Author: EFP

Reflecting on ‘The Amhara Psychology’

By  yalmazborsa

Recently, a piece was posted online written by Befeqadu, a blogger, an activist, interested in and usually posting findings, thoughts and ‘feelings’ on issues that strike the average cyber-Ethiopians’ attention. I have a few things to say, and I present some findings that may add some depth to the author’s writing, if in fact he continues to research and engage with the topic. It is only because I genuinely believe he wants to expand his knowledge about this. The last few paragraphs of his piece are convoluted and funky, I am sure not only to me, but also to him, the author. In my last paragraphs, I lay out some things I’ve been noticing, in relation to his piece, but in general to what I feel is happening on social media as well.

Cheers,

Hewan

—

Befeqadu’s piece was titled ‘The Amhara Psychology’. He starts off with trying to identify and define what contemporary Amhara is in comparison with what it historically represented. Then he highlights how tracing the language might help us pin down the evolution of the people who speak Amharic, an OK approach, but which thereby subtly declares that those who speak it would be those who are called Amhara. He also claims, without citation, that “ [l]egend has it that it was in Shoa, in the 13th century, that the language was first born” and further, that “the language is younger than Cushitic languages that include Afaan Oromo and Somali”. Primarily, it is with respect that I say, one should not make such a bold heading for a piece that isn’t even three pages long and for one which more than factual and evidence based research only presents exhausted theories about the Amhara. How does one understand the psychology of a group of diverse people? (Didn’t we tackle this in anthropology 101)

In the book, Church and State (1270 – 1527) by Taddesse Tamrat, Taddesse uses ‘Amhara’ to represent not the Amharic speaking group, but a Christian ‘advance guards’ that expanded to the south, facing conflicts with the Shewans (64). They are represented differently from the Tigre. He writes “It is apparent that all the Semitic linguistic groups south of the Tigre region had a similar origin. The Amhara tribal group is the most northerly of these communities and was probably the earliest to be established as such”. Taddesse here is explaining the southward expansion of Christians prior to the 9th century, further proving that Amhara did in fact exist before the 9th century. In fact, he continues to write, “the earliest recorded tradition of Christian settlement in the region indicates that there was already a distinct Amhara population…” (37-38). Further, Taddesse writes Yikunno Amlak’s dynasty was comprised of “Amhara and the Christian communities of Shawa” (67). I use this to present a theory, that perhaps the Amhara were not entirely Christian, and could have been pagan, and or Muslim if they had to be identified as their own group here. Or perhaps, the Amhara were their own distinct group, just like the Shewa.

Befeqadu has ignored Church documents in his writing, and I would like to guide his attention to one Gedl, Gedle Teklehaymanot, of the king not the saint. This also mentions the Amhara. It is to be noted that the Gedl was written in the 800s. The roots, Biher, languages and descriptions of the people of Ethiopia are stated in the volumes of Gedle Teklehaymanot.

Other books include: The Ethiopians by Edward Ullendorff states that Amharic has been the “Lesanne Negus” (language of the kings) officially from Yikunno Amlak’s period reign in 1270, although Amharic has been used by the Zagwe Monarchs, Lalibela et al. He presents evidence that Ge’ez and Amharic have co-existed side by side for centuries. “…the evolution of Amharic and the other modern languages can best be envisaged in this way: classical Ethiopic, in the course of time, spread over a fairly large area and, when political and other circumstances were propitious […], eventually became differentiated to such an extent that the varying speech forms were mutually unintelligible” (119). Further, the language may have been made the official national language in the past 100 years, it has been the court language for centuries (124) and its grammar studied by indigenous and foreign scholars since the middle ages. And, to Befeqadu’s list of sources that declare the Amharic language has Cushitic influences, there is solid evidence that its “Semitic stock remains appreciable” in Ullendorf’s book (125).

In Titov’s Modern Amharic Language script of 1976, he writes that there is evidence that the first known Amharic writings were from the 13th century. It should also be noted that even among the EthioSemitic languages, Amharic is classified as among the ‘Southern Semetic languages of Ethiopia, along with Guragigna, Harari, Argoba etc.. The northern Semetic languages are the Tigre, Tigrigna, the old Ethiopic  and Ge’ez’.

In Gedle Qewustos written in the 14th century, there are words such as ስርጓይ which are followed by similar descriptions by church scholars which state «በአገራችን ቋንቋ ይህ እምቧይ ይባላል» referring to Amharic.

For further research, please also refer to Girma Awgichew’s book on Ethiosemetic languages and his thorough discussion of the arguments about the evolution of Amarigna. You can also refer to Kidane Wold Kifle, Nibure-ed Ermias’s ኢትዮጵያ የአለም መፋረጃ and Mesfin Woldemariam’s book which came out 7 years ago, in 2003 E.C (sorry, I forgot the title)

—

Questions and points of reflection:

To his claim, “people -whatever their ethnic background is – have to be [Orthodox Christians] and speak Amharic to have the maximum chance of taking over leadership”, I say this is partially fabricated. The Solomonic Dynasty has never been based on whether or not one speaks Amharic, and not after Tewodros as well. It mattered most whether one can trace their lineage to the House of David (Asfa-Wossen Assrate 2015; Kebra Nagast) regardless of what language you spoke. [Zagwe was based on ethnicity, Solomonic dynasty was known for intermarriages (consider this as checks and balances).]

Befeqadu’s piece is also filled with chronological confusion. He seems to contradict himself by stating that Oromiffa was used in the Zemene Mesafint time-period, even though he stated that he was discussing post-Tewodross II Ethiopia. This confusion could be emblematic of a deeper confusion of understanding what exactly he is claiming, but that is to be excused.

He then states that Gondar royalties had adopted Catholic Christianity, even though it was only Atse Suseneyos of the 17th century who officially converted and even that after deep chaos in the empire, followed by revolts from all sorts of groups, including the re-known Wellete Petros. Rumour has it that Atse ZeDengil and Atse Ya’ekob had converted but this could have been spread by royalty to simply get rid of them as power rivals. Abune Gorgorious የኢትዮጵያ ቤተክርስትያን ታሪክ and Tsehafee Tezaz Gebreselassie, the first Ethiopian Tsefihet Minister’s books are references. This is also present in the reknown Ethopian historian’s TekleTsadik Mekuria’s volumes, especially ከይኩኖአምላክ እስከ ቴዎድሮስ. Further, he mentions that in Ethiopia’s entire history, it was only Aba Jifar who was able to keep his faith while ruling a province of Ethiopia. What are the sources? Atse Zeria Yakob and Atse Amde Tsion, have gone to the extremes of Adal to expand their country – had accepted Harrar’s and Adals rulers to rule as Muslim Sultans as long as they pay tribute to the central government. Menelik’s is only exceptional because of Aba Jiffar’s proximity to the central government. Orthodox Christianity was the basis on which one could claim the throne. This was, in fact, only changed upon the reign of Haile Selassie, who was the single ruler in Ethiopia’s history to have forced direct familial lineage to legitimize one’s quest for power, to this Teklehawariat, Ras Assrate and several are evidences.

But once again, I repeat, language or ethnicity has never been a factor to rule Ethiopia. The author makes speculations as to why the Tigre could have ruled over Ethiopia. It is interesting that a Church scholar mentioned to me today that this is written in several manuscripts that the Amhara of current Shoa have lineages that go back 4 or 5 generations to the Tigre.

Then again, the author’s chronology is off and one is not quite sure which century he is talking about when he says “Amhara people speak of their birth place (saying I’m Gojjamé, Gondarré, Showayé or Wolloyé)”. Up-to about four decades ago, Amhara had taken to mean ‘Orthodox Christian’ instead of much more (Mesfin Woldemariam). His assumption that one has to ‘amharanize’ oneself then becomes even more confusing. Is he saying that all who speak Amharic will become Amhara? How about his claim that the Amhara themselves don’t necessarily call themselves that. If he is speaking of the language becoming that of a working language in contemporary Ethiopia, then would he say the same for English as it is becoming the global language? Are we Englisizing ourselves, or do we consider that simply a uniting tool for humanity? But this for another discussion.

I believe Befeqadu’s piece took a turn for the worse upon his insulting claim that ‘the common psychological make-up of the Amhara today is pride’.

