Author: EFP

Donald Trump’s foreign policy on Africa is likely to be: ‘Where’s that?’

 Professor of Humanities and the Director of the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), University of Johannesburg

University of Johannesburg

US President elect Donald Trump greets supporters on election night in New York. Reuters/Jonathan Ernst

Africa is likely to slide down the list of foreign policy priorities of a Donald Trump administration. This is because America’s foreign policy is determined by both domestic and foreign issues.

When it comes to domestic factors Trump is not going to be open to lobbying by the African diaspora in the US which has, historically, always played an important role in pushing African policy and keeping the continent on the domestic agenda. But this constituency hasn’t helpedTrump at all in this election so there’s no need for any payback. And I think that the kind of visibility Africa had is also going to fall in social movements and society in general in the US.

Trump is also unlikely to have any tolerance for the idea that the African diaspora is part of the “sixth region” of Africa. The African Union recognises people of African decent who live outside the continent as the sixth region, in addition to southern, eastern, central, western and northern Africa.

This isn’t going to be something that is of much concern to the new president-elect.

In addition, I think that he is going to be intolerant and disinterested in issues around the domestic politics of African countries. That is unless – as he was very clear in his acceptance speech – they strongly impinge on American national interests.

For example, I don’t think he is going to be very interested in what is happening in Somalia or Ethiopia or in other parts of Africa where there may be conflict. Trump hasn’t got a great capacity for detail, so at best he will live by macro assessments.

The other break with tradition is that it’s impossible to predict who he will chose as his assistant-secretary of state for Africa. As a follower of foreign policy over the past 40 years it has been possible, in nearly all instances, to know who the new incumbent is likely to be. Examples include Chester Crocker, Hank Cohen and Susan Rice. Now with Trump, we simply have no indication.

With this in mind I think it is really important for African countries, including South Africa, to be very conscious, constructive and conspicuous in their choices of ambassador. These appointments will be crucial in opening the doors to the new Trump administration. The worst that African countries can do, however difficult it will be politically, would be to show their displeasure and hold their noses.

Security will be a major issue

Security is going to be a major issue on Trump’s foreign policy agenda. This points directly at the US African Command, which was established in 2007. Africom, as it is generally known, is one of six of the US Defence Department’s “geographic combatant commands and is responsible to the Secretary of Defence for military relations with African nations, the African Union and African regional security organisations”.

When it comes to American policy in Africa, Africom is very likely to emerge as its central piece. Given Trump’s expressed, belligerent viewson the Muslim world, Africom will be set to be the lynchpin. I think African countries should resist this because it is central to American ideology in the world and will bring African countries into conflict with China. But whether African states will in fact resist is a different issue.

In fact, I think one of the issues African leaders will have to be careful about now is how they have to manage their relationships with China and the US. The US has been a little bit lackadaisical in its approach to Africa while China has made great strides on the continent. Not all, in my view, bad. The US will in all likelihood resist the inroads China has made, an issue African leaders will have to manage with kid gloves.

Trade won’t be a given

The African Growth and Opportunity Act AGOA, which came into effect 16 years ago, is aimed at expanding US trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa. It is supposed to “stimulate economic growth, to encourage economic integration, and to facilitate sub-Saharan Africa’s integration into the global economy”.

There’s still some life left in the act. But it’s clear that Trump is protectionist. He is not going to tolerate any expansion or extension of the agreement, or any misunderstandings. This means American trade policy under Trump needs to be watched closely.

There is also likely to be a decline in aid to Africa from the US. For some African countries aid from the US is absolutely crucial. Take Malawi for example, where it is essential and necessary. As a businessman Trump will want something in return and it’s unlikely he will get his sort of returns on investment from most African countries. His possible response will be that of a reality show host – eject any errant contestants.

Another factor that will affect investment is that Trump is going to improve American infrastructure. I think he is going to borrow and he is going to use the money to rebuild the US because that is his project, to “make America great again”. He will most certainly not care if it comes at the expense of aid to or trade with a number African countries.

The next four years promise to test Africa’s place in the world. The lodestars by which we have understood politics such as rightwing, fiscal conservative, social conservative are all going to be overturned.

What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa

By Mark Anderson and Nicholas Norbrook | The Africa Report

Image result for dictator donald trump

Donald Trump has been elected the 45th president of the United States. Here’s what his presidency could mean for Africa:

Slowing economic growth

Africa’s economies are already struggling with the downturn. If Trump’s nationalist rhetoric on trade is translated into action, expect, “a global recession, with no end in sight”, according to economist Paul Krugman. The recently re-signed AGOA trade deal between Africa and the US, worth some $50bn, is under threat. More seriously, if Trump holds good to his promise to pick a trade war with China, the aggregate demand for commodities will plummet further – one of the key drivers of many African economies.

