብሄር ተወላጆች እንደ ከተማው ነዋሪ ያላቸው ውክልና እንደተጠበቀ ሆኖ፣ ከምክር ቤት ወንበር 25% የማያንስ የኦሮሞ ብሄር ተወላጆች ብቻ የሚወከሉበት መቀመጫ ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

3) በዚህ አንቀፅ ንዑስ አንቀፅ (2) ላይ የተደነገገው እንደተጠበቀ ሆኖ፣ የኦሮሞ ብሄር ተወላጆች ውክልና በየደረጃው ባሉ ምክር ቤቶች፣ የሥራ አስፈፃሚውና የዳኝነት አካል ውስጥ ተፈፃሚነት ይኖረዋል፡፡

4) በኦሮሚያ የመንግስታዊና ህዝባዊ ድርጅቶች መስሪያ ቤቶች ውስጥ ወይም ጉዳዮች ላይ የሚፈፀሙ ወንጀሎች እንዲሁም በኦሮሚያ ክልል ውስጥ ወንጀል ሰርተው ወደ 4 ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ በመምጣት የሚደበቁትን ተጠሪጣሪ ወንጀለኞች የክልሉ ፖሊስ፣ አቃቤ ህግና ፍርድ ቤቶች የመመርመር፣ የመያዝና የመቅጣት ሙሉ መብት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

5) በዚህ አንቀፅ ንኡስ አንቀፅ (4) የተደነገገ ቢኖርም፣ በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ የተፈፀሙ ከክልሉ ጋር የተያያዙ ወንጀሎች ከፌዴራልና ከከተማ አስተዳደሩ የፍትህና የፀጥታ አካሎች ጋር በትብብር መስረት ይኖርባቸዋል፡፡

6) ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስት ዋና ከተማ ሆና ታገለግላለች፡፡

ስለ ማህበራዊ የአገልግሎት ጥቅሞች
1) የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ለተለያዩ መንግሥታዊ፣ ሕዝባዊና የልማት ማህበሮች ቢሮዎች፣ ክልሉ ታሪካዊ፣ ባህላዊ፣ ማህበራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ እሴቶቹን ለስብሰባ አደራሾች፣ የኮሚኒቲ ማዕከላትና ለሌሎች ሕዝባዊ አገልግሎቶች የሚውሉ ህንፃዎችና ፋሲሊቲዎች የሚገነባበት በቂ መሬት ክልለሉ ከሚፈለገው አከባቢ ከከተማ አስተዳደሩ ከሊዝ ነፃ የማግኘት ጥቅሙ ይጠበቅለታል፡፡

2) ለኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሥት ኃላፊዎችና ሠራተኞች እንዲሁም የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች የመኖሪያ ቤት በከተማ አስተዳደሩ ከሚገነቡ የጋራ መኖሪያ ቤቶች በ15% ቅድሚያ የማግኘት ወይም የመከራየት መብት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

3) የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስትና የከተማው ነዋሪ የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች አደባባዮች፣ ማዕከላት፣ አዳራሾች፣ ስታዲየሞች፣ ሜዳዎች…ወዘተ አገልግሎት ማግኘት ሲፈልጉ ቅድሚያ የመጠቀም ሙሉ መብት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

4) በከተማው አስተዳደር ውስጥ ነዋሪ ለሆኑ የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች ልጆቻቸውን በአፍ መፍቻ ቋንቋቸው በአፋን ኦሮሞ የሚያስተምሩ ት/ቤቶች በመስተዳድሩ ወጪ ተሰርተው ትምህርት እንዲሰጥ ያደርጋል፡፡

5) የከተማ አስተዳደሩ ከከተማው ዳሪ ላይ ለሚገኙ አርሶ አደሮች የጤና አገልግሎት በቅርብ እንዲያገኙ የጤና ተቋማትን እንዲያስፋፋ ይደረጋል፡፡

6) የክልሉ ቢሮዎችና ሠራተኞች የሚጠቀሙባቸው የመኖሪያ ቤቶች የሚሆን የመብራት፣ ውኃ፣ መንገድ፣ ስልክና ወዘተ የመሰረተ ልማቶች አገልግሎቶች እንዲያገኙ ይደረጋል፡፡

7) በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ዙሪያ ለሚኖረው ሕብረተሰብ ልዩ ልዩ የማህበራዊ አገልግሎቶች እንደ መንገድ፣ ትራንስፖርት፣ መብራት፣ ውኃ፣ ስልክና የመሳሰሉትን በማቅረብ የፊንፊኔ 5 ዙሪያ ኦሮሚያ ዞን ከተሞችና የገጠር ቀበሌዎች ነዋሪዎች ተጠቃሚ እንዲሆኑ ይደረጋል፡፡

8) ለከተማው መስተዳድር የመጠጥ ውሃ አገልግሎት በክልሉ ከሚገኙ የከርሰ ምድርና ገፀ ምድር ውሃ የሚገኝ በመሆኑ የመጠጥ ውሃ አገልግሎቱ የሚገኝበትና የአገልግሎቱ መስመር የሚያልፍባቸው የክልሉ ከተሞች እና ቀበሌዎች የውሃ አቅርቦት ዝርጋት በመስተዳድሩ ወጭ የመጠጥ ውሃ ተጠቃሚ የመሆን መብት አላቸው፡፡

9) የከተማ መስተዳድር ለከተማው ህዝብ የሚያቀርባቸው አገልግሎቶች በመስተዳድሩ አዋሳኝ ለሚኖረው የኦሮሚያ ክልል ሕዝብ ሊዳረሱ የሚችሉ ሲሆን ነዋሪዎቹ በተመሳሳይ ሁኔታ የአገልግሎቶቹ ተጠቃሚ የመሆን መብት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