“The source of this pride is the long standing narration of heroism and leadership opportunity they had. They do have strong sense of ownership to the state. They make proud of the fact that they had central role in forming the Ethiopian state. And, therefore, they don’t like critics of the way Ethiopia is formed. They hate anyone who hates the Imperial rulers and dislike who doesn’t like the state.”

This particular paragraph above is what led me to conclude that Befeqadu’s piece is not educational, nor is it meant to be taken as such. It is his assumptions of what he believes; and the piece a reflection of Befeqadu’s true opinions. No one can be challenged for what they simply assume. He refers to a group he fails to recognize through his “research” as ‘they’. He tells us, the readers, disrespectfully, that the Amhara’s pride is ‘their’ fibre of identity. He repeats that ‘they’ had a central role in forming the Ethiopian state, even-though he himself has been arguing that it could have been true that the ancestors to the Amhara group were not necessarily Amhara. He concludes with what he cannot justify. Should we count the lineage of the rulers of Ethiopia to prove that most of them were not Amhara? Is this what we have come down to?

After this, the author has two to three paragraphs, which frankly I couldn’t clearly understand. Thus, I apologize for the conclusion I am about to draw, considering they may not necessarily be in line with what Befeqadu intended to say. How is it that a group that the author claims as extremely diverse and is collectedly given one name, meant to be individualistic? In fact, how is it then possible for an activist, a reader, to criticize a group where he has done little research on/about/– for being individualistic? Now, where the Amhara came from and what role they had in the state formation needs exhaustive research, but so does the fact that EPRDF’s rule has consolidated the Amhara to mean more than what it meant a hundred years ago. People should not assume the psyche of a vast group of people based on ‘ethno-nationalists’ they meet online. I say this, because I do not believe Befeqadu understands any group of people, especially not the people of Wello, or Gojjam, or Gondar, or Shewa entirely to have warranted him to write that they are proud and have a growingly ‘Amhara nationalism’.

—

Finally, my 2, 3, 4, +… cents.

I do not see much difference in forced narrations of history and Bef’s extremely bold 2 page writing on the Amhara Psychology. They both enforce things that are not necessarily factual, with unclear methodology and basically non-existent research. Doesn’t this counter what Befeqadu claims to stand for?

Also consider this: why has there been a growing trend to automatically disregard or insult Befeqadu’s or his friends’ writings recently? If a large group of people on social media are constantly revoking what you write, whether or not you are on point, then it could be people do not feel represented by what you present. If people state, over and over again, that their activists do not represent them, then there is clearly something off.

This is simply a post by someone who wanted to comment on things he views and hears and reads. Levine and other anthropological scholars are not enough to write about Ethiopia. Truthfully, I was more shocked by the amount of people he reached on social media than by the contents of his writings. If, I for one, know that I have so many followers, I would do further research and present my audience a respectful and thought-out piece. As a point of departure, if ever Befeqadu gets around to responding to this, I would like to ask, what exactly is the motif for this piece? Will you go on further to write about the Tigre Psyche? Or the Oromo Psychology? And won’t it be divisive to try to discuss such narrow definitions of ourselves?

I also suggest we come back to our own sources as well. The Orthodox Church has documents that we can use to analyze and discuss our past and which are accessible; we cannot only read Leslau and Levine and claim to know Ethiopia. Diversify your sources, dear Befeqadu, time and time again, there seems to be a debilitating Eurocentric approach you use in your writings. Ethiopia’s history is reconstructed from Ge’ez books.

Also, as a final question: why wasn’t this written in Amharic? Is there a reason for using English? I’m using English because my background forces me to be comfortable with English than Amharic. This I ask because your one comment to a friend’s latest book was that ‘to reach majority readers, he should have written in Amharic’.

Regardless, we appreciate the effort and I personally thank you for providing me with evidence that if I am ever to write about Ethiopians, I have to be simply careful with my research.

Selam

Reflecting on ‘The Amhara Psychology’

By  yalmazborsa

Recently, a piece was posted online written by Befeqadu, a blogger, an activist, interested in and usually posting findings, thoughts and ‘feelings’ on issues that strike the average cyber-Ethiopians’ attention. I have a few things to say, and I present some findings that may add some depth to the author’s writing, if in fact he continues to research and engage with the topic. It is only because I genuinely believe he wants to expand his knowledge about this. The last few paragraphs of his piece are convoluted and funky, I am sure not only to me, but also to him, the author. In my last paragraphs, I lay out some things I’ve been noticing, in relation to his piece, but in general to what I feel is happening on social media as well.

Cheers,

Hewan

—

Befeqadu’s piece was titled ‘The Amhara Psychology’. He starts off with trying to identify and define what contemporary Amhara is in comparison with what it historically represented. Then he highlights how tracing the language might help us pin down the evolution of the people who speak Amharic, an OK approach, but which thereby subtly declares that those who speak it would be those who are called Amhara. He also claims, without citation, that “ [l]egend has it that it was in Shoa, in the 13th century, that the language was first born” and further, that “the language is younger than Cushitic languages that include Afaan Oromo and Somali”. Primarily, it is with respect that I say, one should not make such a bold heading for a piece that isn’t even three pages long and for one which more than factual and evidence based research only presents exhausted theories about the Amhara. How does one understand the psychology of a group of diverse people? (Didn’t we tackle this in anthropology 101)

In the book, Church and State (1270 – 1527) by Taddesse Tamrat, Taddesse uses ‘Amhara’ to represent not the Amharic speaking group, but a Christian ‘advance guards’ that expanded to the south, facing conflicts with the Shewans (64). They are represented differently from the Tigre. He writes “It is apparent that all the Semitic linguistic groups south of the Tigre region had a similar origin. The Amhara tribal group is the most northerly of these communities and was probably the earliest to be established as such”. Taddesse here is explaining the southward expansion of Christians prior to the 9th century, further proving that Amhara did in fact exist before the 9th century. In fact, he continues to write, “the earliest recorded tradition of Christian settlement in the region indicates that there was already a distinct Amhara population…” (37-38). Further, Taddesse writes Yikunno Amlak’s dynasty was comprised of “Amhara and the Christian communities of Shawa” (67). I use this to present a theory, that perhaps the Amhara were not entirely Christian, and could have been pagan, and or Muslim if they had to be identified as their own group here. Or perhaps, the Amhara were their own distinct group, just like the Shewa.

Befeqadu has ignored Church documents in his writing, and I would like to guide his attention to one Gedl, Gedle Teklehaymanot, of the king not the saint. This also mentions the Amhara. It is to be noted that the Gedl was written in the 800s. The roots, Biher, languages and descriptions of the people of Ethiopia are stated in the volumes of Gedle Teklehaymanot.

Other books include: The Ethiopians by Edward Ullendorff states that Amharic has been the “Lesanne Negus” (language of the kings) officially from Yikunno Amlak’s period reign in 1270, although Amharic has been used by the Zagwe Monarchs, Lalibela et al. He presents evidence that Ge’ez and Amharic have co-existed side by side for centuries. “…the evolution of Amharic and the other modern languages can best be envisaged in this way: classical Ethiopic, in the course of time, spread over a fairly large area and, when political and other circumstances were propitious […], eventually became differentiated to such an extent that the varying speech forms were mutually unintelligible” (119). Further, the language may have been made the official national language in the past 100 years, it has been the court language for centuries (124) and its grammar studied by indigenous and foreign scholars since the middle ages. And, to Befeqadu’s list of sources that declare the Amharic language has Cushitic influences, there is solid evidence that its “Semitic stock remains appreciable” in Ullendorf’s book (125).

In Titov’s Modern Amharic Language script of 1976, he writes that there is evidence that the first known Amharic writings were from the 13th century. It should also be noted that even among the EthioSemitic languages, Amharic is classified as among the ‘Southern Semetic languages of Ethiopia, along with Guragigna, Harari, Argoba etc.. The northern Semetic languages are the Tigre, Tigrigna, the old Ethiopic  and Ge’ez’.

In Gedle Qewustos written in the 14th century, there are words such as ስርጓይ which are followed by similar descriptions by church scholars which state «በአገራችን ቋንቋ ይህ እምቧይ ይባላል» referring to Amharic.