Upon news of Trump’s election, stock futures fell in Asia and Europe and the Dow Jones dropped 800 points. Financial markets see Trump as an uncertainty. He has suggested that the US should buy back some of its $20tn debt – at a discount of course.

Empowering dictators

Trump is known to be fond of the leadership styles of Saddam Hussein and Vladimir Putin. The US president-elect has already been congratulated by two members of Africa’s third term club: Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza and Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni.

Trump has publicly supported torture and called for the killing of the families of terrorists. He also supports the continuing use of the notorious Guantanamo Bay facility in Cuba. Incumbent President Barack Obama had promised to close that facility during his presidency.

Slashing development aid

The US is the world’s biggest bilateral aid donor. Last year Washington spent $31bn on overseas development assistance, with much of those funds going to Africa. In an interview with the Washington Post, Trump said his presidency will focus on internal programmes rather than overseas aid. “We have no money for education because we can’t build in our own country,” he said. “And at what point do you say hey, we have to take care of ourselves. So, you know, I know the outer world exists and I’ll be very cognizant of that but at the same time, our country is disintegrating, large sections of it, especially in the inner cities.”

Trump has, however, spoken out in support of the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which was former President George W. Bush’s main Africa-focused initiative during his presidency between 2000 and 2008.

Extremist recruitment

Trump’s calls for a temporary ban on muslim immigrants into the US was heavily criticised as xenophobic and divisive. Somali terror group Al Shabaab has cells in the US, most notably in Minnesota where there is a large Somali population. On Monday, Trump spoke out against the Somali community during a visit to Minnesota. “You’ve seen first-hand the problems caused with faulty refugee vetting, with very large numbers of Somali refugees coming into your state without your knowledge, without your support or approval,” he told a cheering crowd. “Some of them [are] joining Isis and spreading their extremist views all over our country and all over the world.” These comments are likely to make more young men feel marginalised, driving them into the arms of terror organisations.

Climate change

Trump’s victory will land as a bombshell in Marrakech, where politicians and activists are gathering to continue implementation of the landmark climate deal signed in Paris last year. But many of Trump’s supporters are climate change skeptics. For the many Africans living on coasts threatened by rising seawaters – 20 million people in Nigeria alone – this is bad news. Likewise the two in three people on the continent who rely on agriculture, and are threatened by drought and water shortages.

European repercussions

And with elections scheduled across Europe in 2017 – France, Germany, Italy – might far-right forces like the Front Nationale feel the wind at their back? Should a populist wave crash across Europe, migrants already under siege will face tougher pressures. Already in post-Brexit Britain, racists have been emboldened in their physical confrontations with migrants. Identity checks, internment camps, populist-inspired violence, closed borders: europeans may have uncomfortable flashbacks to the 1930s.

Read the original article on Theafricareport.com : What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa | International
Follow us: @theafricareport on Twitter | theafricareport on Facebook

What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa

By Mark Anderson and Nicholas Norbrook | The Africa Report

Image result for dictator donald trump

Donald Trump has been elected the 45th president of the United States. Here’s what his presidency could mean for Africa:

Slowing economic growth

Africa’s economies are already struggling with the downturn. If Trump’s nationalist rhetoric on trade is translated into action, expect, “a global recession, with no end in sight”, according to economist Paul Krugman. The recently re-signed AGOA trade deal between Africa and the US, worth some $50bn, is under threat. More seriously, if Trump holds good to his promise to pick a trade war with China, the aggregate demand for commodities will plummet further – one of the key drivers of many African economies.

Upon news of Trump’s election, stock futures fell in Asia and Europe and the Dow Jones dropped 800 points. Financial markets see Trump as an uncertainty. He has suggested that the US should buy back some of its $20tn debt – at a discount of course.

Empowering dictators

Trump is known to be fond of the leadership styles of Saddam Hussein and Vladimir Putin. The US president-elect has already been congratulated by two members of Africa’s third term club: Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza and Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni.

Trump has publicly supported torture and called for the killing of the families of terrorists. He also supports the continuing use of the notorious Guantanamo Bay facility in Cuba. Incumbent President Barack Obama had promised to close that facility during his presidency.