10)ከተማ አስተዳደሩ የከተማ አዋሳኝ የሆኑ የክልሉ ከተሞችና የገጠር ቀበሌዎች ላይ የሰው ሰራሽና የተፈጥሮ አደጋዎች እንዳይከሰቱ የመጠበቅና የመከላከል፤ ተከስተው ከተገኙም ጉዳቱን የመቀነስ ሃላፊነት አለበት፡፡

11)የከተማው አስተዳድር ለከተማው ህዝብ ከሚያቀርባቸው አገልግሎቶች ጋር በተያያዙ የልማት ሥራዎችን በክልሉ መንግስት ጋር በመመካከርና በመስማማት ሊፈፅም ይችላል፡፡

13/ ስለ ባህላዊና ታሪካዊ ጥቅሞች

1) በከተማ አስተዳደር ውስጥ የሚገኙ የተለያዩ ቦታዎች መጠሪያ ወይም ስያሜዎች በጥንት ስሞቻቸው እንዲጠሩና ተዛብተው እየተጠሩ ያሉት ስሞች እንዲስተካከሉ ይደረጋል፡፡

2) የከተማ አስተዳደሩ የኦሮሞ ሕዝብ ብሔራዊ ማንነት የሚያንፀባርቅ አሻራ በከተማው ውስጥ በቋሚነት እንዲኖር ከኦሮሞ ሕዝብ ጋር የተያያዙ ታሪካዊ ክስተቶች ወይም በኦሮሞ ብሄራዊ ጀግኖች ስም መታሰቢያዎች እንዲኖሩ የመንግስት ተቋማት ህንፃዎች፣ አደባባዮች፣ ጎዳናዎች፣ አይሮፕላን ማረፊያ፣ ሠፈሮች እና የመሳሰሉት በስማቸው የመሰየም ሃላፊነት አለበት፡፡

3) በከተማ አስተዳሩ ወጪ በተቋቋሙ የሬድዮና የቴሌቪዥን ማሰራጫ ጣቢያዎች ከከተማው የሚተላለፉ ፕሮግራሞች ለአፋን ኦሮሞ የአየር ጊዜ የመመደብ ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

4) በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ የሚኖረው የዛሬውና መጪው ትውልድ የፊንፊኔን ታሪክ በተዛበ መልኩ ሳይሆን ኦሮሞዎች ይኖሩበት የነበረች ጥንታዊ መሬታቸው እንደነበረችና በኃይል ተገፍተው ወደ ዳር በመገፋታቸው ቁጥራቸው እየተመናመነ መሄዱንና ወደ አናሳነት መቀየራቸውን ህዝቡ እንዲያውቅና እውቅና እንዲሰጥ የከተማ አስተዳደሩ በትምህርት ስርዓት፣ በሚዲያ፣በህዝባዊ መድረኮችና በመሳሰሉት የመስራት ግዴታ ይኖራዋል፡፡

5) በመስተዳድሩ ውስጥ የሚገኙ ትምህርት ቤቶች የታሪክ ማስተማሪያ መፃሕፍት ውስጥ የኦሮሞ ህዝብ የፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ የጥንት ነባር ሕዝብ መሆኑን አዲሱ ትውልድ እንዲገነዘብ ይደረጋል፡፡

6) በከተማ አስተዳደሩ ውስጥ ነዋሪ የሆኑ የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች የማንነቱ ዋና መገለጫ የሆኑት ታሪኩን፣ እምነቱን፣ ቋንቋውን፣ ባህላዊ እሴቶቹን የመጠበቅ፣ የማሳደግና ስራ ላይ የማዋል መብቱን የከተማ አስተዳደሩ የማክበር ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

7) በከተማው ውስጥ የሚገኙ ሙዚያሞች፣ የባህል ማዕከላት፣ የሲኒማና ትያትር ቤቶች እና ፓርኮች የኦሮሞ ባህላዊ እሴቶች፣ ቋንቋ፣ ታሪክና ወግ ሊያንሰራሩበት የሚችሉ ስልቶችን በመቀየስ የድጋፍ እርጃዎችን የመውሰድ ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

8) በከተማው መስተዳድር ውስጥ በሚገኙ ሙዚየሞች ውስጥ የኦሮሞን ሕዝብ ታሪክ፣ ባህል፣ ወግ የሚያንፀባርቁ ቅርፆችንና መጽሐፎች እንዲሟሉና እንዲኖሩ መስተዳድሩ ከክልሉ ጋር በመመካከር የመስራት ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

14/ ስለ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጥቅሞች

1) በከተማው የሚኖረው የኦሮሞ ተወላጅ ከመሬቱ ያለመፈናቀል ሙሉ ዋስትና አለው፡፡

2) በከተማው አስተዳደር ውስጥ በልማት ምክንያት ለሚነሱ የኦሮሞ አርሶ አደሮች በተነሱበት አከባቢ በዘላቂነት የመቋቋም መብት አላቸዉ፡፡

3) ለልማት ተነሺ መሆኑ ሲረጋገጥ በቂ ቅድመ ዝግጅት እንዲያደርጉ ማሳወቅ፣ በካሳ ግመታ ተሳታፊ እንዲሆኑ ማድረግና የወቅቱን የገበያ ዋጋ ያገናዘበ በቂ የካሳ ክፍያና ምትክ ቦታ ለተነሽው አርሶ አደርና ለቤተሰቡ በተነሱበት አከባቢ እንዲያገኙ ይደረጋል፡፡

4) በልማት ምክንያት የሚፈናቀሉ አርሶ አደሮች የተከፈላቸውን ካሳ በዘላቂነት መጠቀም እንዲችሉ ፕሮጀክቶችን በመቅረፅ ስራ ላይ እንዲውሉ ይደረጋል፡፡

5) በዚህ አንቀፅ ንዑስ አንቀፅ (2) ስራ ላይ ለማዋል እንዲቻል የከተማ አስተዳደሩ ራሱን ያቻለ ይህን ስራ የሚሰራ ተቋም በማቋቋም መደገፍና መከታተል ይኖርበታል፡፡