For further research, please also refer to Girma Awgichew’s book on Ethiosemetic languages and his thorough discussion of the arguments about the evolution of Amarigna. You can also refer to Kidane Wold Kifle, Nibure-ed Ermias’s ኢትዮጵያ የአለም መፋረጃ and Mesfin Woldemariam’s book which came out 7 years ago, in 2003 E.C (sorry, I forgot the title)

—

Questions and points of reflection:

To his claim, “people -whatever their ethnic background is – have to be [Orthodox Christians] and speak Amharic to have the maximum chance of taking over leadership”, I say this is partially fabricated. The Solomonic Dynasty has never been based on whether or not one speaks Amharic, and not after Tewodros as well. It mattered most whether one can trace their lineage to the House of David (Asfa-Wossen Assrate 2015; Kebra Nagast) regardless of what language you spoke. [Zagwe was based on ethnicity, Solomonic dynasty was known for intermarriages (consider this as checks and balances).]

Befeqadu’s piece is also filled with chronological confusion. He seems to contradict himself by stating that Oromiffa was used in the Zemene Mesafint time-period, even though he stated that he was discussing post-Tewodross II Ethiopia. This confusion could be emblematic of a deeper confusion of understanding what exactly he is claiming, but that is to be excused.

He then states that Gondar royalties had adopted Catholic Christianity, even though it was only Atse Suseneyos of the 17th century who officially converted and even that after deep chaos in the empire, followed by revolts from all sorts of groups, including the re-known Wellete Petros. Rumour has it that Atse ZeDengil and Atse Ya’ekob had converted but this could have been spread by royalty to simply get rid of them as power rivals. Abune Gorgorious የኢትዮጵያ ቤተክርስትያን ታሪክ and Tsehafee Tezaz Gebreselassie, the first Ethiopian Tsefihet Minister’s books are references. This is also present in the reknown Ethopian historian’s TekleTsadik Mekuria’s volumes, especially ከይኩኖአምላክ እስከ ቴዎድሮስ. Further, he mentions that in Ethiopia’s entire history, it was only Aba Jifar who was able to keep his faith while ruling a province of Ethiopia. What are the sources? Atse Zeria Yakob and Atse Amde Tsion, have gone to the extremes of Adal to expand their country – had accepted Harrar’s and Adals rulers to rule as Muslim Sultans as long as they pay tribute to the central government. Menelik’s is only exceptional because of Aba Jiffar’s proximity to the central government. Orthodox Christianity was the basis on which one could claim the throne. This was, in fact, only changed upon the reign of Haile Selassie, who was the single ruler in Ethiopia’s history to have forced direct familial lineage to legitimize one’s quest for power, to this Teklehawariat, Ras Assrate and several are evidences.

But once again, I repeat, language or ethnicity has never been a factor to rule Ethiopia. The author makes speculations as to why the Tigre could have ruled over Ethiopia. It is interesting that a Church scholar mentioned to me today that this is written in several manuscripts that the Amhara of current Shoa have lineages that go back 4 or 5 generations to the Tigre.

Then again, the author’s chronology is off and one is not quite sure which century he is talking about when he says “Amhara people speak of their birth place (saying I’m Gojjamé, Gondarré, Showayé or Wolloyé)”. Up-to about four decades ago, Amhara had taken to mean ‘Orthodox Christian’ instead of much more (Mesfin Woldemariam). His assumption that one has to ‘amharanize’ oneself then becomes even more confusing. Is he saying that all who speak Amharic will become Amhara? How about his claim that the Amhara themselves don’t necessarily call themselves that. If he is speaking of the language becoming that of a working language in contemporary Ethiopia, then would he say the same for English as it is becoming the global language? Are we Englisizing ourselves, or do we consider that simply a uniting tool for humanity? But this for another discussion.

I believe Befeqadu’s piece took a turn for the worse upon his insulting claim that ‘the common psychological make-up of the Amhara today is pride’.

“The source of this pride is the long standing narration of heroism and leadership opportunity they had. They do have strong sense of ownership to the state. They make proud of the fact that they had central role in forming the Ethiopian state. And, therefore, they don’t like critics of the way Ethiopia is formed. They hate anyone who hates the Imperial rulers and dislike who doesn’t like the state.”

This particular paragraph above is what led me to conclude that Befeqadu’s piece is not educational, nor is it meant to be taken as such. It is his assumptions of what he believes; and the piece a reflection of Befeqadu’s true opinions. No one can be challenged for what they simply assume. He refers to a group he fails to recognize through his “research” as ‘they’. He tells us, the readers, disrespectfully, that the Amhara’s pride is ‘their’ fibre of identity. He repeats that ‘they’ had a central role in forming the Ethiopian state, even-though he himself has been arguing that it could have been true that the ancestors to the Amhara group were not necessarily Amhara. He concludes with what he cannot justify. Should we count the lineage of the rulers of Ethiopia to prove that most of them were not Amhara? Is this what we have come down to?

After this, the author has two to three paragraphs, which frankly I couldn’t clearly understand. Thus, I apologize for the conclusion I am about to draw, considering they may not necessarily be in line with what Befeqadu intended to say. How is it that a group that the author claims as extremely diverse and is collectedly given one name, meant to be individualistic? In fact, how is it then possible for an activist, a reader, to criticize a group where he has done little research on/about/– for being individualistic? Now, where the Amhara came from and what role they had in the state formation needs exhaustive research, but so does the fact that EPRDF’s rule has consolidated the Amhara to mean more than what it meant a hundred years ago. People should not assume the psyche of a vast group of people based on ‘ethno-nationalists’ they meet online. I say this, because I do not believe Befeqadu understands any group of people, especially not the people of Wello, or Gojjam, or Gondar, or Shewa entirely to have warranted him to write that they are proud and have a growingly ‘Amhara nationalism’.

—

Finally, my 2, 3, 4, +… cents.

I do not see much difference in forced narrations of history and Bef’s extremely bold 2 page writing on the Amhara Psychology. They both enforce things that are not necessarily factual, with unclear methodology and basically non-existent research. Doesn’t this counter what Befeqadu claims to stand for?

Also consider this: why has there been a growing trend to automatically disregard or insult Befeqadu’s or his friends’ writings recently? If a large group of people on social media are constantly revoking what you write, whether or not you are on point, then it could be people do not feel represented by what you present. If people state, over and over again, that their activists do not represent them, then there is clearly something off.

This is simply a post by someone who wanted to comment on things he views and hears and reads. Levine and other anthropological scholars are not enough to write about Ethiopia. Truthfully, I was more shocked by the amount of people he reached on social media than by the contents of his writings. If, I for one, know that I have so many followers, I would do further research and present my audience a respectful and thought-out piece. As a point of departure, if ever Befeqadu gets around to responding to this, I would like to ask, what exactly is the motif for this piece? Will you go on further to write about the Tigre Psyche? Or the Oromo Psychology? And won’t it be divisive to try to discuss such narrow definitions of ourselves?

I also suggest we come back to our own sources as well. The Orthodox Church has documents that we can use to analyze and discuss our past and which are accessible; we cannot only read Leslau and Levine and claim to know Ethiopia. Diversify your sources, dear Befeqadu, time and time again, there seems to be a debilitating Eurocentric approach you use in your writings. Ethiopia’s history is reconstructed from Ge’ez books.

Also, as a final question: why wasn’t this written in Amharic? Is there a reason for using English? I’m using English because my background forces me to be comfortable with English than Amharic. This I ask because your one comment to a friend’s latest book was that ‘to reach majority readers, he should have written in Amharic’.

Regardless, we appreciate the effort and I personally thank you for providing me with evidence that if I am ever to write about Ethiopians, I have to be simply careful with my research.

Selam

HOW THE NSA BUILT A SECRET SURVEILLANCE NETWORK FOR ETHIOPIA

The Intercept

“A WARM FRIENDSHIP connects the Ethiopian and American people,” U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced earlier this year. “We remain committed to working with Ethiopia to foster liberty, democracy, economic growth, protection of human rights, and the rule of law.”

Indeed, the website for the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia is marked by press releases touting U.S. aid for farmers and support for public health infrastructure in that East African nation. “Ethiopia remains among the most effective development partners, particularly in the areas of health care, education, and food security,” says the State Department.