Slashing development aid

The US is the world’s biggest bilateral aid donor. Last year Washington spent $31bn on overseas development assistance, with much of those funds going to Africa. In an interview with the Washington Post, Trump said his presidency will focus on internal programmes rather than overseas aid. “We have no money for education because we can’t build in our own country,” he said. “And at what point do you say hey, we have to take care of ourselves. So, you know, I know the outer world exists and I’ll be very cognizant of that but at the same time, our country is disintegrating, large sections of it, especially in the inner cities.”

Trump has, however, spoken out in support of the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which was former President George W. Bush’s main Africa-focused initiative during his presidency between 2000 and 2008.

Extremist recruitment

Trump’s calls for a temporary ban on muslim immigrants into the US was heavily criticised as xenophobic and divisive. Somali terror group Al Shabaab has cells in the US, most notably in Minnesota where there is a large Somali population. On Monday, Trump spoke out against the Somali community during a visit to Minnesota. “You’ve seen first-hand the problems caused with faulty refugee vetting, with very large numbers of Somali refugees coming into your state without your knowledge, without your support or approval,” he told a cheering crowd. “Some of them [are] joining Isis and spreading their extremist views all over our country and all over the world.” These comments are likely to make more young men feel marginalised, driving them into the arms of terror organisations.

Climate change

Trump’s victory will land as a bombshell in Marrakech, where politicians and activists are gathering to continue implementation of the landmark climate deal signed in Paris last year. But many of Trump’s supporters are climate change skeptics. For the many Africans living on coasts threatened by rising seawaters – 20 million people in Nigeria alone – this is bad news. Likewise the two in three people on the continent who rely on agriculture, and are threatened by drought and water shortages.

European repercussions

And with elections scheduled across Europe in 2017 – France, Germany, Italy – might far-right forces like the Front Nationale feel the wind at their back? Should a populist wave crash across Europe, migrants already under siege will face tougher pressures. Already in post-Brexit Britain, racists have been emboldened in their physical confrontations with migrants. Identity checks, internment camps, populist-inspired violence, closed borders: europeans may have uncomfortable flashbacks to the 1930s.

Read the original article on Theafricareport.com : What Donald Trump’s presidency means for Africa | International
Follow us: @theafricareport on Twitter | theafricareport on Facebook

ብሎክቼይን አዲሱ ኢንተርኔት

By Geleta Gammo

 

ብሎክቼይን ማለት በመሰረቱ ያልተማከለ የመረጃ መዝገብ ነው። በዚህ የመረጃ መዝገብ ላይ የሚመዘገቡ ነገሮች ሁሉ
1፣ ያልተማከለ ነው። ማለት፣ አንድ መረጃ በብሎክቼይን ላይ ሲመዘገብ የመረጃው ቅጂ ከብሎክቼይኑ ጋር በተያያዙ በሚሊዮኖች በሚቆጠሩ ኮምፑተሮች ሁሉ ላይ ይቀመጣል። ይህ ማለት መረጃው ሊጠፋ አይችልም።

ምሳሌ1፣ በስሜ የተመዘገበ የቤት ካርታ ቢኖረኝና ይህንን ብሎክቼይን ላይ ባስመዘግብ ያ የኔን ስም የያዘ ካርታ ተባዝቶ በመላው ዓለም ባሉ ኮምፑተሮች ይቀመጣል። የኔ ኮሙፑተር ቢሰረቅ ካርታው በኔ ስም እስካለ ድረስ ምንም ለውጥ አያመጣም።

ምሳሌ 2፣ አንድ ሰው የህክምና ታሪክ መዝገብ አለው ብንል ይህ መዝገብ በብሎክቼይን ላይ ከተቀመጠ ሁሌም አዲስ ነገር ሲመጣ እየተጨመረበት ይኖራል። ወደ አዲስ ዶክቶር ጋ ሰውዬው ሲሄድ የመዝገብ ቁጥሩን ቁልፍ ለዶክቶሩ ሲሰጠው የታማሚውን የጤና ታሪክ ዶክቶሩ አይቶ የበለጠ ይረዳል።

ምሳሌ3፣ አንድ ሰው ማንነቱን ለማሳወቅ ራሱን ሊያሳውቁ ከሚችሉት ነገሮች ጋር አንድ ጊዜ ራሱን ብሎክቼይን ላይ መመዝገብ ብቻ ነው። ለምሳሌ ፎቶውን የጣት አሻራውን ቢያስቀምጥና ከዚህ መታወቂያው ጋር የቤት ካርታውን ወይም የህክምና መዝገቡን የባምክ ቁጥሩን ቢያያይዝ፣ ሌላ መታወቂያ አያስፈልገውም። የትም ዓለም ቢሄድ ፓስፖርት አያስፈገውም። ማንነቱን ከብሎክ ቼይን ላይ ማሳየት ይችላል። ማሳየት ለሚፈልገው ብቻ ያሳያል።