6) ቀደም ሲል በልማት ምክንያት ከይዞታቸው ተነስተው ለተለያዩ ማብበራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ችግሮች የተጋለጡ አርሶ አደሮችና ቤተሰቦቻቸው ተገቢውን መረጃ በማሰባሰብና በማደራጀት መልሰው እንዲቋቋሙ ይደረጋል፡፡

7) ከተማ አስተደዳደሩ ለቋንቋ አገልግሎት፣ ለጋራ ምክር ቤቱ፣ ቦታን ከሊዝ ውጭ የሚሰጥ፣ የመኖሪያ ቤት ቅዲሚያ የሚሰጥ፣ የት/ቤቶች ግንባታና ማስፋፋት፣ የውሃ አቅርቦት ለአከባቢው ህዝብ በነፃ የሚሰጥ፣ ለኦሮሞ ተወላጆች ባህል፣ ታሪክ፣ ቋንቋ መስፋፋትና መንከባከብ የሚሰራ በመሆኑ ምንጫቸው ከክልሉ ሆኖ ወደ መስተዳድሩ በሚገቡ ለመኖሪያ ቤት ግንባታ፣ ለኢንዱስትርና ለፋብሪካዎች የሚውሉ ጥሬ እቃዎች፣ ለመጠጥ ውሃና ሌሎች የተፈጥሮ ሀብቶች ይጠቀማል፡፡

8) በኦሮሚያ ክልል ውስጥ የሚመረቱ የአርሶ አደር ወይም ማህበራት ምርቶች ፊንፊኔ/ አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ የገበያ ቦታ ከሊዝ ነፃ ያገኛሉ፡፡

9) የከተማ ነዋሪ የሆነው የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች በንግድና በሌሎች ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጠቀሜታ ያላቸው የስራ መስኮች ውስጥ ተሳታፊነትና ተጠቃሚነት እንዲያድግ የድጋፍ ርምጃዎችን በመውሰድ ነባሩን የኦሮሞ ህዝብ በከተማው ከሚኖረው አብዛኛው ማህበረሰብ ጋር ፍትሃዊ የሐብት ክፍፍል እንዲኖር የከተማ አስተዳደሩ ሁኔታዎችን የማመቻቸት ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

15/ ስለ አካባቢ ደህንነት ጥቅሞች

1) መስተዳድሩ ከከተማው የሚወጡትን ደርቅና ፍሳሽ ቆሻሻዎች የሚያስከትሉትን ጉዳት የአካባቢ ብክለት ቁጥጥርን አስመልክቶ በወጡ ሕጐች መሠረት የማስቀረት ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

2) ከከተማው አስተዳደር የሚወጡ ደረቅና ፍሳሽ ቆሻሻዎች ወደ ክልሉ እንዳይለቀቁ ማድረግ፣ ተለቆ ከተገኘ በሰው፣ በእንስሳትና በተፈጥሮ አከባቢ ላይ የሚደርሰውን ጉዳትና ብክለት መተበቅና መከላከል፣ መስተዳድሩ ወደ ክልሉ በተጣሉ ወይም በፈሰሱ ቆሻሻዎች ምክንያት በሰው፣ በእንስሳት፣ በመሬት፣ በአከባቢና በአየር ብክለት ላይ ለደረሰው ጉዳት በቂ ካሳ የመክፈል ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

3) መስተዳድሩ ከከተማው የሚያወጣቸው ፍሳሽና ደረቅ ቆሻሻዎችን የማከም ወይም መልሶ የመጠቀም ስልት በማቀድ መስተዳድሩ ተግባራዊ የማድረግ ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

4) በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ዙሪያ ለሚገኙት ቀበሌዎች ወንዞችና የተፈጥሮ ሀብቶች አስፈላጊውን እንክብካቤ የማድረግ ግዴታ ይኖርበታል፡፡

16/ የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግስት መብቶች

1) የክልሉ መንግስት በከተማ አስተዳደሩ በሚያወጣቸው ፖሊሲዎች፣ ስትራቴጂዎች፣ ሕጎችና ዕቅዶች የኦሮሞ ተወላጆችን ጥቅሞችና ፍላጎቶች ግምት ውስጥ ያስገባና መብቶቻቸውን የሚያስከብር መሆኑን አስተያየት እና የማሻሻያ ሐሳብ የማቅረብ መብት ይኖረዋል፡፡

2)ክልሉ ከተማውንና ክልሉን በሚያስታሳስሩ ጉዳዮች ላይ ፖሊሲዎችን፣ ስትራቴጂዎችና ዕቅዶችን በማመንጨት ለአስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት የማቅረብ ስልጣን ይኖረዋል፡፡

3)የክልሉ መንግስት የዚህን አዋጅ ማሻሻያ ሀሳብ በማመንጨት ለኢፌዲሪ የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የማቅረብ መብት ይኖረዋል፡፡ የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤትም ይህን አዋጅ ለማሻሻል ሲፈልግ የክልሉ መንግስት አስተያየት መጠየቅ ይኖርበታል፡፡

4)የኢ.ፌ.ደ.ሪ. መንግሥት የሚኒስትሮች ም/ቤት ይህን አዋጅ ለማስፈጸም ደንብ ከማውጣቱ በፊት የክልሉን አስተያየት ጠይቆ በደንቡ ውስጥ አስተያየቱ እንዲያካተት ማድረግ ይኖርበታል፡፡

5)የከተማ አስተዳደሩ የነዋሪ ኦሮሞዎችንና የክልሉን መብትና ጥቅም ሊነኩ የሚችሉ ፖሊሲዎች፣ ስትራቴጂዎች፣ ሕጎችና ዕቅዶች በአስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤትና በጋራ ምክር ቤት በውይይት ከስምምነት ላይ ካልደረሰ ተፈጻሚነት አይኖራቸውም፡፡