Behind the scenes, however, Ethiopia and the U.S. are bound together by long-standing relationships built on far more than dairy processing equipment or health centers to treat people with HIV. Fifteen years ago, the U.S. began setting up very different centers, filled with technology that is not normally associated with the protection of human rights.

In the aftermath of 9/11, according to classified U.S. documents published Wednesday by The Intercept, the National Security Agency forged a relationship with the Ethiopian government that has expanded exponentially over the years. What began as one small facility soon grew into a network of clandestine eavesdropping outposts designed to listen in on the communications of Ethiopians and their neighbors across the Horn of Africa in the name of counterterrorism.

In exchange for local knowledge and an advantageous location, the NSA provided the East African nation with technology and training integral to electronic surveillance. “Ethiopia’s position provides the partnership unique access to the targets,” a commander of the U.S. spying operation wrote in a classified 2005 report. (The report is one of 294 internal NSA newsletters released today by The Intercept.)

The NSA’s collaboration with Ethiopia is high risk, placing the agency in controversial territory. For more than a decade, Ethiopia has been engaged in a fight against Islamist militant groups, such as Al Qaeda and Shabab. But the country’s security forces have taken a draconian approach to countering the threat posed by jihadis and stand accused of routinely torturing suspects and abusing terrorism powers to target political dissidents.

“The Ethiopian government uses surveillance not only to fight terrorism and crime, but as a key tactic in its abusive efforts to silence dissenting voices in-country,” says Felix Horne, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch. “Essentially anyone that opposes or expresses dissent against the government is considered to be an ‘anti-peace element’ or a ‘terrorist.’”

The NSA declined to comment for this story.

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia. It is the largest city in Ethiopia with a population of 3.4 million. (Photo from March 2014) | usage worldwide Photo by: Yannick Tylle/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia.

Photo: Yannick Tylle/picture-alliance/dpa/AP

In February 2002, the NSA set up the Deployed Signals Intelligence Operations Center – also known as “Lion’s Pride” – in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, according to secret documents obtained by The Intercept from the whistleblower Edward Snowden. It began as a modest counterterrorism effort involving around 12 Ethiopians performing a single mission at 12 workstations. But by 2005, the operation had evolved into eight U.S. military personnel and 103 Ethiopians, working at “46 multifunctional workstations,” eavesdropping on communications in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. By then, the outpost in Addis Ababa had already been joined by “three Lion’s Pride Remote Sites,” including one located in the town of Gondar, in northwestern Ethiopia.

“[The] NSA has an advantage when dealing with the Global War on Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,” reads an NSA document authored in 2005 by Katie Pierce, who was then the officer-in-charge of Lion’s Pride and the commander of the agency’s Signal Exploitation Detachment. “The benefit of this relationship is that the Ethiopians provide the location and linguists and we provide the technology and training,” she wrote.  According to Pierce, Lion’s Pride had already produced almost 7,700 transcripts and more than 900 reports based on its regional spying effort.

Pierce, now a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve and a lawyer in private practice, had noted her role with the NSA’s Ethiopia unit in an online biography. When contacted by The Intercept, she said little about her time with Lion’s Pride or the work of the NSA detachment. “We provided a sort of security for that region,” she said. The reference to the NSA in Pierce’s online biography has since disappeared.

Reta Alemu Nega, the minister of political affairs at the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington, D.C., told The Intercept that the U.S. and Ethiopia maintained “very close cooperation” on issues related to intelligence and counterterrorism. While he did not address questions about Lion’s Pride, Alemu described regular meetings in which U.S. and Ethiopian defense officials “exchange views” about their partnership and shared activities.

Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam militants take a break at a front-line section in sanca district in Mogadishu, on July 21, 2009. Somalia's hard line Shabab militia yesterday raided the offices of three UN organisations hours after they banned their operations on accusation that they were "enemies of Islam and Muslims. The armed group stormed the United Nations Development Programme, UN Department of Safety and Security and the UN Political Office for Somalia in two southern Somalia towns and impounded office equipment. The above foreign agencies have been found to be working against the benefit of the Somali Muslim population and against the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia," the Shebab said in a statement. AFP PHOTO/ MOHAMED DAHIR (Photo credit should read MOHAMED DAHIR/AFP/GettyImages)

Shabab and Hizbul Islam militants take a break at a front-line section in Sanca district in Mogadishu, on July 21, 2009.

Photo: Mohamed Dahir/AFP/Getty Images

Lion’s Pride does not represent the first time that Ethiopia has played a vital role in U.S. signals surveillance. In 1953, the U.S. signed a 25-year agreement for a base at Kagnew Station in Asmara, Ethiopia, according to a declassified NSA report obtained by the nonprofit National Security Archive. Navy and Army communications facilities based there were joined by an NSA outpost just over a decade later.

On April 23, 1965, the Soviet Union launched Molniya-1, its first international communications satellite. The next month, the NSA opened STONEHOUSE, a remote listening post in Asmara. The facility was originally aimed at Soviet deep space probes but, in the end, “[its] main value turned out to be the collection of Soviet MOLNIYA communications satellites,” according to a 2004 NSA document that mentions STONEHOUSE.

STONEHOUSE was closed down in 1975 due to a civil war in Ethiopia. But its modern-day successor, Lion’s Pride, has proved to be “such a lucrative source for SIGINT reports” that a new facility was built in the town of Dire Dawa in early 2006, according to a secret NSA document. “The state of the art antenna field surrounded by camels and donkey-drawn carts is a sight to behold,” reads the NSA file. The effort, code-named “LADON,” was aimed at listening in on communications across a larger swath of Somalia, down to the capital Mogadishu, the Darfur region of Sudan, and parts of eastern Ethiopia.

At a May 2006 planning conference, the Americans and Ethiopians decided on steps to “take the partnership to a new level” through an expanded mission that stretched beyond strictly counterterrorism. Targeting eastern Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and the nearby Somali borderlands, the allied eavesdroppers agreed on a mission of listening in on cordless phones in order to identify not only “suspected al-Qa’ida sympathizers” but also “illicit smugglers.”

“It is very troubling to hear the U.S. is providing surveillance capacities to a government that is committing such egregious human rights abuses in that region.”

From the time Lion’s Pride was set up until predominantly ChristianEthiopia invaded mostly Muslim Somalia in December 2006, the U.S. poured about $20 million in military aid into the former country. As Ethiopian troops attempted to oust a fundamentalist movement called the Council of Islamic Courts, which had defeated several warlords to take power in Somalia, Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter said the two nations had “a close working relationship” that included sharing intelligence. Within a year, Ethiopian forces were stuck in a military quagmire in Somalia and were facing a growing rebellion in the Ogaden region as well.

“While the exact nature of U.S. support for Ethiopian surveillance efforts in the Ogaden region is not clear, it is very troubling to hear the U.S. is providing surveillance capacities to a government that is committing such egregious human rights abuses in that region,” says Horne, the Human Rights Watch researcher.  “Between 2007-2008 the Ethiopian army committed possible war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians in this region during its conflict with the Ogaden National Liberation Front.”

For the U.S., “the chaos” caused by the invasion “yielded opportunities for progress in the war on terrorism,” stated a top secret NSA documentdated February 2007.  According to the document, the Council of Islamic Courts was harboring members of an Al Qaeda cell that the NSA’s African Threat Branch had been tracking since 2003. After being flushed from hiding by the Ethiopian invasion, the NSA provided “24-hour support to CIA and U.S. military units in the Horn of Africa,” utilizing various surveillance programs to track Council of Islamic Courts leaders and their Al Qaeda allies. “Intelligence,” says the document, “was also shared with the Ethiopian SIGINT partner to enable their troops to track High Value Individuals.” The NSA deemed the effort a success as the “#1 individual on the list” was “believed killed in early January” 2007, while another target was arrested in Kenya the next month. The identities of the people killed and captured, as well as those responsible, are absent from the document.

As the Council of Islamic Courts crumbled in the face of the invasion, its ally, the militant group Shabab, saw Somalis flock to its resistance effort. Fueled and radicalized by the same chaos exploited by the NSA, Shabab grew in strength. By 2012, the terrorist group had formally become an Al Qaeda affiliate. Today, the U.S. continues to battle Shabab in an escalatingconflict in Somalia that shows no sign of abating.