2፣ መረጃው ተመስርጠው (encrypted) ሆነው ይመዘገባሉ። ይህ ማለት ቁልፉን ከያዘው በስተቀር ማንም ሊያየው አይችለም። ቁልፎቹ ሁለት ናቸው። አንደኛው የባሌበቱ ቁልፍ ሲሆን ሌላው ሌላ ሰው እንዲያይ የሚሰጥ ቁልፍ ነው። ይህ ለሌላ የሚሰጠው በተቀባዩ መታወቂያ ቁልፍ ስለሚመዘገብ የተሰጠው ሰውየ ብቻ ነው ሊያይ የሚችለው። ለሌላ አሳልፎ መስጠት አይችልም። ያንን እንዲያደርግ ፈቃድ ካልተሰጠው በስተቀር። ባለቤቱ በፈለገው ጊዜ ያንን ለሰው የተሰጠ ቁልፍ መሰረዝ ይችላል።

ምስሌ 1፣ የተገለጸው የቤት ካርታ ሙሉ በሙሉ ለሁሉም እንዲታይ፣ የተወሰነው መረጃ ብቻ እንዲታይ፣ ለተወሰነ ሰው ብቻ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ለምሳሌ የባለቤቱ ስም እንዳይታይና የመሬቱ ስፋት ብቻ ለህዝብ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ፍርድ ቤት ሲቀርብ ዳኛውና ፖሊስ ብቻ ስሙ ምን እንደሚል ማሳየት ይቻላል።

ምሳሌ3፣ የህክምና መረጃው ለዶር ብቻ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ዶሩ ህክምናውን ሲጨርስ ለሱ የተዘጋጀው ቁልፍ ከተሰረዘ ዶሩ ተመልሶ መግባት አይችለም።
ነገር ግን ስም ሳይታይ የበሽታው ዓይነት፣ የተወሰደው መድሃኒት፣ ለመዳን የወሰደበት ጊዜ የመሳሰሉት ለሁሉም ዶክቶሮች ወይም ተመራማሪዎች ስም ሳይኖር እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ያ ማለት ተመራማሪዎች ስንተ በዚህ በሽታ ታማሚ እንዳለና የትኛው መድሃኒት እንደሚሰራ ማወቅ ይችላሉ። ይህ ለምርምር በጣም ጠቃሚ ነው። እስከ ዛሬ ያሉ የህክምና ምርምሮችን አስቸጋሪ የሚያደርገው እንዲህ ዓይነት መረጃ አለመገኘት ነው።

ምሳሌ3፣ የጣት አሻራውን ከብሎክ ቼይን ጋር በማመሳከር ማንነቱንና ከየት እንደመጣ እንዲታወቅ አድርጎ ማስመዝገብ ይችላል። ሌላውን መረጃ ተጨማሪ ቁልፍ አድርጎበት። ያ ማለት ሰውዬው የትም አገር ሄዶ ራሱን ቢስት ቢያንስ ማን እንደሆነ ከየት እንደመጣ ወዲያው ይታወቃል። የአደጋ ጊዜ ተጠሪ ቢያስቀምጥና ሁለት ሶስት እንዲህ ዓይነት ሰዎችን አብረው ከፈረሙ ሌላው መረጃው ሁሉ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይችላል።
ቢሞት አምስት የሚያምናቸው ሰዎች ከፈረሙበት በሱ ስም የተመዘገቡ ንብረቶች ለማዛወር እንዲቻል ማድረግ ይቻላል፡
የመክፈቻ ቁልፉ ቢጠፋበት ማንነቱን የሚገልጹ ቀድሞ የመረጣቸው አምስት ሰዎች እንዲፈርሙ ባምድረግ ማንነቱን ማሳወቅ ይችላል። ያ ማለት ማንም ሌላውን አስመስኦ ምንም ማድረግ አይችልም። (identity theft) አይኖርም።

3፣ በዚህ የመረጃ መዝገብ ላይ የተመዘገበ ነገር መሰረዝ ወይም መቀየር አይቻልም። መረጃው ብሎክቼይን የተባለበትም ምክንያት ለዚህ ነው። መረጃው በጥቅል ጥቅል ተደርጎ ርስበርሱ በተመዘገበበት ጊዜ ቅደም ተከተል ይቀመጣል። ይህ ቅደም ተከተል አይዛነፍም። የመጀመሪያውና የሚቀጥለው መረጃ በጊዜ ማኅተም (time stamp) የተቆራኙ በመሆናቸው በመሃከላቸው አዲስ ነገር ማስገባት አይቻልም።