ክፍል ሶስት:- ስለ የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ጉባዔ መቋቋም

17/ ስለመቋቋም

1) የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ጉባዔ በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ የሚኖሩ የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች የሚወከሉበት የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ጉባዔ ከዚህ በኋላ “ጉባዔ“ ተብሎ የሚጠራ በዚህ አዋጅ ተቋቁሟል፡፡

2) የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ጉባዔ አባላት በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ውስጥ የሚኖሩ የኦሮሞ ተወላጆች ብቻ የሚሳተፉበት ምርጫ በአገሪቱ የምርጫ ሕግ መሰረት ይፈጸማል፡፡

3) ጉባዔው ቋሚ ጽ/ቤት፣ ድጋፍ ሰጪ ሠራተኞች እና ሙያተኞች ይኖሩታል፡፡

18/ የጉባዔው ሥልጣንና ተግባር

የኦሮሞ ብሔራዊ ጉባዔ ከዚህ በታች የተመከለቱትን ሥልጣንና ተግባር ይኖሩታል፡፡

1) በከተማው ውስጥ የኦሮሞ ቋንቋ፣ ባህል፣ ታሪክ እንዲጠበቅ፣ እንክብካቤ እንዲያገኝ ፖሊሲና ሕግ ያወጣል፤ የከተማ አስተዳደሩም የማስፈፀም ግዴታ ይኖራዋል፡፡

2) በከተማው አስተዳደር ውስጥ ነባሪ የቦታ ስያሜዎች ተመልሰው እንዲያንሰራሩ ሕግ ያወጣል፡፡

3) በከተማው አስተዳደር ምክር ቤት ውስጥ የሚወከሉ የኦሮሞ ተወላጅ ተወካዮችን አባላት ይመርጣል፡፡

4) ኦሮሞዎችን ወክለው የከተማ አስተዳደሩን የሚመሩ የሥራ ሃለፊዎች ከንቲባ እና ሌሎች የካቢኔ አባላትን ተጠቁመው በምክር ቤቱ እንዲጸድቅ ያስደርጋል፡፡

5) በአዋጁ ውስጥ የተደነገጉ የከተማ አስተዳደሩ ነዋሪ የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች መብቶችና ጥቅሞች በትክክል ተግባራዊ መሆናቸውን ይከታተላል፡፡

6) ጉባዔውን የሚመራ አፈ ጉባዔ፣ ምክትል አፈጉባዔና ሌሎች ሃላፊዎችን ይመርጣል፡፡

7) ጉባዔው ስራውን በአግባቡ ለመፈፀም እንዲያስችለው ልዩ ልዩ አደረጃጀት ሊኖረው ይችላል፡፡

8) ጉባዔው የአሰራር ስርዓት መመሪያ ሊያወጣ ይችላል፡፡

19/ የጉባዔው ዋና መሥሪያ ቤት

1) የጉባዔው ዋና መሥሪያ ቤት አድራሻ ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ነው፡፡

2) ጉባዔው እንደአስፈላጊነቱ በከተማው የአስተዳደር እርከኖች ቅርንጫፍ ጽሕፈት ቤቶች ሊኖሩት ይኖራዋል፡፡

20/ አርማ

ጉባዔው የራሱ አርማ ይኖረዋል::

21/ በጀት

የከተማው አስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት ለጉባዔው ሥራ የሚያስፈልገውን በጀት ከጉባዔው በሚቀርብለት ጥያቄ መሰረት የመመደብ ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

22/ የጉባዔው የሥራ ዘመን

የጉባዔው የሥራ ዘመን 5 ዓመት ሆኖ የከተማ አስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት ምርጫ ተካሂዶ በአዲስ መልክ ሲዋቀሩ ይኸውም ጉባዔ በአዲስ መልክ ይዋቀራል፡፡

ክፍል አራት:- ስለ የጋራ ምክር ቤት መቋቋም

23/ የጋራ ምክር ቤት መቋቋም

የኦሮሚያ ክልል በፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳድር ውስጥ ስላለው ልዩ ጥቅምን አስመልክቶ የወጡትን ሕጎች ተግባራዊነት የሚከታተልና የሚያስፈፅም ከክልሉ ወይም ከጉባዔውና አስተዳደሩ የተውጣጣ የጋራ ምክር ቤት ከዚህ በኋላ “የጋራ ምክር ቤት“ ተብሎ የሚጠራ በዚህ አዋጅ ተቋቁሟል፡፡

24/ የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ዋና መሥሪያ ቤት

1) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ዋና መሥሪያ ቤት አድራሻ ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ነው፣

2) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ በከተማው የአስተዳደር እርከን በየትኛውም ስፍራ የተለያዩ አደረጃጀትና ቅርንጫፍ ጽሕፈት ቤት ሊኖረው ይችላል፤

25/ አርማ

የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ የራሱ አርማ ይኖረዋል::

26/ የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ሥልጣንና ተግባር

የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ የሚከተሉት ሥልጣንና ተግባር ይኖሩታል፡፡

1) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ በዚህ አዋጅ የተደነገጉ ጥቅሞች፣ በምክር ቤቱና ጉባዔው የሚወጡ ፖሊሲዎች፣ ስትራቴጂዎች፣ ዕቅዶችና ሕጎች መፈፀማቸውን ይከታተላል፣ ያረጋግጣል፣

2) በክልሉና በአስተዳሩ የጋራ ጉዳዩች ላይ ተጨማሪ ጥናቶች እንዲደረጉ ይደረጋል፤ ሲፀድቁም ተግባራዊ እንዲሆኑ ይደረጋል፣

3) የጋራ ም/ቤቱ በክልሉና በአስተዳሩ ላይ ያለውን ልዩ ጥቅም አስመልክቶ የወሰናቸውን ውሣኔዎች የሚቃረን ውሣኔ ማንኛዉም አካል መወሰን አይችልም፡

4) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች በአፋን ኦሮሞ የሚማሩበትን ትምህርት ቤት መስተዳድሩ መክፈቱን፣ መገንባቱን፣ የመምህራንና ለመማር ማስተማር የሚያስፈልጉትን ግብዓቶች መሟላቱን ይከታተላል ያስፈፅማል ፡፡

5) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ በልማት ምክንያት ለሚነሱ የኦሮሞ ብሔር ተወላጆች መብትን ያስጠብቃል በዘላቂነት መቋቋም እንዲችሉ የመልሶ ማቋቋሙን ሥራ ይከታተላል ያስፈፅማል፡፡

6) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ስራውን በአግባቡ ለመፈፀም እንዲያስችለው ልዩ ልዩ አደረጃጀት ሊኖረው ይችላል፡፡

7) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱን የአሰራር ስርዓት መመሪያ ሊያወጣ ይችላል፡፡

27/ የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ አመሠራረት

1) 44 አባላት ያሉት በክልሉ ወይም ከጉባዔውና ከአስተደዳሩ በተውጣጡ አባላት ምክር ቤቱ ይቋቋማል፡፡

2) 22 አባላት ከክልሉ ወይም ከጉባዔው ይወከላሉ፡፡

3) 22 አባላት ከአስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት ይወከላሉ፡፡

4) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ሰብሳቢ ከጉባዔው ከተወከሉት አባላት መካከል ይሆናል፡፡

5) የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ም/ሰብሳቢ በአስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት ከተወከሉት አባላት መካከል ይሆናል፡፡

6) ምክር ቤቱ ቋሚ ጽ/ቤት፣ ድጋፍ ሰጪ ሠራተኞች እና ሙያተኞች ይኖሩታል፡፡

28/ በጀት

የከተማው አስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት ለጋራ ምክር ቤቱ ሥራ የሚያስፈልገውን በጀት ከጋራ ምክር ቤቱ በሚቀርብለት ጥያቄ መሰረት የመመደብ ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

29/ የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ የሥራ ዘመን

የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ የሥራ ዘመን 5 ዓመት ሆኖ የፊነፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ምክር ቤት እና የጉባዔው ምርጫ ተካሂዶ በአዲስ መልክ ሲዋቀሩ ይኸውም የጋራ ምክር ቤቱ በአዲስ መልክ ይዋቀራል፡፡

ክፍል አምስት:- ልዩ ልዩ ድንጋጌዎች

30/ መተባበርና የመፈፀም ግዴታ

1) ይህን አዋጅ እና አዋጁን ተከትሎ የሚወጡትን ደንቦችና መመሪያዎች ሥራ ላይ ለማዋል ማናቸውም ሰው ወይም አካል የመተባበር ግዴታ አለበት፡፡

2) የከተማ አስተዳደሩ እና የአስተዳደሩ መንግስታዊ አካላት በሙሉ አዋጁን የመፈፀም ግዴታ አለባቸው፡፡

31/ የአዋጁን አፈፃፀም ስለመቆጣጠር

1) የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት እና ጨፌ ኦሮሚያ ይህን አዋጅና በአዋጁ መሰረት የሚወጡትን ደንቦችና መመሪያዎች በትክክል ስራ ላይ መዋላቸውን የመቆጣጠር ሥልጣንና ኃላፊነት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

2) የኢ.ፌ.ደ.ሪ. መንግሥት የሚኒስትሮች ም/ቤት እና ክልላዊ መንግስቱ ይህን አዋጅና በአዋጁ መሰረት የሚወጡትን ደንቦችና መመሪያዎች በትክክል ስራ ላይ መዋላቸውን የመከታተልና የመደገፍ ሥልጣንና ኃላፊነት ይኖራቸዋል፡፡

32/ ተፈፃሚነት ስለማይኖራቸው ህጐች

ይህን አዋጅ ጋር የሚቃረን ማንኛውም ሕግ፣የአዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር ቻርተር አዋጅ ፣ መመሪያ፣ የአሠራር ልምዶች ወይም ውሳኔዎች በዚህ አዋጅ ውስጥ የተደነገጉ ጉዳዮች በሚመለከት ተፈፃሚነት አይኖራቸውም፡፡

33/ ደንብና መመሪያ የማውጣት ሥልጣን

1) የኢ.ፌ.ደ.ሪ. መንግሥት የሚኒስትሮች ም/ቤት ይህን አዋጅ ለማስፈፀም ደንብ ሊያወጣ ይችላል፡፡

2) ጉባዔው እና የአስተዳደሩ ምክር ቤት ይህን አዋጅና በአዋጁ መሰረት የሚወጣውን ደንብ ለማስፈፀም መመሪያ ሊያወጡ ይችላሉ፡፡

34/ አዋጁ የሚፀናበት ጊዜ

ይህ አዋጅ በፌዴራል ነጋሪት ጋዜጣ ታትሞ ከወጣበት ቀን ጀምሮ የፀና ይሆናል፡፡

ፊንፊኔ/አዲስ አበባ ……….. ቀን 2009 ዓ.ም

ሙላቱ ተሾመ(ዶ/ር)

የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ፕሬዚዳንት

LOVE-Triangle in the Middle East?

The friendships and enmities among countries, political groups and militant organisations in the Middle East

A “mosaic chart” of Middle Eastern relationships

ISLAMIC STATE (IS) has no friends. But it has upended geopolitics in the Middle East and drawn America’s armed forces back to the region. Our “relationship mosaic” summarises the friendships and enmities among countries, political groups and militant organisations in the Middle East. It provides a quick, simplified glimpse (the “neutral” category, for instance, embraces a large number of possibilities).