The first batch of Ethiopian troops leaving the Somali capital Mogadishu hold a departure ceremony 23 January 2007 at Afisiyooni Air Base. Ethiopian troops began withdrawing from Mogadishu nearly four weeks after they helped oust Islamist forces from the Somali capital. A special departure ceremony was held for the pullout of the first batch of around 200 soldiers at the former headquarters of the Somali air force in the southern outskirts of the capital. AFP PHOTO/STRINGER (Photo credit should read STRINGER/AFP/GettyImages)

The first batch of Ethiopian troops leaving the Somali capital Mogadishu hold a departure ceremony Jan. 23, 2007 at Afisiyooni Air Base.

Photo: Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

At the time the NSA set up Lion’s Pride, the U.S. State Department had criticized Ethiopia’s security forces for having “infringed on citizens’ privacy rights,” ignoring the law regarding search warrants, beating detainees, and conducting extrajudicial killings. By 2005, with Lion’s Pride markedly expanded, nothing had changed. The State Department found:

The Government’s human rights record remained poor. … Security forces committed a number of unlawful killings, including alleged political killings, and beat, tortured, and mistreated detainees. … The Government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights, and the law regarding search warrants was often ignored. The Government restricted freedom of the press. … The Government at times restricted freedom of assembly, particularly for members of opposition political parties; security forces at times used excessive force to disperse demonstrations. The Government limited freedom of association. …

A separate State Department report on Ethiopia’s counterterrorism and anti-terrorism capabilities, issued in November 2013 and obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act, noted that there were “inconsistent efforts to institutionalize” anti-terrorism training within Ethiopian law enforcement and added that while the Ethiopian Federal Police use surveillance and informants, “laws do not allow the interception of telephone or electronic communications.” The readable sections of the redacted report make no mention of the NSA program and state that the U.S. “maintains an important but distant security relationship with Ethiopia.”

A 2010 NSA document offers a far different picture of the bond between the security agencies of the two countries, noting that the “NSA-Ethiopian SIGINT relationship continues to thrive.”

In an after-action report, a trainer from NSA Georgia’s “Sudan/Horn of Africa Division” described teaching a class attended by soldiers from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and civilians from Ethiopia’s Information Network Security Agency. He praised the Ethiopians for “work[ing] so hard on our behalf” and wrote that his students were “excited and eager to learn.”

According to the documents, analysts from the Army’s 741st Military Intelligence Battalion were still detailed to Lion’s Pride while the Ethiopians they worked beside had increased their skills at analyzing intercepted communications. “More importantly, however,” the American trainer noted, “is the strengthening of the relationship” between NSA and Ethiopian security forces. NSA Georgia, he declared, was eager to continue “developing the relationship between us and our Ethiopian counterparts.”

The NSA refused to comment on whether Lion’s Pride continues to eavesdrop on the region, but no evidence suggests it was ever shut down. There is, however, good reason to believe that U.S. efforts have strengthened the hand of the Ethiopian government. And a decade and a half after it was launched, Ethiopia’s human rights record remains as dismal as ever.

“Governments that provide Ethiopia with surveillance capabilities that are being used to suppress lawful expressions of dissent risk complicity in abuses,” says Horne. “The United States should come clean about its role in surveillance in the Horn of Africa and should have policies in place to ensure Ethiopia is not using information gleaned from surveillance to crack down on legitimate expressions of dissent inside Ethiopia.”

———

Documents published with this article:

HOW THE NSA BUILT A SECRET SURVEILLANCE NETWORK FOR ETHIOPIA

The Intercept

“A WARM FRIENDSHIP connects the Ethiopian and American people,” U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced earlier this year. “We remain committed to working with Ethiopia to foster liberty, democracy, economic growth, protection of human rights, and the rule of law.”

Indeed, the website for the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia is marked by press releases touting U.S. aid for farmers and support for public health infrastructure in that East African nation. “Ethiopia remains among the most effective development partners, particularly in the areas of health care, education, and food security,” says the State Department.

Behind the scenes, however, Ethiopia and the U.S. are bound together by long-standing relationships built on far more than dairy processing equipment or health centers to treat people with HIV. Fifteen years ago, the U.S. began setting up very different centers, filled with technology that is not normally associated with the protection of human rights.

In the aftermath of 9/11, according to classified U.S. documents published Wednesday by The Intercept, the National Security Agency forged a relationship with the Ethiopian government that has expanded exponentially over the years. What began as one small facility soon grew into a network of clandestine eavesdropping outposts designed to listen in on the communications of Ethiopians and their neighbors across the Horn of Africa in the name of counterterrorism.

In exchange for local knowledge and an advantageous location, the NSA provided the East African nation with technology and training integral to electronic surveillance. “Ethiopia’s position provides the partnership unique access to the targets,” a commander of the U.S. spying operation wrote in a classified 2005 report. (The report is one of 294 internal NSA newsletters released today by The Intercept.)

The NSA’s collaboration with Ethiopia is high risk, placing the agency in controversial territory. For more than a decade, Ethiopia has been engaged in a fight against Islamist militant groups, such as Al Qaeda and Shabab. But the country’s security forces have taken a draconian approach to countering the threat posed by jihadis and stand accused of routinely torturing suspects and abusing terrorism powers to target political dissidents.

“The Ethiopian government uses surveillance not only to fight terrorism and crime, but as a key tactic in its abusive efforts to silence dissenting voices in-country,” says Felix Horne, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch. “Essentially anyone that opposes or expresses dissent against the government is considered to be an ‘anti-peace element’ or a ‘terrorist.’”

The NSA declined to comment for this story.

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia. It is the largest city in Ethiopia with a population of 3.4 million. (Photo from March 2014) | usage worldwide Photo by: Yannick Tylle/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia.

Photo: Yannick Tylle/picture-alliance/dpa/AP

In February 2002, the NSA set up the Deployed Signals Intelligence Operations Center – also known as “Lion’s Pride” – in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, according to secret documents obtained by The Intercept from the whistleblower Edward Snowden. It began as a modest counterterrorism effort involving around 12 Ethiopians performing a single mission at 12 workstations. But by 2005, the operation had evolved into eight U.S. military personnel and 103 Ethiopians, working at “46 multifunctional workstations,” eavesdropping on communications in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. By then, the outpost in Addis Ababa had already been joined by “three Lion’s Pride Remote Sites,” including one located in the town of Gondar, in northwestern Ethiopia.

“[The] NSA has an advantage when dealing with the Global War on Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,” reads an NSA document authored in 2005 by Katie Pierce, who was then the officer-in-charge of Lion’s Pride and the commander of the agency’s Signal Exploitation Detachment. “The benefit of this relationship is that the Ethiopians provide the location and linguists and we provide the technology and training,” she wrote.  According to Pierce, Lion’s Pride had already produced almost 7,700 transcripts and more than 900 reports based on its regional spying effort.

Pierce, now a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve and a lawyer in private practice, had noted her role with the NSA’s Ethiopia unit in an online biography. When contacted by The Intercept, she said little about her time with Lion’s Pride or the work of the NSA detachment. “We provided a sort of security for that region,” she said. The reference to the NSA in Pierce’s online biography has since disappeared.

Reta Alemu Nega, the minister of political affairs at the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington, D.C., told The Intercept that the U.S. and Ethiopia maintained “very close cooperation” on issues related to intelligence and counterterrorism. While he did not address questions about Lion’s Pride, Alemu described regular meetings in which U.S. and Ethiopian defense officials “exchange views” about their partnership and shared activities.

Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam militants take a break at a front-line section in sanca district in Mogadishu, on July 21, 2009. Somalia's hard line Shabab militia yesterday raided the offices of three UN organisations hours after they banned their operations on accusation that they were "enemies of Islam and Muslims. The armed group stormed the United Nations Development Programme, UN Department of Safety and Security and the UN Political Office for Somalia in two southern Somalia towns and impounded office equipment. The above foreign agencies have been found to be working against the benefit of the Somali Muslim population and against the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia," the Shebab said in a statement. AFP PHOTO/ MOHAMED DAHIR (Photo credit should read MOHAMED DAHIR/AFP/GettyImages)

Shabab and Hizbul Islam militants take a break at a front-line section in Sanca district in Mogadishu, on July 21, 2009.