ምሳሌ1፣ የቤት ካርታው አንዴ ከተመዘገበ ባለቤቱ እስካልፈረመ ድረስ ለዘላለም እዛው ይኖራል። ነገርግን ቤቱ ቢሸጥ ካርታው መዝገቡ ላይ ካርታው ወደየት እንደሄደ ተመዝግቦ ወደ አዲሱ ባለቤት መዝገብ ይገባል። አዲሱ ባለቤት መዝገብ ላይም ካርታው ከየት፣ መቼ እንደመጣ ይመዘገባል። ይህ የተመዘገበው ነገርም ለዘላለም አይጠፋም።

ምሳሌ2፣ ይህንኑ ካርታ ሌላ ዋጋ ያለው ነገር ነው ብንል፣ ለምሳሌ መኪና፣ አልማዝ፣ ወርቅ፣ ብር ነው ብንል ፣ መኪናውም ሆነ አልማዙ፣ ወርቁም ሆነ ብሩ ከየት ተነስቶ ወዴት እንደሄደና ለምን እንደሄደ (በሽያጭ ይሁን በስጦታ) ተመዝግቦ ለዘላለም ይቀመጣል። ማንም ሰው ሊሰርዘው ሊደልዘው አይችልም። አንድ ሰው ራሱ ኮምፑተር ላይ ያለውን ብሎክቼይን ውስጥ ያለውን መረጃ ወደ ኋላ ሄዶ ቢቀይር ምንም ጥቅም የለውም። ምክንያቱም የተቀየረበትን ጊዜ ሌሎች ኮፑተሮች ከራስቸው መረጃ ጋር ስለሚያመሳክሩ አይቀበሉትም።

ይህ ማለት ሙስናና ስርቆት በፍጹም የማይቻል ይሆናል ማለት ነው።

4፣ ብሎክቸይን ሶስተኛ ምስክር አይፈልግ።
አሁ ባለበት ሁኔታ ማንኛውምንም ንብረት ለማስተላለፍ ወይ የውልና መረጃ መሄድ ወይም ምስክሮችን ማቆም ያስፈልጋል። ወይ ፍርድ ቤት መሄድ ያስፈጋል። ይህ ደግሞ ጊዜና ገንዘብ ይፈጃል።

ምሳሌ፣ ቤቴን ወይም መኪናዬን መሸጥ ብፈልግ፣ ሶስተኛ ምስክር ወይም መገናኛ መሄድ አያስፈልገኝም። ሰውዬውንም ማግኘት አያስፈልገኝም። ገዢና ሻጭ ከተስማሙ የብሎክቼይን ውል ይፈራረማሉ። ይህ ውል በብሎክ ቼይን ብልጥ ውል (smart contract) በመባል ይታወቃል።
በመሰረቱ ይህ ውል የኮምፑተር ፕሮግራም ነው። ማንኛውም የኮምፑተር ፕሮግራም በመሰረቱ ትዕዛዝ ነው። ሁሉም ፕሮግራሞች ይህ ሲደረግ ይህንን አድርግ የሚል ትዕዛዞች ናቸው።

ይህ ወደ ውል ሲቀየር ከገዢ አካውንት አንድ መቶ ሺህ ብር ወደ ሻጭ አካውንት ሲገባ የካርታውን ወይም የመኪናውን ስም ወደ ገዢ አዙር ተብሎ የሚጻፍ ውል ነው። በሶስት ቀን ውስጥ ገንዘቡ ካልገባ ውሉ ይሰረዝ የሚልም ሊጨመርበት ይችላል። መያዣ አንድ ሺህ ብር ሲገባ ውሉ የሶስት ቀን ገደቡን እንዲያከብር፣ መያዣ ካልገባ ለ 1 ሰዓት ብቻ እንዲጠብቅም ማዘዝ ይቻላል። የተለያየ ዓይነት ትዕዛዝ መስጠት ይቻላል።

ይህንን ውል ሁለቱም በብሎክቼይን ላይ የግል ቁልፋቸውን በማሳየት ይፈርማሉ። ይህ ውል ከተፈረመ በኋላ በሁለቱም ስምምነት ካልሆነ የትኛውም ወገን በራሱ ሊቀይረው አይችልም። መሰረዝም ማስተካክለም አይቻልም። በዚህ ውል መሰረትም፣ ቤቱም ሆነ መኪናው በውሉ ጊዜ ለሌላ ሰው እንዳይተላለፉ መቆለፍም ይቻላል።
ገዢው የተዋዋሉትን ገንዘብ መጠን በሻጩ አካውንት ሲያስገባ ወዲያውኑ የቤቱ ካርታም ሆነ የመኪና ሊብሬው ወደ ገዢው ይተላለፋል።