Syria’s official al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, is almost as isolated as IS: neither was invited to a conference of Syrian opposition groups held in Saudi Arabia in December 2015. The Syrian government is disliked by many countries, but supported by Iran and Russia. Russia’s relationship with Turkey deteriorated sharply after the Turks’ shooting-down of a Russian warplane in November. The Iraqi Kurds count numerous friends and no sworn enemies. Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia’s already sour relations with Shia-led Iran deteriorated severely in early January 2016 following the execution of an influential Shia cleric by the Saudis. The resulting diplomatic row saw a number of other Arab League countries, including Qatar and Kuwait, take sides with the Saudi government against Iran. For its part, America must play a delicate diplomatic game in holding together some very unlikely ties.

The Economist:The differences between the Catholic and Orthodox churches

The Economist explains

TO A non-Christian, or even to a Christian who prefers to keep doctrine and worship as simple as possible, the Catholic and Orthodox churches can look pretty similar. Both use elaborate ceremonies of ancient origin and have multiple ranks of robed clergy; both claim continuity with the dawn of the Christian era; both have rich theological and scholarly traditions and generally, long institutional memories. Only an apparently tiny difference separates the versions they use of the creed setting out their basic beliefs in a triune God of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Why, then, do the two religious bodies not simply unite? On February 12th Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, the head of the Russian Orthodox church, will meet in Cuba. Though not unprecedented in the last ten centuries such a meeting is nonetheless unusual. Why?

Part of the answer is that precisely because both institutions have long memories, differences which emerged many centuries ago still matter. The formal parting between the Christian West and the Christian East occurred in 1054; to some extent it reflected cultural and geopolitical competition between the Greek-speaking “east Roman” empire, in other words Byzantium, and Latin-speaking western Europe where Roman authority had collapsed in the fifth century, but new centres of power had emerged. Tensions rose in the early 11th century when the Catholic Normans overran Greek-speaking southern Italy and imposed Latin practices on the churches there. The Patriarch of Constantinople retaliated by putting a stop to outposts of Latin-style worship in his home city, and the pope sent a delegation to Constantinople to sort the matter out. The delegation’s leader, Cardinal Humbert, excommunicated the Patriarch; the Patriarch promptly did the same to the visitor.

In the run-up to that final rupture there had been growing differences over the pope’s claim to authority over the whole of Christendom, in contrast with the Orthodox view that all the ancient centres of the Christian world (Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem as well as Rome and Constantinople) were approximately equal in status. The Orthodox took issue with the pope for mandating a version of the creed which in their view amounted to a subtle downgrading of the Holy Spirit. To this theological difference was added a massive geopolitical grievance: in 1204 Latin armies ransacked Constantinople, which was still the Christian world’s greatest centre of commerce and culture and imposed a Latin regime for about six decades. In the Orthodox collective memory, this act of betrayal by fellow Christians weakened the great city and rendered inevitable its conquest by the Muslim Turks in 1453. Having gone their separate ways, the Christian West and Christian East spawned different theological traditions. The West developed the idea of purgatory and of “penal substitution” (the idea that Christ’s self-sacrifice was a necessary payoff to a punitive Father-God). Neither teaching appeals to Orthodox Christians. The East, with a penchant for mixing the intellectual and the mystical, explored the idea that God was both inaccessible to human reason but accessible to the human heart.

To the Orthodox believer, Catholic theology seems excessively categorical and legalistic; to the Catholic mind, Orthodox thinking in its mystical flights can seem vague and ambivalent. In a few hours of set-piece discussion in Havana airport on February 12th, the pope and Patriarch will hardly be able to resolve these centuries-old differences. But at least they may understand each other a little better.

“We Can’t Protest So We Pray”

“We Can’t Protest So We Pray”: Anguish in Amhara During Ethiopia’s State of Emergency

Woman and child outside a Gonder church with crosses marked in ash on foreheads. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

Woman and child outside a Gonder church with crosses marked in ash on their foreheads. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

BAHIR DAR, Apr 17 2017 (IPS) – As dawn breaks in Bahir Dar, men prepare boats beside Lake Tana to take to its island monasteries the tourists that are starting to return.

Meanwhile, traffic flows across the same bridge spanning the Blue Nile that six months ago was crossed by a huge but peaceful protest march.

“They were waiting for an excuse to shoot.” –Priest in Bahir Dar

But only a mile farther the march ended in the shooting of unarmed protesters by security forces, leaving Bahir Dar stunned for months.

Events last August in the prominent Amhara cities of Bahir Dar (the region’s capital) and Gonder (the former historical seat of Ethiopian rule) signalled the spreading of the original Oromo protests to Ethiopia’s second most populace region.

By October 9, following further disasters and unrest, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front party declared a six-month state of emergency, which was extended at the end of this March for another four months.

Ethiopian national flags and regional Amhara flags flutter along the bridge over the Blue Nile on the road going east from Bahir Dar that the protesters took last year. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

Ethiopian national flags and regional Amhara flags flutter along the bridge over the Blue Nile on the road going east from Bahir Dar that the protesters took last year. A mile on from the bridge the peaceful march descended into tragedy with shots fired into the crowd. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

On the surface, the state of emergency’s measures including arbitrary arrests, curfews, bans on public assembly, and media and Internet restrictions appear to have been successful in Amhara.

Now shops are open and streets are busy, following months when the cities were flooded with military personal, and everyday life ground to a halt as locals closed shops and businesses in a gesture of passive resistance.

Speaking to residents, however, it’s clear discontent hasn’t abated. Frustrations have grown for many due to what’s deemed gross governmental oppression. But almost everyone agrees that for now, with the state of emergency in place, there’s not much more they can do.

“Now it’s the fasting period before Easter, so people are praying even more and saying: Where are you God? Did you forget this land?” says Stefanos, who works in Gonder’s tourism industry, and didn’t want to give his name due to fear of arrest by the Command Post, the administrative body coordinating the state of emergency.