Photo: Mohamed Dahir/AFP/Getty Images

Lion’s Pride does not represent the first time that Ethiopia has played a vital role in U.S. signals surveillance. In 1953, the U.S. signed a 25-year agreement for a base at Kagnew Station in Asmara, Ethiopia, according to a declassified NSA report obtained by the nonprofit National Security Archive. Navy and Army communications facilities based there were joined by an NSA outpost just over a decade later.

On April 23, 1965, the Soviet Union launched Molniya-1, its first international communications satellite. The next month, the NSA opened STONEHOUSE, a remote listening post in Asmara. The facility was originally aimed at Soviet deep space probes but, in the end, “[its] main value turned out to be the collection of Soviet MOLNIYA communications satellites,” according to a 2004 NSA document that mentions STONEHOUSE.

STONEHOUSE was closed down in 1975 due to a civil war in Ethiopia. But its modern-day successor, Lion’s Pride, has proved to be “such a lucrative source for SIGINT reports” that a new facility was built in the town of Dire Dawa in early 2006, according to a secret NSA document. “The state of the art antenna field surrounded by camels and donkey-drawn carts is a sight to behold,” reads the NSA file. The effort, code-named “LADON,” was aimed at listening in on communications across a larger swath of Somalia, down to the capital Mogadishu, the Darfur region of Sudan, and parts of eastern Ethiopia.

At a May 2006 planning conference, the Americans and Ethiopians decided on steps to “take the partnership to a new level” through an expanded mission that stretched beyond strictly counterterrorism. Targeting eastern Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and the nearby Somali borderlands, the allied eavesdroppers agreed on a mission of listening in on cordless phones in order to identify not only “suspected al-Qa’ida sympathizers” but also “illicit smugglers.”

“It is very troubling to hear the U.S. is providing surveillance capacities to a government that is committing such egregious human rights abuses in that region.”

From the time Lion’s Pride was set up until predominantly ChristianEthiopia invaded mostly Muslim Somalia in December 2006, the U.S. poured about $20 million in military aid into the former country. As Ethiopian troops attempted to oust a fundamentalist movement called the Council of Islamic Courts, which had defeated several warlords to take power in Somalia, Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter said the two nations had “a close working relationship” that included sharing intelligence. Within a year, Ethiopian forces were stuck in a military quagmire in Somalia and were facing a growing rebellion in the Ogaden region as well.

“While the exact nature of U.S. support for Ethiopian surveillance efforts in the Ogaden region is not clear, it is very troubling to hear the U.S. is providing surveillance capacities to a government that is committing such egregious human rights abuses in that region,” says Horne, the Human Rights Watch researcher.  “Between 2007-2008 the Ethiopian army committed possible war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians in this region during its conflict with the Ogaden National Liberation Front.”

For the U.S., “the chaos” caused by the invasion “yielded opportunities for progress in the war on terrorism,” stated a top secret NSA documentdated February 2007.  According to the document, the Council of Islamic Courts was harboring members of an Al Qaeda cell that the NSA’s African Threat Branch had been tracking since 2003. After being flushed from hiding by the Ethiopian invasion, the NSA provided “24-hour support to CIA and U.S. military units in the Horn of Africa,” utilizing various surveillance programs to track Council of Islamic Courts leaders and their Al Qaeda allies. “Intelligence,” says the document, “was also shared with the Ethiopian SIGINT partner to enable their troops to track High Value Individuals.” The NSA deemed the effort a success as the “#1 individual on the list” was “believed killed in early January” 2007, while another target was arrested in Kenya the next month. The identities of the people killed and captured, as well as those responsible, are absent from the document.

As the Council of Islamic Courts crumbled in the face of the invasion, its ally, the militant group Shabab, saw Somalis flock to its resistance effort. Fueled and radicalized by the same chaos exploited by the NSA, Shabab grew in strength. By 2012, the terrorist group had formally become an Al Qaeda affiliate. Today, the U.S. continues to battle Shabab in an escalatingconflict in Somalia that shows no sign of abating.

The first batch of Ethiopian troops leaving the Somali capital Mogadishu hold a departure ceremony 23 January 2007 at Afisiyooni Air Base. Ethiopian troops began withdrawing from Mogadishu nearly four weeks after they helped oust Islamist forces from the Somali capital. A special departure ceremony was held for the pullout of the first batch of around 200 soldiers at the former headquarters of the Somali air force in the southern outskirts of the capital. AFP PHOTO/STRINGER (Photo credit should read STRINGER/AFP/GettyImages)

The first batch of Ethiopian troops leaving the Somali capital Mogadishu hold a departure ceremony Jan. 23, 2007 at Afisiyooni Air Base.

Photo: Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

At the time the NSA set up Lion’s Pride, the U.S. State Department had criticized Ethiopia’s security forces for having “infringed on citizens’ privacy rights,” ignoring the law regarding search warrants, beating detainees, and conducting extrajudicial killings. By 2005, with Lion’s Pride markedly expanded, nothing had changed. The State Department found:

The Government’s human rights record remained poor. … Security forces committed a number of unlawful killings, including alleged political killings, and beat, tortured, and mistreated detainees. … The Government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights, and the law regarding search warrants was often ignored. The Government restricted freedom of the press. … The Government at times restricted freedom of assembly, particularly for members of opposition political parties; security forces at times used excessive force to disperse demonstrations. The Government limited freedom of association. …

A separate State Department report on Ethiopia’s counterterrorism and anti-terrorism capabilities, issued in November 2013 and obtained by The Intercept via the Freedom of Information Act, noted that there were “inconsistent efforts to institutionalize” anti-terrorism training within Ethiopian law enforcement and added that while the Ethiopian Federal Police use surveillance and informants, “laws do not allow the interception of telephone or electronic communications.” The readable sections of the redacted report make no mention of the NSA program and state that the U.S. “maintains an important but distant security relationship with Ethiopia.”

A 2010 NSA document offers a far different picture of the bond between the security agencies of the two countries, noting that the “NSA-Ethiopian SIGINT relationship continues to thrive.”

In an after-action report, a trainer from NSA Georgia’s “Sudan/Horn of Africa Division” described teaching a class attended by soldiers from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and civilians from Ethiopia’s Information Network Security Agency. He praised the Ethiopians for “work[ing] so hard on our behalf” and wrote that his students were “excited and eager to learn.”

According to the documents, analysts from the Army’s 741st Military Intelligence Battalion were still detailed to Lion’s Pride while the Ethiopians they worked beside had increased their skills at analyzing intercepted communications. “More importantly, however,” the American trainer noted, “is the strengthening of the relationship” between NSA and Ethiopian security forces. NSA Georgia, he declared, was eager to continue “developing the relationship between us and our Ethiopian counterparts.”

The NSA refused to comment on whether Lion’s Pride continues to eavesdrop on the region, but no evidence suggests it was ever shut down. There is, however, good reason to believe that U.S. efforts have strengthened the hand of the Ethiopian government. And a decade and a half after it was launched, Ethiopia’s human rights record remains as dismal as ever.

“Governments that provide Ethiopia with surveillance capabilities that are being used to suppress lawful expressions of dissent risk complicity in abuses,” says Horne. “The United States should come clean about its role in surveillance in the Horn of Africa and should have policies in place to ensure Ethiopia is not using information gleaned from surveillance to crack down on legitimate expressions of dissent inside Ethiopia.”