ለምሳሌ የመኪናው ቁልፍ ወይም የቤቱ ቤት ቁልፍ በእጅ አሻራ የሚከፈት ቢሆን መኪናው ከዛ በኋላ በቀድሞው ባለቤቱ አሻራ አይከፈትም ማለት ነው። መኪናው አልነሳም ሊልም ይችላል።
ዛሬ ስልኮች ሳይቀሩ በአሻራ መክፈትና መዝጋት በሚቻልበት ጊዜ ይህንን ማድረግ በጣም ቀላል ነው።

5፣ ብሎክቼይንን በመጠቀም የምርጫ ድምጽ መስጠት ይቻላል። በብሎክ ቼይን የተደረገ ምርጫን መስረቅ አይቻልም። ይህ ማለት ዲሞክራሲ….

6፣ የብሎክ ቼይንን ጥቅም ላይ የሚያውል ድርጅት መዝገቡ ሊሰረቅበት አይችልም፣ ጉልበተኛ ሊዘጋው አይችልም፣ ሌቦች፣ ሙሰኞች ሊበሉት አይችሉም…

ዘላለማዊ ይሆናል ማለት ነው።

ብሎክቼይን አዲሱ ኢንተርኔት

By Geleta Gammo

 

ብሎክቼይን ማለት በመሰረቱ ያልተማከለ የመረጃ መዝገብ ነው። በዚህ የመረጃ መዝገብ ላይ የሚመዘገቡ ነገሮች ሁሉ
1፣ ያልተማከለ ነው። ማለት፣ አንድ መረጃ በብሎክቼይን ላይ ሲመዘገብ የመረጃው ቅጂ ከብሎክቼይኑ ጋር በተያያዙ በሚሊዮኖች በሚቆጠሩ ኮምፑተሮች ሁሉ ላይ ይቀመጣል። ይህ ማለት መረጃው ሊጠፋ አይችልም።

ምሳሌ1፣ በስሜ የተመዘገበ የቤት ካርታ ቢኖረኝና ይህንን ብሎክቼይን ላይ ባስመዘግብ ያ የኔን ስም የያዘ ካርታ ተባዝቶ በመላው ዓለም ባሉ ኮምፑተሮች ይቀመጣል። የኔ ኮሙፑተር ቢሰረቅ ካርታው በኔ ስም እስካለ ድረስ ምንም ለውጥ አያመጣም።

ምሳሌ 2፣ አንድ ሰው የህክምና ታሪክ መዝገብ አለው ብንል ይህ መዝገብ በብሎክቼይን ላይ ከተቀመጠ ሁሌም አዲስ ነገር ሲመጣ እየተጨመረበት ይኖራል። ወደ አዲስ ዶክቶር ጋ ሰውዬው ሲሄድ የመዝገብ ቁጥሩን ቁልፍ ለዶክቶሩ ሲሰጠው የታማሚውን የጤና ታሪክ ዶክቶሩ አይቶ የበለጠ ይረዳል።

ምሳሌ3፣ አንድ ሰው ማንነቱን ለማሳወቅ ራሱን ሊያሳውቁ ከሚችሉት ነገሮች ጋር አንድ ጊዜ ራሱን ብሎክቼይን ላይ መመዝገብ ብቻ ነው። ለምሳሌ ፎቶውን የጣት አሻራውን ቢያስቀምጥና ከዚህ መታወቂያው ጋር የቤት ካርታውን ወይም የህክምና መዝገቡን የባምክ ቁጥሩን ቢያያይዝ፣ ሌላ መታወቂያ አያስፈልገውም። የትም ዓለም ቢሄድ ፓስፖርት አያስፈገውም። ማንነቱን ከብሎክ ቼይን ላይ ማሳየት ይችላል። ማሳየት ለሚፈልገው ብቻ ያሳያል።

