WikiLeaks: Why Sheikh Mo Agreed to Pay Bill Clinton Foundation $2 Million Per Trip to Ethiopia?

Clinton Foundation aide says ‘unless Sheikh Mo has sent us a $6 million check, this sounds crazy to do’

A top Clinton Foundation official expressed reservations about former President Bill Clinton contacting a Saudi Arabian and Ethiopian billionaire to thank him for offering a plane ride to Ethiopia — unless it would mean a seven-figure donation.

According to a briefing memo contained in an email chain released by WikiLeaks, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Al-Amoudi of Midroc had pledged to donate $20 million over 10 years to the Clinton Health Access Initiative. But an economic downturn caused the sheikh to delay payments. The health program did not receive payments in 2010 or 2011.

“Unless Sheikh Mo has sent us a $6 million check, this sounds crazy to do.”

In an email released by WikiLeaks Monday, Clinton Health Access Initiative CEO Ira Magaziner suggested in November 2011 that Clinton call the sheikh.

“CHAI would like to request that President Clinton call Sheikh Mohammed to thank him for offering his plane to the conference in Ethiopia and expressing regrets that President Clinton’s schedule does not permit him to attend the conference,” he wrote.

WikiLeaks released more of the email chain on Tuesday. Amitabh Desai, director of foreign policy at the foundation, expressed reservations — unless the sheikh had caught up with his financial commitment.

“Unless Sheikh Mo has sent us a $6 million check, this sounds crazy to do,” he responded.

But Bruce Lindsey, chairman of the Clinton Foundation’s board of directors, argued in favor of the plan.

“I think they are hopeful if we do this it will help us get the $6 million,” he wrote. “I think he [Clinton] should call.”

The sheikh was born in Ethiopia to an Ethiopian mother and Saudi father. He later moved to Saudi Arabia and made a fortune in construction and real estate before buying oil refineries in Sweden and Morocco. He approached the Clinton Foundation in 2006 and proposed donating $2 million to the health program for every year that Clinton visited Ethiopia. The final agreement the parties struck mentioned a payment schedule but did not tie the money to Clinton’s visits to the African country.

In 2008, the sheikh donated rooms at a Sheraton hotel in Ethiopia and meals for Clinton and a large party for four days — two days longer than originally planned because of aircraft problems.

According to Clinton Foundation documents, the sheikh contributed $5 million to $10 million, though it is unclear how much of that came after the email exchange.

The memo laid out strategies for getting the sheikh to cough up the money he owed and detailed discussions with George Salem, the sheikh’s Washington-based lawyer, and Irvin Hicks, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and one of the sheikh’s representatives in Washington.

“George Salem, Ambassador Hicks, and CHAI feel that it would be helpful if you would call the sheikh and thank him for offering the plane and saying you are sorry you can’t attend ICASA,” the memo stated, referring to the International Conference on AIDS and STIs in Africa. “We don’t think it is necessary for YOU to bring up the payment issue directly.”

Charles Ortel, a Wall Street analyst and critic of the Clinton Foundation, told The Daily Caller on Monday that accepting free travel and other benefits without declaring them for the Clinton Foundation could run afoul of tax law.

“It’s highly illegal and it’s likely that the owners of these aircraft took tax deductions as a gift to the Clinton Foundation,” he told the news site.

The 5 Easiest Ways to Protect Yourself Online -Edward Snowden

Article Image

In a recent interview with The Intercept, Edward Snowden offered some advice for what average citizens can do to reclaim their privacy. Because the sharing of information should be a conversation, not an enigma buried in a site’s ‘Terms of Service.’

1. This includes Signal, an easy-to-use app that encrypts your mobile phone messages, as long as the person you’re calling or texting also has the app installed. Developed by Open Whisper Systems, the app is available for both iOS and Android.

2. The next easy step is to enable two-factor authentication on your accounts. This way an attacker needs not only your password, but also a physical device, like your smartphone, to get the secondary code that opens your account.

3. A password manager, like KeePassX, will ensure your passwords are diversified across all accounts. So, if one account becomes compromised, they won’t all become compromised.

4. The next step is Tor — install it, use it. It looks very much like your browsing in Firefox, only your traffic will be bounced all across the globe, covering your physical location and identity (to a point). A nice side effect is Tor comes with a JavaScript blocker, which disables ads.

5. “Everybody should be running adblock software, if only from a safety perspective,” Snowden said.

By using these programs, people have already changed the conversation about security and privacy. Apple took note adding DuckDuckGo, the search engine that doesn’t track, as one of the available options on its Safari browser. Earlier this year at CES, a “personal privacy” section made its debut. Even DARPA is working to create services that “[enable] safe and predictable sharing of data in which privacy is preserved.” The ability to take control of your privacy has become more attainable than ever.

The trick is getting more people to adopt these programs (think of it like herd immunity). That’s how we’ll create lasting change.

“I think reform comes with many faces,” Snowden told the site. “There’s legal reform; there’s statutory reform more generally; there are the products and outcomes of judicial decisions.”

The sharing of information should be a conversation — not an enigma buried somewhere in the Terms of Service of a site.

The 5 Easiest Ways to Protect Yourself Online -Edward Snowden

Article Image

In a recent interview with The Intercept, Edward Snowden offered some advice for what average citizens can do to reclaim their privacy. Because the sharing of information should be a conversation, not an enigma buried in a site’s ‘Terms of Service.’

1. This includes Signal, an easy-to-use app that encrypts your mobile phone messages, as long as the person you’re calling or texting also has the app installed. Developed by Open Whisper Systems, the app is available for both iOS and Android.

2. The next easy step is to enable two-factor authentication on your accounts. This way an attacker needs not only your password, but also a physical device, like your smartphone, to get the secondary code that opens your account.

3. A password manager, like KeePassX, will ensure your passwords are diversified across all accounts. So, if one account becomes compromised, they won’t all become compromised.

4. The next step is Tor — install it, use it. It looks very much like your browsing in Firefox, only your traffic will be bounced all across the globe, covering your physical location and identity (to a point). A nice side effect is Tor comes with a JavaScript blocker, which disables ads.

5. “Everybody should be running adblock software, if only from a safety perspective,” Snowden said.

By using these programs, people have already changed the conversation about security and privacy. Apple took note adding DuckDuckGo, the search engine that doesn’t track, as one of the available options on its Safari browser. Earlier this year at CES, a “personal privacy” section made its debut. Even DARPA is working to create services that “[enable] safe and predictable sharing of data in which privacy is preserved.” The ability to take control of your privacy has become more attainable than ever.

The trick is getting more people to adopt these programs (think of it like herd immunity). That’s how we’ll create lasting change.

“I think reform comes with many faces,” Snowden told the site. “There’s legal reform; there’s statutory reform more generally; there are the products and outcomes of judicial decisions.”

The sharing of information should be a conversation — not an enigma buried somewhere in the Terms of Service of a site.

Ethiopia’s crisis and Congress

By Annie Boyajian, The Hill

When Congress adjourned in September, it had failed to vote on resolutions on Ethiopia (S.Res. 432/H.Res. 861).

When it returns, it should pass them without delay.

Ethiopia, an important security partner and ally, is heading for crisis. The country is suffering its worst unrest in years in response to the government’s intensifying abuses and restrictions on freedoms, as documented by Freedom House.

On Oct. 8, for the first time in the ruling government’s 25-year history, a state of emergency wasdeclared. Thousands of people have since been detained.

The pending resolutions condemn the killing and arrests of protestors and journalists by security forces and call on the U.S. government to review security assistance and democracy strategies for Ethiopia. They are an important first step in addressing the crisis in Ethiopia, and a needed pivot from current inaction by the U.S. government.They should be passed for these reasons.

1. Tensions are worsening.

Unrest began in November 2015, sparked by the government’s plan to expand the capital by seizing land from farmers in Oromia.

This region produces most of the nation’s wealth and is home to the Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group — and one of its most marginalized.

After security forces brutally responded to peaceful demonstrations, protests expanded, encompassing abuses and restrictions on freedoms and the dominance of Tigrayan elites in the country’s political and economic structures.