“Because people can’t protest, they are praying harder than ever.”

The four-month extension to the state of emergency contains less sweeping powers than before. Now police need warrants to arrest suspects or search their homes, and detention without trial has officially been ended. But grievances remain about what happened before.

“Someone will come and say they are with the Command Post and just tell you to go with them—you have no option but to obey,” Dawit, working in Gonder’s tourism industry, says of hundreds of locals arrested. “No one has any insurance of life.”

Outside Gonder churches, beggars line streets hoping for alms. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

Outside Gonder churches, beggars line streets hoping for alms. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

Locals recall how if young men gathered in too large a group they risked getting arrested.

“The regime has imprisoned, tortured and abused 20, 000-plus young people and killed hundreds more in order to restore a semblance of order,” says Alemante Selassie, emeritus law professor at the College of William & Mary and Ethiopia analyst. “Repression is the least effective means of creating real order in any society where there is a fundamental breach of trust between people and their rulers.”

Across Gondar, many unemployed men seek distraction by chewing the plant khat, a stimulant that motivates animated conversation about security force abuses and the dire local economic situation.

“If you kill your own people how are you a soldier—you are a terrorist,” says 32-year old Tesfaye, chomping on khat leaves. “I became a soldier to protect my people. This government has forgotten me since I left after seven years fighting in Somalia. I’ve been trying to get a job here for five months.”

Beyond such revulsion and frustration, some claim the state of emergency has had other psychological impacts.

“Continued fear and distrust of the [ruling] regime by the Ethiopian people,” says Tewodrose Tirfe of the Amhara Association of America. “Continued loss of hope for a better form a government where basic human rights of the Ethiopians are respected.”

For many the memories of what happened during protests last summer are still raw, especially for Bahir Dar residents.

Tens of thousands gathered in Bahir Dar’s centre on August 7 before marching along the main northeast-running road out of the city toward the Blue Nile River, carrying palm tree leaves and other greenery as symbols of peace.

After crossing the bridge there are various versions about what happened next.

Some say a protester attempted to replace Ethiopia’s current federal national flag flying outside a government building with the older, pan-Ethiopian nationalistic flag—now banned in Amhara—an argument ensued and the guard shot the protester.

Others say that protesters threw stones at the building—the guard fired warning shots in the air—then protesters tried entering the compound—the guard fired at them.

But there is less uncertainly about what happened next.

“Security forces suddenly emerged from buildings and shot into the march for no reason,” says an Ethiopian priest, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “They were waiting for an excuse to shoot.”

It’s estimated 27 died that day, the death toll rising to 52 by the end of the week. A total of 227 civilians have died during unrest in the Amhara region, according to government figures, while others claim it’s much higher.

“Two people on my right side dropped dead,” says 23-year-old Haile, marching that day. “One had been shot in the head, one in the heart.”

Such violence was unprecedented for Bahir Dar, a popular tourist location, known for its tranquil lake and laid-back atmosphere.

“The city went into shock for months,” says the Ethiopian priest.

But as the months have passed, normal daily life has gradually reasserted itself.

“People are tired of the trouble and want to get on with their lives,” says Tesfaye, a tour operator. “But, then again, in a couple of years, who knows.”

Many criticise the government for failing to address long-term structural frictions between Ethiopia’s proclaimed federal constitution and an actual centralist developmental state model, as well as failing to resolve—with some saying it actively stokes—increasing ethnic tensions.

“Three years ago I went to university and no one cared where you were from,” says Haile, a telecommunication engineer in Bahir Dar. “Now Amhara and Tigray students are fighting with each other.”

“Federalism is good and bad,” says Haile’s friend Joseph, who is half Tigrayan and half Amhara. “Ethiopia has all these different groups proud of their languages and cultures. But [on the other hand] even though my father is Tigray, I can’t go and work in Tigray because I don’t speak Tigrayan.”

Joseph pauses to consider, before continuing.

“This government has kept the country together, if they disappeared we would be like Somalia,” he says. “All the opposition does is protest, protest, they can’t do anything else.”

Finding such a view in Gonder is much harder.

“The government has a chance for peace but they don’t have the mental skills to achieve it,” says tourist guide Teklemariam. “If protests happen again they will be worse.”

The main road between Gonder and Bahir Dar winds up and down steep hillsides, surrounded by mountains, cliffs and tight valleys stretching to the horizon.

Ethiopia’s vertiginous topography has challenged foreign invaders for centuries. But it’s potentially a headache for domestic rulers too, added to which militarism is a traditional virtue in the Amhara region.

In Gonder, men talk admiringly of an Amhara resistance movement which conducted hit-and-run attacks on soldiers when they occupied the city, before withdrawing into the surrounding mountains.

“The farmers are ready to die for their land,” the Ethiopian priest says. “It’s all they have known, they have never been away from here.”

According to Gonder locals, armed farmers have been fighting Ethiopian security forces for months.

“I saw dozens of soldiers at Gonder’s hospital with bullet and knife wounds,” says Henok, a student nurse, who took part in the protests. “The government controls the urban but not the rural areas.”

Off the main streets in Gonder, Ethiopia, poverty becomes starker. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

Off the main streets in Gonder, Ethiopia, poverty becomes starker. Credit: James Jeffrey/IPS

Young men like Henok talk passionately of Colonel Demeke Zewudud, a key member of Amhara resistance arrested by the government in 2016, and even more so about Gobe Malke, one of the leaders of the farmer insurrection until he was killed this February, allegedly at the hands of his cousin in the government’s payroll.

“If the government wants a true and real form of stabilization, then it should allow for a true representative form of governance so all people have the representation they need and deserve,” Tewodrose says.

“But the concern of the TPLF is the perception from the international community, so they can continue to receive and misuse foreign aid.”