———

Documents published with this article:

Official video-Teddy Afro – ማር እስከ ጧፍ (ፍቅር እስከ መቃብር)

Teddy Afro Musics. The legendary Ethiopian singer who writes his own lyrics, creates his own melody and since he plays some instruments, he also plays part in the arrangement of his music for more info go to teddyafromuzika.com

Official video-Teddy Afro – ማር እስከ ጧፍ (ፍቅር እስከ መቃብር)

Teddy Afro Musics. The legendary Ethiopian singer who writes his own lyrics, creates his own melody and since he plays some instruments, he also plays part in the arrangement of his music for more info go to teddyafromuzika.com

Toward Making a Proper Space for the Individual in the Ethiopian Constitution

By Berihun Adugna Gebeye, PDF link

A symbolic, normative, and institutional investigation of the 1995 Ethiopian
Constitution reveals that the individual is displaced and locked in the periphery as
much of the socio-economic and political ecology of the state is occupied by Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples (NNPs). The Constitution presents and makes NNPs authors,
sovereigns and constitutional adjudicators by adopting a corporate conception of group
rights. As this corporate conception of group rights permeate and structure the organi–
zation of the Ethiopian state a nd government, the individual is relega ted in the
constitutional order. In order to make the transition to constitutional democracy sus-
tainable, it is argued that the Constitution should accommodate and ensure individual
autonomy by adopting a collective conception of group rights. This offers both the
normative basis and institutional safeguards to strike a proper equilibrium between
group rights and individual rights.
For more go here.

Cyberwar: A guide to the frightening future of online conflict

ZDNet

With cyberwarfare, the battlefield is going online. Here’s everything you need to know.

cyber-war.jpg
Cyberwar: Here’s what you need to know.

Getty Images/iStockphoto

What is cyberwar?

At its core, cyberwarfare is the use of digital attacks by one state to disrupt the computer systems of another in order to create significant damage or destruction.

What does cyberwarfare look like?

Cyberwar is still an emerging concept, but many experts are concerned that it is likely to be a significant component of any future conflicts. As well as troops using conventional weapons like guns and missiles, future battles will also be fought by hackers manipulating computer code.

Governments and intelligence agencies worry that digital attacks against vital infrastructure — like banking systems or power grids — will give attackers a way of bypassing a country’s traditional defences.

Unlike standard military attacks, a cyberattack can be launched instantaneously from any distance, with little obvious evidence in the build up. And it is often extremely hard to trace such an attack back to its originators. Modern economies, underpinned by computer networks that run everything from sanitation to food distribution and communications, are particularly vulnerable to such attacks.

The head of the US National Security Agency (NSA) Admiral Michael Rogers said his worst case cyberattack scenario would involve “outright destructive attacks”, focused on some aspects of critical US infrastructure and coupled with data manipulation “on a massive scale”. Some experts warn it’s a case of when, not if.

What is the definition of cyberwarfare?

Whether an attack should be considered to be an act of cyberwarfare depends on a number of factors. These can include the identity of the attacker, what they are doing, how they do it – and how much damage they inflict.

Like other forms of war, cyberwarfare is usually defined as a conflict between states, not individuals. Many countries are now building up military cyberwarfare capabilities, both to defend against other nations and also to attack if necessary.

Attacks by individual hackers, or even groups of hackers, would not usually be considered to be cyberwarfare, unless they were being aided and directed by a state. For example, cyber crooks who crash a bank’s computer systems while trying to steal money would not be considered to be perpetrating an act of cyberwarfare, even if they came from a rival nation. But state-backed hackers doing the same thing to destabilise a rival state’s economy might well be considered so.

The nature and scale of the targets attacked is another indicator: defacing a company website is unlikely to be considered an act of cyberwarfare, whereas disabling the missile defence system at an airbase would certainly come close. And the weapons used are important too: cyberwar refers to digital attacks on computer systems: firing a missile at a data center would not be considered cyberwarfare.

Cyberwarfare and the use of force

How these factors combine matters because they can help determine what kind of response a country can make to a cyber attack.

There is one key definition of cyberwarfare, which is a digital attack that is so serious it can be seen as the equivalent of a physical attack.

To reach this threshold, an attack on computer systems would have to lead to significant destruction or disruption, even loss of life. This is a significant threshold because under international law states are permitted to use force to defend themselves against an armed attack.

It follows then that, if a country were hit by a cyber attack of significant scale, they would be within their rights to strike back using their standard military arsenal: to respond to hacking with missile strikes. So far this has never happened – indeed it’s not entirely clear if any attack has ever reached that threshold. That doesn’t mean that attacks which fail to reach that level are irrelevant or should be ignored: it just means that the country under attack can’t justify resorting to military force to defend itself. There are plenty of other ways of responding to a cyber attack, from sanctions and expelling diplomats, to responding in kind, although calibrating the right response to an attack is often hard.

What is the Tallinn Manual?

One reason that definitions of cyberwarfare have been blurred is that there is no international law that covers cyberwar, which is what really matters here, because it is such a new concept. That doesn’t mean that cyberwarfare isn’t covered by the law, it’s just that the relevant law is piecemeal, scattered and often open to interpretation.

This lack of legal framework has resulted in a grey area: in the past some states have used the opportunity to test out cyberwar techniques in the knowledge that other states would be uncertain about how they could react under international law.

More recently that grey area has began to shrink. A group of law scholars has spent years working to explain how international law can be applied to digital warfare. This work has formed the basis of the Tallinn Manual, a textbook prepared by the group and backed by the NATO-affiliated Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) based in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, from which the manual takes its name.

The first version of the manual looked at the rare but most serious cyber attacks, which rose to the level of the use of force; the second edition released earlier this year looked at the legal framework around cyber attacks, which do not reach the threshold of the use of force, but which take place on a daily basis.

Aimed at legal advisers to governments, military, and intelligence agencies, the Tallinn manual sets out when an attack is a violation of international law in cyberspace, and when and how states can respond to such assaults.

The manual consists of a set of guidelines — 154 rules — which set out how the lawyers think international law can be applied to cyber warfare, covering everything from the use of cyber mercenaries to the targeting of medical units’ computer systems. The idea is that by making the law around cyberwarfare clearer, there is less risk of an attack escalating, because escalation often occurs when the rules are not clear and leaders over-react.

Which countries are preparing for cyberwar?

According to US intelligence chiefs, more than 30 countries are developing offensive cyber attack capabilities, although most of these government hacking programmes are shrouded in secrecy.

The US intelligence briefing lists Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as the major “cyber threat actors” to worry about. Russia has a “highly advanced offensive cyber program” and has “conducted damaging and/or disruptive cyber-attacks including attacks on critical infrastructure networks”, it warns.

China has also “selectively used cyber attacks against foreign targets” and continues to “integrate and streamline its cyber operations and capabilities”, said the report, which also said Iran has already used its cyber capabilities directly against the US with a distributed denial of service attacks targeting the US financial sector in 2012-3. The report also notes that when it comes to North Korea: “Pyongyang remains capable of launching disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support its political objectives.”

US cyberwarfare capabilities

However, it’s likely that the US has the most significant cyber defence and cyber attack capabilities. Speaking last year President Obama said: “we’re moving into a new era here, where a number of countries have significant capacities. And frankly we’ve got more capacity than anybody, both offensively and defensively.”

Much of this capability comes from US Cyber Command, lead by Admiral Rogers who also leads the NSA, which has a dual mission: to protect US Department of Defence networks but also to conduct “full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries”.

Admiral Michael Rogers, director of the US National Security Agency and head of US Cyber Command

Image: Siim Teder/Estonian Defence Forces

Cyber Command is made up of a number of what it calls ‘Cyber Mission Force teams’. The Cyber National Mission Force teams defend the US by monitoring adversary activity, blocking attacks, and manoeuvring to defeat them. Cyber Combat Mission Force teams conduct military cyber operations to support military commanders, while the Cyber Protection Force teams defend the Department of Defense information networks. By the end of fiscal year 2018, the goal is for the force to grow to nearly 6,200 and for all 133 teams to be fully operational. The US is believed to have used various forms of cyber weapons against the Iranian nuclear programme, the North Korean missile tests and the so-called Islamic State, with mixed results.

Other agencies — such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and CIA — have their own cyber attack capabilities too.

The UK has also publicly stated that is working on cyber defence and offence projects, and has vowed to strike back if attacked in this manner.

What do cyberweapons look like?

The tools of cyberwarfare can vary from the incredibly sophisticated to the utterly basic. It depends on the effect the attacker is trying to create. Many are part of the standard hacker toolkit, and a series of different tools could be used in concert as part of a cyber attack. For example, a Distributed Denial of Service attack was at the core of the attacks on Estonia in 2007.