The ruling political coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is led primarily by members of the Tigray ethnic group, which comprises about 6 percent of the population. Ethiopia’s constitution commits the EPRDF to uniting Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups.

Instead, the EPRDF’s policies have fueled ethnic divisions and distributed economic wealth and political power to the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and political loyalists.

Following the 2005 elections, when the opposition won a third of the seats in parliament, the EPRDF clamped down violently, jailing opposition and enacting laws effectively eliminating independent media and civil society work on human rights, governance and elections issues. The EPRDF has continued to consolidate power, “winning” all 547 seats in parliament in 2015.

Before the state of emergency, the situation was already serious. More than 500 were killed andtens of thousands injured, arrested or disappeared.

The state of emergency — the full text of which is still not public — makes tensions worse. Itimposes a strict curfew, travel restrictions on foreign diplomats, limitations on social media, and prohibitions on protests and opposition-supported television channels.

Security forces are going house-to-house searching for violators.

2. U.S. policy hasn’t worked.

The severity of the situation is not disputed, but some policymakers argue private pressure would be better than public resolutions.

Unfortunately, private pressure for the last decade has yielded few results.

Instead of relaxing restrictions to allow critical voices, Ethiopia has tightened them.

The Obama administration’s shifting positions on Ethiopia have proved ineffective. The State Department’s human rights reports document intimidation of political opposition, but last year Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman praised Ethiopia as a democracy with free and fair elections.

One day later, she clarified that “there are concerns that remain about whether the election will be free and fair and credible,” before then issuing a fuller clarification stating that Ethiopia “has a long road to full democracy.”

Since then, the State Department has expressed “concern about recent clashes,” called fordialogue with the Oromo community and was “troubled” by the recent state of emergency, but has remained silent at other key moments.

The State Department’s inconsistency and frequent public silence seem to embolden the EPRDF.

In September, the government’s spokesperson bragged, “We will not hire any lobbyists to kill the draft resolution. We have many USG officials that support our government, so we do not need additional lobbyists.”

He dismissed the resolutions as “a seasonal flu that comes every now and then,” and said he would “rather US officials not put out statements about the protests [or] the loss of lives and destruction of property in connection thereof.”

3. Passage of resolutions provides clear direction for U.S. policy.

The resolutions are mild given the severity of the situation.

But they provide key elements currently missing from our Ethiopia policy: a consistent position on the violence and how to address it; clear direction for specific actions by the executive branch; and a call for the Ethiopian government to allow a “full, credible, and transparent investigation,” the results of which can be used to inform a more robust U.S. response.

The Ethiopian government’s current repression is destructive, not only for the EPRDF, but for Ethiopia’s long-term economic growth and effectiveness as a security partner. In order to thrive, it must uphold the rights enshrined in its international commitments and its own constitution.

Passage of these resolutions will send this message and will provide much-needed direction for addressing the worsening crisis after years of inaction and inconsistency from the U.S.

Boyajian is advocacy manager at Freedom House.

Ethiopia’s crisis and Congress

By Annie Boyajian, The Hill

When Congress adjourned in September, it had failed to vote on resolutions on Ethiopia (S.Res. 432/H.Res. 861).

When it returns, it should pass them without delay.

Ethiopia, an important security partner and ally, is heading for crisis. The country is suffering its worst unrest in years in response to the government’s intensifying abuses and restrictions on freedoms, as documented by Freedom House.

On Oct. 8, for the first time in the ruling government’s 25-year history, a state of emergency wasdeclared. Thousands of people have since been detained.

The pending resolutions condemn the killing and arrests of protestors and journalists by security forces and call on the U.S. government to review security assistance and democracy strategies for Ethiopia. They are an important first step in addressing the crisis in Ethiopia, and a needed pivot from current inaction by the U.S. government.They should be passed for these reasons.

1. Tensions are worsening.

Unrest began in November 2015, sparked by the government’s plan to expand the capital by seizing land from farmers in Oromia.

This region produces most of the nation’s wealth and is home to the Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group — and one of its most marginalized.

After security forces brutally responded to peaceful demonstrations, protests expanded, encompassing abuses and restrictions on freedoms and the dominance of Tigrayan elites in the country’s political and economic structures.

The ruling political coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is led primarily by members of the Tigray ethnic group, which comprises about 6 percent of the population. Ethiopia’s constitution commits the EPRDF to uniting Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups.

Instead, the EPRDF’s policies have fueled ethnic divisions and distributed economic wealth and political power to the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and political loyalists.

Following the 2005 elections, when the opposition won a third of the seats in parliament, the EPRDF clamped down violently, jailing opposition and enacting laws effectively eliminating independent media and civil society work on human rights, governance and elections issues. The EPRDF has continued to consolidate power, “winning” all 547 seats in parliament in 2015.

Before the state of emergency, the situation was already serious. More than 500 were killed andtens of thousands injured, arrested or disappeared.

The state of emergency — the full text of which is still not public — makes tensions worse. Itimposes a strict curfew, travel restrictions on foreign diplomats, limitations on social media, and prohibitions on protests and opposition-supported television channels.

Security forces are going house-to-house searching for violators.

2. U.S. policy hasn’t worked.

The severity of the situation is not disputed, but some policymakers argue private pressure would be better than public resolutions.

Unfortunately, private pressure for the last decade has yielded few results.

Instead of relaxing restrictions to allow critical voices, Ethiopia has tightened them.

The Obama administration’s shifting positions on Ethiopia have proved ineffective. The State Department’s human rights reports document intimidation of political opposition, but last year Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman praised Ethiopia as a democracy with free and fair elections.

One day later, she clarified that “there are concerns that remain about whether the election will be free and fair and credible,” before then issuing a fuller clarification stating that Ethiopia “has a long road to full democracy.”

Since then, the State Department has expressed “concern about recent clashes,” called fordialogue with the Oromo community and was “troubled” by the recent state of emergency, but has remained silent at other key moments.

The State Department’s inconsistency and frequent public silence seem to embolden the EPRDF.

In September, the government’s spokesperson bragged, “We will not hire any lobbyists to kill the draft resolution. We have many USG officials that support our government, so we do not need additional lobbyists.”

He dismissed the resolutions as “a seasonal flu that comes every now and then,” and said he would “rather US officials not put out statements about the protests [or] the loss of lives and destruction of property in connection thereof.”

3. Passage of resolutions provides clear direction for U.S. policy.

The resolutions are mild given the severity of the situation.

But they provide key elements currently missing from our Ethiopia policy: a consistent position on the violence and how to address it; clear direction for specific actions by the executive branch; and a call for the Ethiopian government to allow a “full, credible, and transparent investigation,” the results of which can be used to inform a more robust U.S. response.

The Ethiopian government’s current repression is destructive, not only for the EPRDF, but for Ethiopia’s long-term economic growth and effectiveness as a security partner. In order to thrive, it must uphold the rights enshrined in its international commitments and its own constitution.

Passage of these resolutions will send this message and will provide much-needed direction for addressing the worsening crisis after years of inaction and inconsistency from the U.S.

Boyajian is advocacy manager at Freedom House.

Tour operators cancel holidays as unrest tightens grip on Ethiopia

Image result for Simien Mountains

The Simien Mountains are popular with hikers CREDIT: GETTY

Saga Holidays is among a number of major UK tour operators to cancel trips to Ethiopia as a wave of unrest spreads across the African country.

The Foreign Office (FCO) is advising against all travel to some regions in the east and all but essential travel to central parts that include places such as Lalibela, popular with tourists for its rock-cut churches.

Saga, Kuoni and Cox and Kings are among those to have cancelled tours for this year, offering refunds or alternatives to customers.

Ancient wall paintings in the Debre Birhan Selassie Church
Ancient wall paintings in the Debre Birhan Selassie Church CREDIT: FOTOLIA/AP

The Ethiopian government this month declared a six-month state of emergency and arrested more than 1,600 people as the FCO warned of clashes between protesters and security forces. Protests have been most fervent in the Amhara and Oromia regions.

In August, some 90 people were believed to have been killed after police used live bullets on protesters chanting anti-government slogans and waving dissident flags.