In his role with the Amhara Association of America, Tewodrose presented a report to a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing March 9 about “Democracy Under Threat in Ethiopia”. The report also detailed 500 security forces killed during fighting in Amhara—Gonder locals claim many more.

“Before I die I just want to see Ethiopia growing peacefully and not divided by tribes,” says 65-year-old grandmother Indeshash, housebound in Gonder due to ongoing leg problems. “If my legs worked I would have protested.”

Why Africa? Why Now?

By Dr. Khaled M. Batarfi, Saudigazette

Dr. Khaled M. Batarfi

WHY are we now so interested in Africa? Why is Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani visiting Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa in less than a year? Why had Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir toured a number of African countries, last year, some of which are relatively small, such as Guinea, Benin, Senegal, Tanzania, the Comoros and Burkina Faso, as well as major nations like Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa, in addition to African-Arab countries — Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt? Why are African leaders visiting Gulf capitals in droves? Why Saudi Arabia and Qatar occupy two observer seats in the African Union? And what does the declaration of Sudan’s foreign minister about a new strategic alliance with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states mean?

These are legitimate questions posed by keen international observers about the Gulf convergence, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with Africa. The two oil-rich countries are investing billions of dollars in under-developed and less-stable markets of the sub-Saharan countries. They seem to be channeling investments in addition to political and commercial partnerships to these promising economies as well as moving to contain Iran’s expansion, culturally, politically and culturally.

The same questions have been raised about China’s interest in Africa for decades, especially when compared to American and Western neglect, with the exception of France and Britain which had past colonial ties with parts of the continent.

Africa, according to Wikipedia, is the world’s second largest and second most populous continent, after Asia, with abundant natural resources. With about 30.2 million km (11.7 million square miles) including adjacent islands, it covers six percent of Earth’s total surface area and 20.4 percent of its total land area. With 1.1 billion people as of 2013, it accounts for about 15 percent of the world’s human population.

The continent, the birthplace of humankind, mostly lacks modern infrastructure, skilled human resources and political, security and financial stability. This may have been partially the result of European exploitation of the continent’s wealth and the enslavement of its population. In return, few countries, like South Africa, Kenya, Tunisia and Sudan, had received substantial developmental investments during colonial era.

Over the last decade, Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates, have been heavily investing in African countries, especially in agricultural resources. Sudan is the food basket of the Arab world, Ethiopia is the Nile origin with enormous agricultural and pastoral treasures. Both command capable infrastructure and human resources. Africa is promising market for the Gulf petroleum, petrochemical and industrial products, and a rich supplier of raw materials and agriculture.

Politically and culturally, Africa has been the strategic depth of the Arab world. Its nations are either mostly Muslim or have large Muslim communities devotedly linked to the Arabian Peninsula and the land of Two Holy Mosques. And among us live generations of Africans who have migrated for work, education and Haj.

It is no secret that the Iranian incursion in African countries is aiming for ideological, economic and political hegemony. The coup attempts of the Iranian-backed sects against the elected governments of Nigeria, Somalia and the Comoros are evidence of malicious intentions.

Arabs and Muslims cannot afford to lose Africa. It is part of our world — geographically, historically, socially and culturally. Realizing such importance, King Faisal Bin Abdulaziz toured Africa in the 1960s. His visits to the likes of Mali and Uganda turned these countries away from Israel to join the Islamic nation. Saudi Arabia hosted numerous African leaders since then, and our bilateral relations became much stronger.

The Arab League and GCC should design a common cooperation strategy with the African Union at all levels, for all above reasons. We need cooperation councils, like those we have with the European Union and South America, in addition to bilateral strategic councils and agreements, like what we have between Sudan and the GCC, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

We definitely need to diversify our international cooperation and investments. It is not safe to rely exclusively on traditional partners, allies and markets. The oceans of interests shift, the winds of alliance twist and the globe is too large, hospitable and diversified for us to be any limited.

Dr. Khaled M. Batarfi is a Saudi writer based in Jeddah. He can be reached at kbatarfi@gmail.com. Follow him at Twitter:@kbatarfi

Why did Donald Trump just send dozens of troops to Somalia?

Somali women military soldiers march during celebrations marking the 57th anniversary since the force was founded in Mogadishu, Somalia, Wednesday, April 12, 2017. (AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh)
Dozens of troops are headed to help fight al-Shabab. (Somali women military soldiers march during celebrations marking the 57th anniversary since the force was founded in Mogadishu, Somalia, Wednesday, April 12, 2017. (AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh))

The end of his first 100 days as US president near, Donald Trump has changed gears when it comes his position on military intervention. As he was enjoying the “most beautiful” chocolate cake with Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago on April 6, he told the Chinese president that the US had fired missiles at a Syrian airfield, following Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons attack on his own people.

On April 13, the US dropped the “Mother Of All Bombs” (MOAB) on Afghanistan: The largest bomb it has used since World War II hit an ISIL tunnel complex. On the same day, as the tension between the US and North Korea escalated, NBC reported that Trump may be ready to launch strikes, prompting requests of caution from China and Russia.

Meanwhile, the US is sending a “small number” of F-35A aircraft to Europe, as part of a “long-planned” training deployment.

And that’s not all: the US has announced April 14 that, for the first time since 1994, it’s deploying “dozens” of regular troops in Somalia to help the ongoing fight against al-Shabab, al-Qaeda’s jihadist ally. They are to provide training and support to the Somali National Army and the African Union mission on the ground, Voice of America reported. The US troops will enhance what has been America’s small presence (three to 50 people) in the country to facilitate the military relationship between Somalia.

The mission is scheduled to continue until the end of September.

This is the first time the US has sent regular forces to Somalia since March 1994, after special forces that were part a peacekeeping mission aimed at enforcing a ceasefire during the Somalian civil war were ensnared in a 15-hour-long battle in Mogadishu. Eighteen Americans were killed in the incident, memorialized in Black Hawk Down, prompting then president Bill Clinton to order a US withdrawal.