Ransomware, which has been a constant source of trouble for businesses and consumers may also have been used not just to raise money but also to cause chaos. There is some evidence to suggest that the recent Petya ransomware attack which originated in Ukraine but rapidly spread across the world may have looked like ransomware but was being deployed to effectively destroy data by encrypting it with no possibility of unlocking it.

Other standard hacker techniques are likely to form part of a cyber attack; phishing emails to trick users into handing over passwords or other data which can allow attackers further access to networks, for example. Malware and virus could form part of an attack like the Shamoon virus, which wiped the hard drives of 30,000 PCs at Saudi Aramco in 2012.

According to the Washington Post, after revelations about Russian meddling in the run up to the 2016 US Presidential elections, President Obama authorised the planting cyber weapons in Russia’s infrastructure. “The implants were developed by the NSA and designed so that they could be triggered remotely as part of retaliatory cyber-strike in the face of Russian aggression, whether an attack on a power grid or interference in a future presidential race,” the report said

Cyberwarfare and zero-day attack stockpiles

Zero-day vulnerabilities are bugs or flaws in code which can give attackers access to or control over systems, but which have not yet been discovered and fixed by software companies. These flaws are particularly prized because there will likely be no way to stop hackers exploiting them. There is a thriving trade in zero-day exploits that allow hackers to sidestep security: very handy for nations looking to build unstoppable cyber weapons. It is believed that many nations have stock piles of zero day exploits to use for either cyber espionage or as part of elaborate cyber weapons. Zero day exploits formed a key part of the Stuxnet cyberweapon (see below).

One issue with cyberweapons, particularly those using zero-day exploits is that — unlike a conventional bomb or missile — a cyberweapon can be analysed and even potentially repurposed and re-used. Also, once used, the zero-day exploits are usually rapidly patched by software vendors, which makes it impossible to use them again. These weapons can also cause much greater chaos than planned, which is what may have happened in the case of the Ukrainian Petya ransomware attack.

What is Stuxnet?

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the-lightwriter, Getty Images/iStockphoto

Stuxnet is a computer worm that targets industrial control systems, but is most famous for most likely being the first genuine cyber weapon, in that it was designed to inflict physical damage. It was developed by the US and Israel (although they have never confirmed this) to target the Iranian nuclear programme. The worm, first spotted in 2010, targeted specific Siemens industrial control systems, and seemed to be specifically targeting the systems controlling the centrifuges in the Iranian uranium enrichment project — apparently damaging 1,000 of these centrifuges and delaying the project, although the overall impact on the programme is not clear.

Stuxet was a complicated worm, using four different zero-day exploits and likely took millions of dollars of research and months or years of work to create.

What are the targets in cyberwar?

Military systems are an obvious target: preventing commanders from communicating with their troops or seeing where the enemy is would give an attacker a major advantage. However, because most developed economies rely on computerised systems for everything from power to food and transport many governments are very worried that rival states may target critical national infrastructure. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, or industrial control systems, which run factories, power stations and other industrial processes are a big target, as Stuxnet showed.

These systems can be decades old and were rarely designed with security as a priority, but are increasingly being connected to the internet to make them more efficient or easy to monitor. But this also makes these systems more vulnerable to attack, and security is rarely upgraded because the organisations operating them do not consider themselves to be a target.

A short history of cyberwar

For many people 2007 was when cyberwar went from the theoretical to the actual.

When the government of the eastern European state of Estonia announced plans to move a Soviet war memorial, it found itself under a furious digital bombardment that knocked banks and government services offline (the attack is generally considered to have been Russian hackers; Russian authorities denied any knowledge). However, the DDoS attacks on Estonia did not create physical damage and, while a significant event, were not considered to have risen to the level of actual cyberwarfare.

Another cyberwarfare milestone was hit the same year, however, when the Idaho National Laboratory proved, via the Aurora Generator Test, that a digital attack could be used to destroy physical objects – in this case a generator.

The Stuxnet malware attack took place in 2010, which proved that malware could impact the physical world.

Since then there has been a steady stream of stories: in 2013 the NSA said it had stopped a plot by an unnamed nation — believed to be China — to attack the BIOS chip in PCs, rendering them unusable. In 2014 there was the attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, blamed by many on North Korea, which showed that it was not just government systems and data that could be targeted by state-backed hackers.

Perhaps most seriously, just before Christmas in 2015 hackers managed to disrupt the power supply in parts of Ukraine, by using a well-known trojan called BlackEnergy. In March 2016 seven Iranian hackers were accused of trying to shut down a New York dam in a federal grand jury indictment.

Nations are rapidly building cyber defence and offence capabilities and NATO in 2014 took the important step of confirming that a cyber attack on one of its members would be enough to allow them to invoke Article 5, the collective defence mechanism at the heart of the alliance. In 2016 it then defined cyberspace as an “operational domain” — an area in which conflict can occur: the internet had officially become a battlefield.

Cyberwar and the Internet of Things

Big industrial control systems or military networks are often considered the main targets in cyberwarfare but one consequence of the rise of the Internet of Things may be to bring the battlefield into our homes.

“Our adversaries have capabilities to hold at risk US critical infrastructure as well as the broader ecosystem of connected consumer and industrial devices know as the Internet of Things,” said a US intelligence community briefing from January 2017. Connected thermostats, cameras and cookers could all be used either to spy on citizens of another country, or to cause havoc if they were hacked.

How do you defend against cyberwarfare

The same cybersecurity practices that will protect against everyday hackers and cyber crooks will provide some protection against state-backed cyber attackers, who use many of the same techniques. That means covering the basics: changing default passwords and making passwords hard to crack, not using the same password for different systems, making sure that all systems are patched and up-to-date (including the use of antivirus software), ensuring that systems are only connected to the internet if necessary and making sure that essential data is backed up securely. This may be enough to stop some attackers or at least give them enough extra work to do that they switch to an easier target.

Recognising that your organisation can be a target is an important step: even if your organisation is not an obvious target for hackers motivated by greed (who would hack a sewage works for money?) you may be a priority for hackers looking to create chaos.

However, for particularly high-value targets this is unlikely to be enough: these attacks are called ‘advanced and persistent’. In this case it may be hard to stop them at the boundary and additional cybersecurity investments will be needed: strong encryption, multi-factor authentication and advanced network monitoring. It may well be that you cannot stop them penetrating your network, but you may be able to stop them doing any damage.

What is cyber espionage?

Closely related but separate to cyberwarfare is cyber espionage, whereby hackers infiltrate computer systems and networks to steal data and often intellectual property. There have been plenty of examples of this in recent years: for example the hack on the US Office of Personnel Management, which saw the records of 21 million US citizens stolen, including five million sets of fingerprints, was most likely carried out by Chinese state-backed hackers.

Perhaps even more infamous: the hacking attacks in the run up to the 2016 US Presidential elections and the theft of emails from the Democratic National Committee: US intelligence said that Russia was behind the attacks. The aim of cyber espionage is to steal, not to do damage, but it’s arguable that such attacks can also have a bigger impact. Law scholars are, for example, split on whether the hacks on the DNC and the subsequent leaking of the emails could be illegal under international law.

Some argue that it mounts up to meddling in the affairs of another state and therefore some kind of response, such as hacking back, would have been justified; others argue that it was just below the threshold required. As such the line between cyberwarfare and cyberespionage is a blurred one: certainly the behaviour necessary is similar for both — sneaking into networks, looking for flaws in software — but only the outcome is different; stealing rather than destroying. For defenders it’s especially hard to tell the difference between an enemy probing a network looking for flaws to exploit and an enemy probing a network to find secrets.

“Infiltrations in US critical infrastructure–when viewed in the light of incidents like these–can look like preparations for future attacks that could be intended to harm Americans, or at least to deter the United States and other countries from protecting and defending our vital interests,” said NSA chief Rogers in testimony to the US Senate.

Cyberwarfare and information warfare

Closely related to cyberwarfare is the concept of information warfare; that is, the use of disinformation and propaganda in order to influence others — like the citizens of another state. This disinformation might use documents stolen by hackers and published — either complete or modified by the attackers to suit their purpose. It may also see the use of social media (and broader media) to share incorrect stories. While Western strategists tend to see cyberwarfare and hybrid information warfare as separate entities, some analysts say that Chinese and Russia military theorists see the two as closely linked.