Foreign Office advice Ethiopia
The Foreign Office has different advice for different parts of the country CREDIT: FOREIGN OFFICE

“Demonstrations have been taking place in the Oromia and Amhara regions in 2016 and further protests are likely,” the Foreign Office said.

“Tensions in Oromia have significantly risen since October 2 when up to 100 people died during a stampede at the Irreechaa religious festival.

“There has been widespread disruption to road travel across Ethiopia. Unauthorised and official roadblocks can appear with little or no warning.”

The country had recently been experiencing a boom in its tourism industry, thanks to its unique mix of history, wildlife and culture. Last year, the country was praised by the European Council on Tourism and Trade for its “excellent preservation of humanity landmarks”.

Beside the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, other draws include the Simien Mountains National Park, Lake Langano, and the Danakil Depression, one of the hottest places on earth.

Ethiopia's Danakil Depression is one of the hottest places on the planet
Ethiopia’s Danakil Depression is one of the hottest places on the planet CREDIT:FOTOLIA/AP

A spokesperson for Kuoni, which offers a tour of the highlights of Northern Ethiopia, said it had stopped selling the trip and would be monitoring the situation.

A spokesperson for Saga, too, said all 2016 departures had been cancelled, adding: “The initial change to FCO advice was that some areas should be avoided. As a result tours were amended to ensure that our holidaymakers were nowhere near those areas. However… the advice changed again and advised against all but essential travel to certain regions of Ethiopia. As a result we took the decision to cancel all 2016 departures.”

Tis Abay Falls on the Blue Nile River, Ethiopia
Tis Abay Falls on the Blue Nile River, Ethiopia CREDIT: AP

Cox and Kings said it would only be able to resume its trips should the FCO advice change.

Responsible Travel, which hosts a number of tour operators on its website running trips in Ethiopia, said some of its clients are continuing to offer tours.

The Simien Mountains National Park in the north of the country
The Simien Mountains National Park in the north of the country CREDIT: FOTOLIA/AP

“Several of the holidays we market in Ethiopia are run by local tour operators, who will continue to offer and run the same trips as they always have done,” said marketing manager Sarah Faith.

“It is then up to each individual traveller to consider the FCO advice and to purchase insurance that will cover them given the FCO warnings.

“Our local operators in Ethiopia are extremely well-placed to understand the day-to-day situation on the ground in the country.”

What Ethiopia’s withdrawals from AMISOM mean for Somalia

Why is Ethiopia bringing back some of the best-trained and best-equipped soldiers fighting al-Shabaab?

Until recently, Ethiopia contributed 4,400 troops to AMISOM's 22,000 in Somalia. Credit: AU UN/Tobin Jones.

Until recently, Ethiopia contributed 4,400 troops to AMISOM’s 22,000 in Somalia. Credit: AU UN/Tobin Jones.

This month has seen multiple withdrawals of Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) units from Somalia. On 11 October, ENDF soldiers under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) unilaterally departed from two strategic towns in the Hiraan region of central Somalia. On 23 October, another contingent abandoned a base in Halgan district of northern Hiraan. Then on 26 October, the BBC reported that ENDF units operating independently of AMISOM had vacated their positions in the Bakol region near the Ethiopian border.

At this point it is unclear how many of the Ethiopian troops deployed in Somalia (numbering roughly 4,400 of AMISOM’s 22,000 total troops) have departed, but it is clear that the withdrawals will have a significant strategic effect on the multinational counterinsurgency.

Both towns that were abandoned in Hiraan – El-Ali and Moqokori – were shortly thereafter occupied by al-Shabaab, and residents have reportedly already fled from villages Bakol in fear of further advances by the Islamist militants.

As al-Shabaab looks to exploit the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the crucial question is whether AMISOM can overcome the loss of strategic positions and manpower at a critical juncture in Somalia’s stabilisation.
The ENDF withdraws

Ethiopia has a complex history of conflict with its neighbours in the Horn of Africa, beginning in the late 19th century when Emperor Menelik II conquered the ethnic Somali region of Ogaden. Thousands of Somalis died trying to regain the Ogaden in an unsuccessful 1977-78 war, and Ethiopia backed various Somali warlords as proxies following the disintegration of the Somali state in the 1990s.

In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with full force to oust the Islamic Courts Union and help install the internationally-recognised Transitional Federal Government. In the wake of this intervention al-Shabaab emerged, drawing on a Salafi-jihadist narrative to exploit the nationalist backlash against the return of Ethiopian “imperialists”, the ENDF’s brutal treatment of civilians, and the transitional government’s lack of popular legitimacy.

In 2007, the African Union established AMISOM, which the ENDF joined as a troop-contributing country in 2014 to protect the fledgling government and degrade al-Shabaab through combined-force offensives. The ENDF brought with it significant war-fighting capabilities that other AMISOM nations lack. Ethiopia’s military is well-trained, well-equipped, and is more competent in the field of logistics than most African armies.

Combat capabilities aside, the ENDF is an unaccountable institution with a disturbing human rights record at home and abroad. In Somalia, ENDF troops have been accused of widespread rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Meanwhile, as the mostly Oromo and Amhara protests have grown in recent months at home, there have been hundreds of deaths as the Tigrayan-dominated government has bypassed regional security forces and deployed the ENDF in traditional police roles such as riot control.

Why is Ethiopia pulling out troops?

The ENDF had remained silent about the withdrawals from Somalia until yesterday, when Communications Minister Getachew Reda denied that they were related to the nationwide state of emergency that was declared in Ethiopia on 9 October in response to the ongoing protests. Instead, he blamed the EU for failing to sufficiently support AMISOM.

While the rationale behind the withdrawals is undoubtedly multifaceted, claims that the domestic unrest is irrelevant to the decision are unconvincing, and not only because of its conspicuous timing. For one, the ethnic tension behind the Ethiopian protests has already manifested itself in Somalia, with several reports of infighting between Oromo soldiers and Tigrayan officers in certain units. It has been the practice of governments since antiquity to bring potentially disloyal troops home to facilitate their surveillance (or punishment) rather than allow them to scheme abroad. The Tigrayan-dominated EPRDF government in Addis Ababa could be following this logic.

It is also possible that ENDF units have redeployed to Ethiopia for the straightforward need to bolster the government’s response to the protests. If the protests evolve into a more organised low-intensity conflict (a distinct possibility) the government will need to deploy significant forces domestically. Ethiopia’s units in Somalia represent less than 5% of the ENDF’s total forces, but battlefield experience often counts more than sheer numbers. Assuming the EPRDF can trust at least some of the units they have brought home, the government will have at its disposal soldiers with significant experience in asymmetrical warfare.

Another possibility is that the EPRDF is attempting to leverage its participation in AMISOM to pre-empt any potential international sanctions. So far the response from theUS and EU to the state of emergency has been quite muted, but should the domestic crackdown intensify, the EPRDF might dangle the possibility of redeploying to Somalia in return for US and EU agreement to temper their responses. (No doubt President Pierre Nkurunziza, whose Burundian armed forces constitute 5,400 of AMISOM’s troops, would be interested to see how that plays out.)

Effects of the withdrawal

Regardless of the EPRDF’s motives and of whether a future redeployment is likely, however, Ethiopia’s withdrawal has already significantly affected AMISOM efforts.

Over the past years, multinational efforts have reduced al -Shabaab’s territorial control from 55% of Somalia in 2010 to roughly 5% today, according to a recent report by the RAND think tank. Nonetheless, the militants remain the single greatest threat to Somalia’s stability, employing modern guerrilla tactics to great effect.

Due to the weakness of the nascent Somali National Army (SNA), AMISOM is crucial to containing the militants, and the abrupt withdrawal of ENDF forces poses a significant strategic setback to these efforts. According to standard counterinsurgency doctrine, AMISOM forces already constitute less than half the number of troops needed to stabilise Somalia, and the withdrawal of ENDF forces will stretch limited resources even further.