2፣ መረጃው ተመስርጠው (encrypted) ሆነው ይመዘገባሉ። ይህ ማለት ቁልፉን ከያዘው በስተቀር ማንም ሊያየው አይችለም። ቁልፎቹ ሁለት ናቸው። አንደኛው የባሌበቱ ቁልፍ ሲሆን ሌላው ሌላ ሰው እንዲያይ የሚሰጥ ቁልፍ ነው። ይህ ለሌላ የሚሰጠው በተቀባዩ መታወቂያ ቁልፍ ስለሚመዘገብ የተሰጠው ሰውየ ብቻ ነው ሊያይ የሚችለው። ለሌላ አሳልፎ መስጠት አይችልም። ያንን እንዲያደርግ ፈቃድ ካልተሰጠው በስተቀር። ባለቤቱ በፈለገው ጊዜ ያንን ለሰው የተሰጠ ቁልፍ መሰረዝ ይችላል።

ምስሌ 1፣ የተገለጸው የቤት ካርታ ሙሉ በሙሉ ለሁሉም እንዲታይ፣ የተወሰነው መረጃ ብቻ እንዲታይ፣ ለተወሰነ ሰው ብቻ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ለምሳሌ የባለቤቱ ስም እንዳይታይና የመሬቱ ስፋት ብቻ ለህዝብ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ፍርድ ቤት ሲቀርብ ዳኛውና ፖሊስ ብቻ ስሙ ምን እንደሚል ማሳየት ይቻላል።

ምሳሌ3፣ የህክምና መረጃው ለዶር ብቻ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ዶሩ ህክምናውን ሲጨርስ ለሱ የተዘጋጀው ቁልፍ ከተሰረዘ ዶሩ ተመልሶ መግባት አይችለም።
ነገር ግን ስም ሳይታይ የበሽታው ዓይነት፣ የተወሰደው መድሃኒት፣ ለመዳን የወሰደበት ጊዜ የመሳሰሉት ለሁሉም ዶክቶሮች ወይም ተመራማሪዎች ስም ሳይኖር እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይቻላል። ያ ማለት ተመራማሪዎች ስንተ በዚህ በሽታ ታማሚ እንዳለና የትኛው መድሃኒት እንደሚሰራ ማወቅ ይችላሉ። ይህ ለምርምር በጣም ጠቃሚ ነው። እስከ ዛሬ ያሉ የህክምና ምርምሮችን አስቸጋሪ የሚያደርገው እንዲህ ዓይነት መረጃ አለመገኘት ነው።

ምሳሌ3፣ የጣት አሻራውን ከብሎክ ቼይን ጋር በማመሳከር ማንነቱንና ከየት እንደመጣ እንዲታወቅ አድርጎ ማስመዝገብ ይችላል። ሌላውን መረጃ ተጨማሪ ቁልፍ አድርጎበት። ያ ማለት ሰውዬው የትም አገር ሄዶ ራሱን ቢስት ቢያንስ ማን እንደሆነ ከየት እንደመጣ ወዲያው ይታወቃል። የአደጋ ጊዜ ተጠሪ ቢያስቀምጥና ሁለት ሶስት እንዲህ ዓይነት ሰዎችን አብረው ከፈረሙ ሌላው መረጃው ሁሉ እንዲታይ ማድረግ ይችላል።
ቢሞት አምስት የሚያምናቸው ሰዎች ከፈረሙበት በሱ ስም የተመዘገቡ ንብረቶች ለማዛወር እንዲቻል ማድረግ ይቻላል፡
የመክፈቻ ቁልፉ ቢጠፋበት ማንነቱን የሚገልጹ ቀድሞ የመረጣቸው አምስት ሰዎች እንዲፈርሙ ባምድረግ ማንነቱን ማሳወቅ ይችላል። ያ ማለት ማንም ሌላውን አስመስኦ ምንም ማድረግ አይችልም። (identity theft) አይኖርም።

3፣ በዚህ የመረጃ መዝገብ ላይ የተመዘገበ ነገር መሰረዝ ወይም መቀየር አይቻልም። መረጃው ብሎክቼይን የተባለበትም ምክንያት ለዚህ ነው። መረጃው በጥቅል ጥቅል ተደርጎ ርስበርሱ በተመዘገበበት ጊዜ ቅደም ተከተል ይቀመጣል። ይህ ቅደም ተከተል አይዛነፍም። የመጀመሪያውና የሚቀጥለው መረጃ በጊዜ ማኅተም (time stamp) የተቆራኙ በመሆናቸው በመሃከላቸው አዲስ ነገር ማስገባት አይቻልም።

ምሳሌ1፣ የቤት ካርታው አንዴ ከተመዘገበ ባለቤቱ እስካልፈረመ ድረስ ለዘላለም እዛው ይኖራል። ነገርግን ቤቱ ቢሸጥ ካርታው መዝገቡ ላይ ካርታው ወደየት እንደሄደ ተመዝግቦ ወደ አዲሱ ባለቤት መዝገብ ይገባል። አዲሱ ባለቤት መዝገብ ላይም ካርታው ከየት፣ መቼ እንደመጣ ይመዘገባል። ይህ የተመዘገበው ነገርም ለዘላለም አይጠፋም።