ENDF units had also been deployed to strategically significant positions in central Somalia. Ethiopian positions in Hiraan, located less than 100km north of Mogadishu, had abutted one of al-Shabaab’s two remaining areas of freedom of movement. The main highway in Hiraan is one of only two which connect Mogadishu to the rest of Somalia, the other running through Al Shabaab’s southern stronghold in Bay and Lower Shabelle.

With positions along the Hiraan highway now abandoned, al-Shabaab can more easily harass AMISOM and SNA forces in Mogadishu’s northern environs and threaten the capital from the north and southwest. They have done this with increasing frequency in the run up to Somalia’s fragile electoral process, and most recently launched a bold attack in Afgoye just 30km south of Mogadishu on 18 October.

[Al-Shabaab steps up attacks in run up to the Somalia elections]

Furthermore, the ENDF withdrawals in Bakol, which was previously a relatively secure region, allow al-Shabaab to expand their operations closer to the Ethiopian border. Given that Bakol borders the Bay region, where al-Shabaab enjoys substantial freedom of movement, increased operability in this area could translate to greater contiguous territorial control than the militants have enjoyed for some time.

The withdrawal also complicates possibilities of a final clearing operation in al-Shabaab’s remaining strongholds north and southwest of Mogadishu. This was always going to be difficult given the fledgling state of the SNA, poor coordination among AMISOM forces, and manpower shortages – not to mention the ease with which insurgents transition to underground cells. But any offensive will now be even more challenging.

A prudent strategy would have been to focus the bulk of forces on clearing the Bay/Lower Shabelle region where al-Shabaab is stronger and gains revenues from extorting traders in the few ports it controls. But the fact that al-Shabaab is now bolstered in Hiraan raises the risks of diverting substantial forces to Shabelle, which would leave Mogadishu and central Somalia vulnerable.

Without a sufficiently capable Somali security sector, the presence of AMISOM is crucial to this critical phase of the counterinsurgency. As the ENDF withdrawals demonstrate, however, a successful multinational stabilisation force is dependent on the stability of the member states themselves.

James Barnett is a Boren Scholar in Tanzania, having previously researched at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. You can follow him on Twitter @jbar1648. The views expressed in this article are his own.

What Ethiopia’s withdrawals from AMISOM mean for Somalia

Why is Ethiopia bringing back some of the best-trained and best-equipped soldiers fighting al-Shabaab?

Until recently, Ethiopia contributed 4,400 troops to AMISOM's 22,000 in Somalia. Credit: AU UN/Tobin Jones.

Until recently, Ethiopia contributed 4,400 troops to AMISOM’s 22,000 in Somalia. Credit: AU UN/Tobin Jones.

This month has seen multiple withdrawals of Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) units from Somalia. On 11 October, ENDF soldiers under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) unilaterally departed from two strategic towns in the Hiraan region of central Somalia. On 23 October, another contingent abandoned a base in Halgan district of northern Hiraan. Then on 26 October, the BBC reported that ENDF units operating independently of AMISOM had vacated their positions in the Bakol region near the Ethiopian border.

At this point it is unclear how many of the Ethiopian troops deployed in Somalia (numbering roughly 4,400 of AMISOM’s 22,000 total troops) have departed, but it is clear that the withdrawals will have a significant strategic effect on the multinational counterinsurgency.

Both towns that were abandoned in Hiraan – El-Ali and Moqokori – were shortly thereafter occupied by al-Shabaab, and residents have reportedly already fled from villages Bakol in fear of further advances by the Islamist militants.

As al-Shabaab looks to exploit the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the crucial question is whether AMISOM can overcome the loss of strategic positions and manpower at a critical juncture in Somalia’s stabilisation.
The ENDF withdraws

Ethiopia has a complex history of conflict with its neighbours in the Horn of Africa, beginning in the late 19th century when Emperor Menelik II conquered the ethnic Somali region of Ogaden. Thousands of Somalis died trying to regain the Ogaden in an unsuccessful 1977-78 war, and Ethiopia backed various Somali warlords as proxies following the disintegration of the Somali state in the 1990s.

In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with full force to oust the Islamic Courts Union and help install the internationally-recognised Transitional Federal Government. In the wake of this intervention al-Shabaab emerged, drawing on a Salafi-jihadist narrative to exploit the nationalist backlash against the return of Ethiopian “imperialists”, the ENDF’s brutal treatment of civilians, and the transitional government’s lack of popular legitimacy.

In 2007, the African Union established AMISOM, which the ENDF joined as a troop-contributing country in 2014 to protect the fledgling government and degrade al-Shabaab through combined-force offensives. The ENDF brought with it significant war-fighting capabilities that other AMISOM nations lack. Ethiopia’s military is well-trained, well-equipped, and is more competent in the field of logistics than most African armies.

Combat capabilities aside, the ENDF is an unaccountable institution with a disturbing human rights record at home and abroad. In Somalia, ENDF troops have been accused of widespread rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Meanwhile, as the mostly Oromo and Amhara protests have grown in recent months at home, there have been hundreds of deaths as the Tigrayan-dominated government has bypassed regional security forces and deployed the ENDF in traditional police roles such as riot control.

Why is Ethiopia pulling out troops?

The ENDF had remained silent about the withdrawals from Somalia until yesterday, when Communications Minister Getachew Reda denied that they were related to the nationwide state of emergency that was declared in Ethiopia on 9 October in response to the ongoing protests. Instead, he blamed the EU for failing to sufficiently support AMISOM.

While the rationale behind the withdrawals is undoubtedly multifaceted, claims that the domestic unrest is irrelevant to the decision are unconvincing, and not only because of its conspicuous timing. For one, the ethnic tension behind the Ethiopian protests has already manifested itself in Somalia, with several reports of infighting between Oromo soldiers and Tigrayan officers in certain units. It has been the practice of governments since antiquity to bring potentially disloyal troops home to facilitate their surveillance (or punishment) rather than allow them to scheme abroad. The Tigrayan-dominated EPRDF government in Addis Ababa could be following this logic.

It is also possible that ENDF units have redeployed to Ethiopia for the straightforward need to bolster the government’s response to the protests. If the protests evolve into a more organised low-intensity conflict (a distinct possibility) the government will need to deploy significant forces domestically. Ethiopia’s units in Somalia represent less than 5% of the ENDF’s total forces, but battlefield experience often counts more than sheer numbers. Assuming the EPRDF can trust at least some of the units they have brought home, the government will have at its disposal soldiers with significant experience in asymmetrical warfare.

Another possibility is that the EPRDF is attempting to leverage its participation in AMISOM to pre-empt any potential international sanctions. So far the response from theUS and EU to the state of emergency has been quite muted, but should the domestic crackdown intensify, the EPRDF might dangle the possibility of redeploying to Somalia in return for US and EU agreement to temper their responses. (No doubt President Pierre Nkurunziza, whose Burundian armed forces constitute 5,400 of AMISOM’s troops, would be interested to see how that plays out.)

Effects of the withdrawal

Regardless of the EPRDF’s motives and of whether a future redeployment is likely, however, Ethiopia’s withdrawal has already significantly affected AMISOM efforts.

Over the past years, multinational efforts have reduced al -Shabaab’s territorial control from 55% of Somalia in 2010 to roughly 5% today, according to a recent report by the RAND think tank. Nonetheless, the militants remain the single greatest threat to Somalia’s stability, employing modern guerrilla tactics to great effect.

Due to the weakness of the nascent Somali National Army (SNA), AMISOM is crucial to containing the militants, and the abrupt withdrawal of ENDF forces poses a significant strategic setback to these efforts. According to standard counterinsurgency doctrine, AMISOM forces already constitute less than half the number of troops needed to stabilise Somalia, and the withdrawal of ENDF forces will stretch limited resources even further.

ENDF units had also been deployed to strategically significant positions in central Somalia. Ethiopian positions in Hiraan, located less than 100km north of Mogadishu, had abutted one of al-Shabaab’s two remaining areas of freedom of movement. The main highway in Hiraan is one of only two which connect Mogadishu to the rest of Somalia, the other running through Al Shabaab’s southern stronghold in Bay and Lower Shabelle.

With positions along the Hiraan highway now abandoned, al-Shabaab can more easily harass AMISOM and SNA forces in Mogadishu’s northern environs and threaten the capital from the north and southwest. They have done this with increasing frequency in the run up to Somalia’s fragile electoral process, and most recently launched a bold attack in Afgoye just 30km south of Mogadishu on 18 October.

[Al-Shabaab steps up attacks in run up to the Somalia elections]

Furthermore, the ENDF withdrawals in Bakol, which was previously a relatively secure region, allow al-Shabaab to expand their operations closer to the Ethiopian border. Given that Bakol borders the Bay region, where al-Shabaab enjoys substantial freedom of movement, increased operability in this area could translate to greater contiguous territorial control than the militants have enjoyed for some time.

The withdrawal also complicates possibilities of a final clearing operation in al-Shabaab’s remaining strongholds north and southwest of Mogadishu. This was always going to be difficult given the fledgling state of the SNA, poor coordination among AMISOM forces, and manpower shortages – not to mention the ease with which insurgents transition to underground cells. But any offensive will now be even more challenging.

A prudent strategy would have been to focus the bulk of forces on clearing the Bay/Lower Shabelle region where al-Shabaab is stronger and gains revenues from extorting traders in the few ports it controls. But the fact that al-Shabaab is now bolstered in Hiraan raises the risks of diverting substantial forces to Shabelle, which would leave Mogadishu and central Somalia vulnerable.

Without a sufficiently capable Somali security sector, the presence of AMISOM is crucial to this critical phase of the counterinsurgency. As the ENDF withdrawals demonstrate, however, a successful multinational stabilisation force is dependent on the stability of the member states themselves.

James Barnett is a Boren Scholar in Tanzania, having previously researched at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. You can follow him on Twitter @jbar1648. The views expressed in this article are his own.

Why is Morocco Returning to African Union?

 

Two countries are making determined efforts to return to Africa. One is, in fact, an African country. Morocco left the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 32 years ago over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) to the continental body.

Morocco considers SADR (Western Sahara), until 1976 a Spanish colony, one of its provinces.

That quarrel has not ended, but it appears Morocco sees it in its best interest to return to the fold. There are several probable reasons for this change.

Although the African Union (AU) and some other countries recognise SADR, the reality on the ground has remained unchanged for the past three decades. SADR controls about 25% of the territory while Morocco controls the rest.

The political and diplomatic situation is a stalemate, but one in which Morocco has a stronger hand. So there is probably no strong reason for Morocco to remain in the cold.

Besides, staying out of the African Union isolates Morocco from a growing market. Africa’s economies are growing and its people are increasingly earning higher incomes.

And with this comes a more visible and bigger role in international affairs. So there are economic and diplomatic benefits to be gained from closer engagement.

To show that they mean business and want to be actively involved with the rest of Africa, Morocco is not going about its return the old-fashioned way – sending diplomatic feelers or envoys to make its case. They are going about it in a businesslike manner, with business proposals and economic projects.

The king, no less, is visiting East Africa, a region of the continent where Morocco hardly has a presence. But he is not calling on the leaders and making the usual nice statements about cherished ties and brotherhood, and so on.

In fact on his just ended visit to Rwanda, he made no speeches. Perhaps that is royal protocol. Or it was not necessary because he came armed with many agreements that made a loud enough statement.

It is not the number of agreements alone that is significant, but the type as well. On such state visits, it is common for agreements to be signed between states. They are usually of a general nature about cooperation and are rarely implemented.

This time they are more specific and wide ranging, covering agriculture, finance, housing, manufacturing, energy, health and education, among others.

It is likely similar agreements will be signed in Tanzania and Ethiopia where the king and his large delegation will be next.

The Moroccans’ current visit to East Africa marks a serious intent to enter the region and widen their interests in Africa. Until recently the Arab north of Africa has had very little to do in this region.

Their interests have been mainly in West Africa. Only Gadaffi’s Libya, perhaps because of its leader’s interest in becoming the de facto leader of Africa, had financial and commercial interests in the region. Lately Egypt has been making trade inroads. Now Morocco is following suit.

From all this, it is clear is that Morocco is determined to return, and indeed has already made the necessary requests to do so.

The other country making a diplomatic comeback in Africa is Israel. The majority of African countries broke relations with Israel in 1973 following the Yom Kippur war. For many it was an expression of solidarity with Egypt and the Palestinians.

What did Africa reap from severing ties with Israel? Not much. In fact the continent suffered heavily from a petrol crisis fuelled by OPEC immediately after the 1973 war.

In terms of development cooperation, the Arabs did not fill the gap left by the Israelis. Yes, there were some loans and grants from a number of Arab Development Banks, but little else.

Instead there was a proliferation of Islamic NGOs and missionary organisations in much of Africa. Because these groups represented different factions within Islam, they brought their differences and created divisions within African Muslims. A more dangerous result was radicalisation of Muslims which has led many of them into joining terrorist organisations.

All along, however, discreet relations between some African countries and Israel remained. In recent times Israel and African countries have been slowly re-engaging. It is perhaps time these contacts came into the open.

Why now and what benefits are there for Africans? Israel continues to be a leader in matters of security, technology and agriculture. Africa needs this expertise.

For the Israelis too, improved relations with Africa are beneficial both economically and diplomatically. In any case, with the political mess in the Middle East, particularly the weakening of Syria and Iraq, the threat to Israel will likely take on another form that requires a different kind of response. Yes, the existential threat remains, but in different configurations.

So two countries are returning to Africa, and this is a reflection of the changing times. Solutions to many conflicts are increasingly to be found in establishing common ground than in maintaining a stand-off.

Collaboration is crucial because the alternative leads only to division and instability. Finally realpolitik and not sentiment is informing diplomatic decisions.

An Oromo Democratic Front (ODF) Proposal

ODF

Ethiopia stands at a crossroads, once again. But this time the prospects facing it are much more starkly contrasting than during past instances of change. If it is put on one course of change, achieving a final breakthrough to a common democratic future looks distinctly promising. If such a course is blocked or not pursued by the stakeholders, on the other hand, the breakdown of order appears threateningly possible. The time to put the country on the right course is now. Unless a country-wide consensus is forged for doing so today, the country will continue its steady slide towards the abyss.

As things stand now, the worrying scenario mentioned above appears more plausible than the former. Are we exaggerating and being alarmist when we draw this pessimistic conclusion? If we are alarmist, we are justified to be so because the time to take corrective measures is now before the country has gone over the cliff and reached a point of no return. There are important reasons why all concerned should worry about Ethiopia’s future.

The ongoing debate of the deaf in Ethiopia is just one of these reasons. Parties are talking past each other instead of conversing with each other. No one is genuinely paying attention to the pain and grievances or perspective of the other. As during many past periods in the country’s history, the choices currently confronting it are, once again, posed in a binary either/or manner. Even though the Oromo is at the forefront of the struggle to bring fundamental change in Ethiopia, some continue to sidestep core Oromo demands and talk as if the choices are either defending the present order or restoring the unitary state of yesteryears. Unless prominence is given to the more forward looking alternatives espoused by the Oromo, Ethiopia’s continued existence as a polity is questionable and we may all be condemned to live under a condition of sustained instability.

The present rulers of Ethiopia are absolutely convinced that there is no alternative to their style of administration. Even when admitting the need for some reform, however cosmetic, they can only think of reforming themselves. While endangering the country with its intransigence and refusal to make a shift in course, they shed crocodile tears for the country’s possible implosion if they are toppled. Consequently, they are determined to permanently preserve the status quo. However, societal rejection of their administration has been steadily growing and has now reached fever pitch.

The opposite stand, espoused by a very vocal sector, recognizes nothing valuable in how the present rulers structured Ethiopia and have ruled it for a quarter of a century. In this perspective, the present rulers put Ethiopia on a completely disastrous course from the outset by structuring Ethiopia into a federation curved along ethno-linguistic bases. Proponents of this stand see no alternative to dumping the present administrative system lock, stock and barrel.

The rancorous debate between these two opposing sides, hence, offers nothing new about the future. The present rulers are determined to preserve the status quo that has been rejected by most Ethiopians. Their vocal opponents look back to the time when the country was conceived as a unitary state with ethnic homogenization through assimilation as a strategy to forge a unitary nation and wish to restore it. But that conception of Ethiopia was militarily challenged by an increasing number of armed groups culminating in its replacement by the present structure. Hence, Ethiopian society is being offered the choice of either enduring the present failed approach to governance or the one preceding it, which has also disastrously failed. It is the stalemate between these two proposals, lacking any forward looking element, which worries us about the future of Ethiopia.

We wish to state one of our convictions up front. Structuring Ethiopia as a multinational state is a move in the right direction. And this move is due to neither the diabolical nor noble intensions of the present rulers. It was a historical necessity that was insurmountable at the time the military regime collapsed and the current rulers were catapulted to power. Consequently, the present rulers deserve neither commendation nor condemnation for embracing the principle of multinational federalism in Ethiopia. Structuring Ethiopia as a multinational state was as an unavoidable as was the Dergue’s Land Reform Proclamation of 4 March 1975. Both of these constructive developments in Ethiopia’s recent history were however ultimately abused to serve negative purposes not because they were wrong but because those ruling the country are/were averse to democracy in both instances.

The fundamental aim of this Proposal is articulating an alternative to the two proposals discussed above. Its core intention is recognizing and preserving what is positive in the status quo as well as the one preceding it. This stems from our conviction that some progress has been registered during each of the previous two incidents of change. When posed in this manner, the intention of this Proposal is undeniably reformist. Even at this eleventh hour of a popular revolution precipitated by the regime’s refusal to implement the minimum of reforms in its core policies and basic modus operandi, we believe reform and reformism offers the best route out of the country’s malaise. It aspires to build on positive developments during these instances of change instead of aspiring to totally scrap them.

All stakeholders must admit one fact. The only thing unchangeable in human history is the inevitability of change. Hence, it is better to anticipate the inevitably coming change and plan for it than to be overwhelmed by its unexpected consequences after it has occurred.

What constitutes the litmus test for evaluating the preferred direction of the coming change? We believe the answer lies in Martin Luther King’s now well-known observation that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” Thus, the next process of change in Ethiopia should position the country “on the arc of the moral universe … bending toward justice.” Morality demands the search for justice for all.

Seeking justice for all is the fundamental aim of this Proposal. Because what is considered as just by one set of actors is often denounced as unjust by another group of actors, even the term “justice” could be controversial in the Ethiopian context just like so many other concepts.

What principle can help close the gulf separating these kinds of contrasting stands concerning justice? We propose that if the exercise of any right does not unjustly infringe on another’s ability to freely exercise their rights, then justice for all would be realized.

This Proposal is deliberately written in a concise form for a reason. The more is stated, the more detractors would find reasons to argue against it. We are not afraid of debate but wish to avoid the hair-splitting type of exchanges that so bedevil political discourse in Ethiopia. We are also not directly addressing the issues that are subjects of ongoing controversies in the country. Instead, we are dealing with the premises, traditions and mentalities—worldviews—lurking behind the positions currently confronting each other.  Unless these underlying assumptions are seriously interrogated and their hindrance to charting a better future is unearthed, we are condemned to relive our past and dismal present.  To prevent Ethiopia from sliding into further chaos, many, including some from the international community, are calling for dialogue between Ethiopia’s contending stakeholders to resolve the impasse.  Dialogue is the only alternative.  However, no dialogue can tackle the impasse without meaningfully addressing the mindsets that underlie the ongoing conflict. This Proposal is prepared with this in mind.

  1. THE MEANS DETERMINES THE END

Political movements in Ethiopia disagree on almost all issues except one. And that exception is democracy. Not a single Ethiopian movement is opposed to democracy. All movements agree that the installation of a democratic order should be the aim of the ongoing struggle. This common aspiration, hence, constitutes the factor potentially uniting the country’s gravely divided movements. Hence, this is an asset that is worth cherishing, preserving and promoting. A potential area of contention is perhaps the undue focus on outcomes rather than the process of democracy and the quality—their impartiality, professionalism, and openness—of the institutions that serve as the pillars of genuinely democratic society.

The controversial question is how the struggle for democracy should be conducted. Specifically, what means of struggle is likely to lead to democracy and what is not? The answer can be found by revisiting the recent history of Ethiopia. On several occasions during the last half century, Ethiopian movements have employed armed/violent struggle as the means to achieve democracy. They have fallen far short of their intended aspiration in each instance. The experiences of numerous other countries corroborate this tragic end result of armed struggle.

At this stage, asking the following provocative question appears pertinent: What is insanity? The equally provocative answer is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.” Consequently, if democracy is truly our common aspiration, we should reconsider our attitude regarding armed struggle. Armed struggle has not culminated in democracy in the past and is not likely to do so in the future.

The reason for this tragic consequence of armed struggle is quite simple if we are willing to stop and think. Any group employing armed means can prevail over the incumbent dictatorship only under one condition. And that is excelling the incumbent in precisely those behaviours that are inimical to democracy: secretiveness, unquestioning obedience top-down diktats, and intolerance of differing opinion. Because of the need to excel in these undemocratic behaviours in order to defeat the incumbent dictatorship, democracy becomes the first casualty of armed struggle within the movement conducting it. And a movement that itself is undemocratic cannot be expected to become a democratizing agency. No one can practice democracy in the external arena while internally suppressing it. And no internally democratic movement has ever succeeded in successfully conducting the protracted armed struggle that overcoming tyranny entail. Even established democracies are forced to significantly curtail civil freedoms during times of war and serious security threats.

Armed struggle, hence, is ineffective in ushering in democracy and effective only in replacing one form of dictatorship with an even more repressive alternative. Breaking out of this vicious cycle is possible only by dispensing with the common practice of blaming the incumbent for forcing armed means on those seeking democracy. A dictatorship obviously fears and hates democracy more than anything else. As the result, it prefers to manoeuvre its opponents into engaging it on the undemocratic plane, where it has the upper hand. Those genuinely seeking democracy should consciously avoid struggling in the manner preferred by the incumbent dictatorship.

As the country gradually inches day by day into an armed struggle as a default and unavoidable option, it is hard to argue against an oppressed people’s right to defend itself against violent repression by the ruling party. The temptation to avenge our killers and defend against the onslaught of our oppressors is a natural human reaction. Self-defence, by all means in one’s disposal, is an inviolable right. However, we still need to stop and think seriously about where this slippery slope lands us: into the arms of another tyranny.

Even if armed struggle is proven to be unavoidable due to the sheer brutality of the ongoing repression on the civilian population, its negative consequences and how to limit its negative repercussions need to be looked at closely and dispassionately—even if doing so at a time when sections of the country are being turned into bloodbath is seen as ivory-tower intellectual conceit.

The reason why armed struggle replaces one form of dictatorship with an even more repressive alternative has been stated. The dictatorship that captures power by armed means has another complicating nature. It becomes imbued with a high degree of self-righteousness even as the struggle is underway. This is due to the fact that the leadership overseeing the struggle invokes democracy to motivate its followers to pay the highest sacrifice. Such a leadership ultimately assumes that it alone epitomizes democracy. Any criticism of such a leadership runs the risk of being portrayed as opposing democracy and mercilessly suppressed.

After coming to power, such a dictatorship also loves to invoke the memory of the martyrs who died in the struggle as the current regime does ad nauseam. It harangues the public non-stop that it owes a debt to the martyrs and does not state when this debt is paid up. Hence, the dead ends up indefinitely dominating the living. And all sorts of crimes are likely to be committed in the name of those who no more are in a position to express their opinion.

Moreover, the ownership of armed struggle steadily narrows during the struggle ultimately being monopolized by the secretive conspiratorial top leaders or even the top leading personality opening the way for the cult of personality. This appears to be innate to armed struggle and has repeatedly recurred in world history.

The ownership of non-violent struggle, on the contrary, has to continuously expand to embrace all participants. In fact, the only way non-violent struggles can succeed is through widespread public ownership and their active and creative participation in it. The aim and strategies of non-violent struggle are openly declared in order to attract a widespread participation. Once owned by the public in this manner, the path to narrowing the ownership of the struggle is blocked forever. Over all, the ultimate aim of non-violent struggle is openly declared and pursued—imbuing it with a high degree of internal democracy; and can thus culminate in the installation of a democratic order.

Sacrificing one’s life is sadly inevitable in the conduct of both non-violent and armed struggles. But the leaders of armed struggle often end up considering human life as just one of the many resources expended during its conduct. They ultimately draw a balance sheet of the deaths they inflict on the enemy and their own casualties. This cavalier attitude towards human life ultimately devalues it. Combatants are discouraged from openly expressing their grief about the death of their own comrades, to say nothing about that of the opposing force.

Both non-violent and armed struggle require a high degree of selflessness, including the willingness to lay down one’s precious life. However, participants in armed struggle are more nonchalant about taking the life of the opponent—precisely because they are selfless enough to put their own life on the line. On the contrary, non-violent struggle is premised on making the loss of any life unnecessary.  And regrettable, when it happens. Those engaged in non-violent struggle do not aim to t life but to give their own if necessary. Participants in non-violent struggle value their own life as much as they value that of their persecutors. And when any life is lost during the non-violent struggle, the public turns out to mourn and celebrate the life of the martyr.

Armed and non-violent struggle have contrasting impacts on the internal solidarity of the incumbent dictatorship. Armed struggle tends to approach the incumbent as a monolithic entity and aspires to demolish it by force. This external threat plays into the hand of the top leadership of the dictatorship who portrays any threat against it as a threat to anyone sharing anything with it. The rhetoric of the armed opponent may give more prominence to denouncing the top leadership of the dictatorship. But in practice, this denunciation runs the risk of steadily expanding to include the society that spawned the top leadership of the dictatorship. This top leadership would also do everything to fuel this fear of the society that spawned it.

On the contrary, non-violent struggle has the potential of driving a wedge among factions and interest groups within the camp of the dictatorship. Non-violent struggle does not approach the dictatorship as a monolithic entity but a collection of human beings. It does not dismiss outright the existence of individuals with conscience even within the camp of the dictatorship. Non-violent struggle deploys moral arguments in order to impact the conscience of all involved. Some, even in the camp of the dictatorship, are liable to be impacted by this form of persuasion. Hence, non-violent struggle has the potential of drawing a wedge between moderates and the extremist core of the dictatorship.

  1. THE DIVISIVE ROLE OF ETHIOPIAN HISTORY

The preceding section cited Ethiopia’s history of the last half a century in order to evaluate the efficacy of armed struggle in charting a common democratic future. Hence, imagining and working for the realization of a common democratic future inevitably involves looking back at the past. But this does not appear promising in the Ethiopian context. Reading and interpreting history tend to be very divisive. The heroes of one set of actors happen to be the villains of another. And one group’s history is considered as fiction by another. What is seen as the Golden Age of one group is portrayed as the dawn of the Dark Age for another. Even the depth of Ethiopian history is just as controversial. Does the history of contemporary Ethiopia uninterruptedly stretch back for several millennia or is it only a little over a century long?

Why is the history of other African countries rarely as controversial? Perhaps this could be due to the fact that the powers that created the other African countries packed up and left after independence. In Ethiopia, however, the state was created by indigenous actors and the society from which the creators of the contemporary state were home-grown and have had nowhere else to go. And, as in any other processes of state formation, armed conquest was involved in bringing present-day Ethiopia into existence. But unlike other democratic countries, where the initial act of coercion by force was ultimately replaced by voluntary consent, force still remains the factor holding Ethiopia’s disparate cultural/linguistic societies together. As the result, when and how Ethiopia was put together still remains the subject of an emotive debate. The politicization of the reading and interpretation and re-interpretation of Ethiopian history thus still rubs raw nerves. This has the implication of rendering the historicization of politics in Ethiopia inevitable. Consequently, political stands tend to be backed with a specific interpretation of past history. When politics should rather be about solving problems facing today’s and tomorrow’s generations! Unless a way is found around this mutual politicization of history and the historicization of politics, imagining and realizing a common democratic future will thus remain unattainable.

Finding a way around this burden of Ethiopian history that stands in the way of imagining and articulating a common democratic future is way beyond the scope of this very brief writing. Instead, what will be attempted is proposing a few approaches on how to stem the obstacle posed by differing readings and interpretations of Ethiopia’s history. Even this modest attempt has a lot of dangerous, risky and controversial implications.

First, is it perhaps possible to agree that there is no such thing as the clinical and absolutely objective writing of history? Hence, the work of even the most refined professional historians is inevitably influenced by their biased preferences of some data, reading or perspective over others. Even research in such supposedly clinical subjects as physics, chemistry and other physical sciences is affected by preferential tapping of data and paradigms. This results from the fact that understanding any objective reality involves some degree of abstraction. A society’s means of understanding its past does not stand still: it continues to evolve, on account of the advent of new technology, and changes in philosophical perspectives and social tastes and sensitivities, necessitating a rereading and re-interpretation of the past. In addition, the archival material normally cited by historians is itself produced by contemporary chroniclers with their own biases—some selected in and many others left out. Hence, treating any history as Gospel truth should be approached with the utmost care.

Second, can we agree that the notion of “people without history” is not only wrong and unjust but also serves as the rationale for the commission of injustice? Every society has a past although maybe its ancestors did not have a literate culture to document it in writing. Hence, the history of the world should ideally be the sum total of the histories of all humans. Likewise, the history of a particular country should be the sum total of the histories of all sectors of its population.

Third, the literature which serves as the source for writing history is often assembled by individuals belonging to the dominant sector. This, hence, stamps history with a bias favouring the victor when documenting a particular process of state formation. History speaks in the commanding voice of the victor and mutes out the faint voices of the vanquished. The situation and suffering of the victim is rarely even mentioned. This has an inevitable implication. History written based on such a biased documentation ends up humiliating the descendants of those victims. Such was the history of Ethiopia that motivated some groups to develop a thirst for a kind of history differing from the one officially taught in schools. The end result was the politicization of Ethiopian history mentioned above. If we really want to end this, the state and state organs ought to favour the history of Ethiopia that reflects the role of all communities, which history should be taught in schools. This requires accepting that all communities have played a role in shaping contemporary Ethiopia.

Fourth, can we agree that there is no such thing as a completely blameless society? Every society has committed aggression against one or another of its neighbours at some times while finding itself at the receiving end of aggression by one or another of its neighbours at another time.

Finally, none of us chose the family/society into which we were born nor the particular locality or country where we were born. As individuals, we have the choice of moving to another country and of changing our citizenship. The society into which we were born, however, cannot exercise this option. Its only option is finding a way to peacefully live with its dignity upheld with the other societies thrown together to shape the population of the country. The focus of the effort of Ethiopia’s political movements should be working out the terms that allow such a dignified and peaceful coexistence among all the cultural/linguistic communities composing the Ethiopian population.

Proposal: Hence, can we agree to live with differing readings and interpretations of Ethiopia’s history on one condition? That it should not permanently demonize and criminalize a particular sector of the Ethiopian population, exclude any other from being part of the state, or deny that injustice was ever committed. Otherwise, our divergent reading and interpretation of Ethiopian history would permanently stand in the way of realizing a common democratic future.

  1. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

One of the most controversial and unavoidable issues in jointly seeking and charting a common democratic future concerns the invocation of the right of self-determination by marginalized groups, including the Oromo, who otherwise make up close to half of the country’s population. Returning to the debate surrounding this issue is not promising because contrasting stands have congealed. Instead, we should focus on the right to self-identification, without which self-determination or any other political project is impossible. Hence we start by addressing the controversial nature of self-identification because it is another matter standing in the way of forging a common democratic future in Ethiopia. This is yet another factor that sets apart Ethiopian politics from that of other countries, at least in Africa. This kind of controversy is almost non-existent elsewhere in Africa where individuals freely identify themselves either as members of their ethnic community or citizens of their country depending on the context. In Ethiopia, however, controversy rages over whether individuals first and foremost refer to themselves as Oromo, Amhara, Sidama, Afar, Guraghe, Somali, Tigrean, Anyuak, etc. or strictly as Ethiopians.

Delving into this topic runs the risk of just contributing to the presently raging controversy instead of defusing it. A volume can be written on the topic and yet fail to suggest a way around it. The aim of this brief writing is to suggest a number of simple principles that could point to a way to how to defuse this raging controversy.

First, can we agree that the right to self-identification is a fundamental human right that belongs to the self concerned and to no one else? Stripping individuals of this right amounts to violating their humanity. It is like treating them as objects instead of conscious subjects. Whoever says to individuals “you are allowed to call yourself only A and not B” is exercising supremacy. Such a designator is also asserting ownership of the designated. Those exercising this type of supremacy by appropriating the others’ right to self-identification are in the position to also change their mind and say “from now on you can only identify yourself as X and not Y.” As the result, those whose right to self-identification has been appropriated in this manner are forced to lead a precarious life always questioning how they will be designated next.

Second, can we agree that the right to self-identification is a fundamental democratic right in the absence of which it is impossible to organize for any common purpose: political, social, cultural, religious, etc.? Individuals have to identify themselves as workers, women, members of cultural/linguistic community, etc. in order to organize to pursue a common objective. Restricting this right in any manner would ultimately lead to curtailing the right to assembly and organization. After all, the human being is fundamentally a social creature.

Third, can we agree that self-identification can be invoked in a multiple and contextual manner? Individuals can identify themselves as workers in one context. And as women at other times. And as women workers in yet another context, in which self-identification both as worker and woman is invoked. Likewise, why is it not possible for individuals to identify themselves as Oromo in one situation and as Oromo Ethiopians under another?

The answer is quite simple. Until recently being an Oromo was officially portrayed as antithetical to being an Ethiopian. This mentality is still reflected in the discourse of a vocal sector of Ethiopia’s elite. It is this mentality that drove some Oromo activists to articulate being an Oromo as antithetical to being an Ethiopian. Rejecting those who reject you is a natural human reaction. If at some time the dominant system denied Oromo identity as part of Ethiopian identity or tried to eliminate its traditions or discourage the use of its language through various means, one should not be surprised if those at the other end thought the same, and tried to assert the right denied. The only way to resolve this problem is by accepting that being an Oromo and an Ethiopian is not mutually exclusive and is indeed possible.

Fourth, can we agree that the right to self-identification can be invoked to serve constructive or destructive purposes? When this right is invoked to attack and belittle others, it definitely serves a destructive purpose. When it is invoked to seek justice for oneself as human beings, however, it plays a constructive role. Struggling for justice for the self should not amount to denying justice to others. And when it does, a red line has been crossed and should be corrected. Only when such a red line is crossed is the right to self-identification serving a negative purpose.

  1. HOW TO INSTITUTE INCLUSIVE CHANGE

Ethiopia has undergone several incidents of tumultuous change during the past half century. There is one thing common to all these incidents of change. A particular group or even an individual ultimately monopolized the political space subsequent to the change that unfolded. Some of these changes started with widespread societal participation. This was the case especially with the process that brought the imperial era to an end. But soon after the imperial regime was unseated, various rival groups fought each other with the aim of monopolizing Ethiopia’s political space. This rivalry pitted against each other several nascent parties that claimed Marxism-Leninism as their ideology, and pioneered the practice of the “Red Terror” in order to self-righteously liquidate members of their opponents. The military clique simply appropriated this practice and employed it to demolish the rival civilian parties. Meanwhile, several processes of liquidation occurred within the junta at the end of which one officer managed to monopolize the political space.

When the military regime was overthrown in May 1991, the incoming EPRDF signalled its willingness to share political space with other movements by inviting them to join the Transitional Government. Within a few months, however, more and more of these non-EPRDF organizations were either systematically eased out or left the Transitional Government out of frustration. The course was set thereafter ultimately culminating in the monopolization of the political space in Ethiopia by the EPRDF. In the course of the following decade, the same process unfolded within the EPRDF, and one person eventually monopolized the political space, until his natural death.

We cannot change how these previous processes of change unfolded. But we can, and have to, identify and deal with the mentality that made the monopolization of political space inevitable in both instances. Otherwise, we will remain stuck in the vicious cycle of witnessing groups and individuals replacing each other as the monopoly holders of the political space. In undemocratic systems, monopolizing political space enables monopolizing the economic and other spheres as well.

First, these recurrent monopolizations of political space resulted from the mentality of “winners take all.” Not only that, the winning party is determined to indefinitely keep its gains. This means that losers lose everything and permanently. As the result, the losers have no stake whatsoever in the incumbent order. This drives the opposition not to acknowledge anything worthwhile in the policies and practices of the incumbent ruler. Neither does the incumbent acknowledge anything positive in the policy proposals of the opposition. In fact those in power view opposition to the regime as criminal. Change stemming from these mutually confrontational stands can have no other outcome but zero-sum.

Second, the feeling of self-righteousness slips in to further complicate this already complicated political contest. Each party portrays an absolute conviction that its stand, and only its stand, can serve the interest of the country or the people which it purports to represent. This often extends to the effort of trying to make the rule of the incumbent coterminous with that of not only the administration but also the Ethiopian state. As the result, successive rulers have done everything possible to wrap the state around themselves in order to signal that any threat directed against them is also a threat to the survival of the Ethiopian state itself. The country is currently on the verge of a frightening possibility due to this mentality.

Third, differentiating the state and government, which has never happened in Ethiopia to date, becomes well-nigh impossible so long as this mentality prevails. The bureaucracy, the military, police, the judicial system, etc. are believed to belong to the incumbent and to promote strictly its interests under this dispensation. Even the Constitution is believed to be an instrument tailored to reflect and enforce the vision and interests of strictly the incumbent ruler. Consequently, all these pillars of state institutions have undergone significant overhauls after each incident of change to date.

Demolishing these institutions and starting all over again after each incident of change is a very expensive undertaking in a country as impoverished as Ethiopia. It is also wrong because all forms of administration have positive and negative aspects. And positive aspects can be preserved and refined while removing the obviously negative ones. This requires both the incumbent and opposition agreeing on a couple of matters. The incumbent rulers should acknowledge that their policies and practices are not perfect by admitting that they are fallible human beings. The opposition should likewise acknowledge that not all the policies and practices of the incumbent stem from its diabolical intentions but also from burning question at the time it rose to power. And any policies and structures instituted by the incumbent to accommodate historically-rooted demands need to be preserved. So long as this kind of mentality replaces the one prevailing until now, both the defenders of the status quo and agents of change will have something in common.

Our proposal, hence, is a simple one: Those wanting to preserve the status quo can and should acknowledge that accepting some changes may serve such a purpose. And those seeking change should similarly acknowledge that preserving the positive aspects of the status quo could ease such a process.

  1. SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES

We, members of the opposition, love to hold the ruling party responsible for all of Ethiopia’s predicaments. Doing so may be politic but we should not mislead ourselves by our own rhetoric. This does not mean to exonerate the ruling party from its responsibility for the current crisis and debacle in which its security forces are turning the country into a bloodbath and one huge prison. There are undoubtedly problems introduced by the present rulers. There are others that they inherited and exacerbated instead of defusing. And there are still others that are beyond the control of the present rulers regardless of their claim to be fully in control.

For example, climate change is truly becoming a problem defying even the most powerful countries. And in the Ethiopian context, this challenge is further compounded by the simultaneous depletion and pollution of natural resources and galloping population growth. This makes the prioritization of poverty alleviation higher than any other pursuit. The present rulers should be commended for putting development at the top of their priorities although whether they are genuinely and fairly implementing it could be debated. And any incoming regime must be prepared to refine and build on their efforts.

  1. TECHNICAL MATTERS

This Proposal has not addressed such technical issues of caretaker government and other transitional arrangements. These issues will be addressed in a separate proposal, to be shared with different stakeholders and developed collaboratively. This decision stems from our conviction that such matters are less controversial than the attitudinal and traditional mind-sets that stand in the way of imagining and realizing a common democratic future.