ምሳሌ2፣ ይህንኑ ካርታ ሌላ ዋጋ ያለው ነገር ነው ብንል፣ ለምሳሌ መኪና፣ አልማዝ፣ ወርቅ፣ ብር ነው ብንል ፣ መኪናውም ሆነ አልማዙ፣ ወርቁም ሆነ ብሩ ከየት ተነስቶ ወዴት እንደሄደና ለምን እንደሄደ (በሽያጭ ይሁን በስጦታ) ተመዝግቦ ለዘላለም ይቀመጣል። ማንም ሰው ሊሰርዘው ሊደልዘው አይችልም። አንድ ሰው ራሱ ኮምፑተር ላይ ያለውን ብሎክቼይን ውስጥ ያለውን መረጃ ወደ ኋላ ሄዶ ቢቀይር ምንም ጥቅም የለውም። ምክንያቱም የተቀየረበትን ጊዜ ሌሎች ኮፑተሮች ከራስቸው መረጃ ጋር ስለሚያመሳክሩ አይቀበሉትም።

ይህ ማለት ሙስናና ስርቆት በፍጹም የማይቻል ይሆናል ማለት ነው።

4፣ ብሎክቸይን ሶስተኛ ምስክር አይፈልግ።
አሁ ባለበት ሁኔታ ማንኛውምንም ንብረት ለማስተላለፍ ወይ የውልና መረጃ መሄድ ወይም ምስክሮችን ማቆም ያስፈልጋል። ወይ ፍርድ ቤት መሄድ ያስፈጋል። ይህ ደግሞ ጊዜና ገንዘብ ይፈጃል።

ምሳሌ፣ ቤቴን ወይም መኪናዬን መሸጥ ብፈልግ፣ ሶስተኛ ምስክር ወይም መገናኛ መሄድ አያስፈልገኝም። ሰውዬውንም ማግኘት አያስፈልገኝም። ገዢና ሻጭ ከተስማሙ የብሎክቼይን ውል ይፈራረማሉ። ይህ ውል በብሎክ ቼይን ብልጥ ውል (smart contract) በመባል ይታወቃል።
በመሰረቱ ይህ ውል የኮምፑተር ፕሮግራም ነው። ማንኛውም የኮምፑተር ፕሮግራም በመሰረቱ ትዕዛዝ ነው። ሁሉም ፕሮግራሞች ይህ ሲደረግ ይህንን አድርግ የሚል ትዕዛዞች ናቸው።

ይህ ወደ ውል ሲቀየር ከገዢ አካውንት አንድ መቶ ሺህ ብር ወደ ሻጭ አካውንት ሲገባ የካርታውን ወይም የመኪናውን ስም ወደ ገዢ አዙር ተብሎ የሚጻፍ ውል ነው። በሶስት ቀን ውስጥ ገንዘቡ ካልገባ ውሉ ይሰረዝ የሚልም ሊጨመርበት ይችላል። መያዣ አንድ ሺህ ብር ሲገባ ውሉ የሶስት ቀን ገደቡን እንዲያከብር፣ መያዣ ካልገባ ለ 1 ሰዓት ብቻ እንዲጠብቅም ማዘዝ ይቻላል። የተለያየ ዓይነት ትዕዛዝ መስጠት ይቻላል።

ይህንን ውል ሁለቱም በብሎክቼይን ላይ የግል ቁልፋቸውን በማሳየት ይፈርማሉ። ይህ ውል ከተፈረመ በኋላ በሁለቱም ስምምነት ካልሆነ የትኛውም ወገን በራሱ ሊቀይረው አይችልም። መሰረዝም ማስተካክለም አይቻልም። በዚህ ውል መሰረትም፣ ቤቱም ሆነ መኪናው በውሉ ጊዜ ለሌላ ሰው እንዳይተላለፉ መቆለፍም ይቻላል።
ገዢው የተዋዋሉትን ገንዘብ መጠን በሻጩ አካውንት ሲያስገባ ወዲያውኑ የቤቱ ካርታም ሆነ የመኪና ሊብሬው ወደ ገዢው ይተላለፋል።

ለምሳሌ የመኪናው ቁልፍ ወይም የቤቱ ቤት ቁልፍ በእጅ አሻራ የሚከፈት ቢሆን መኪናው ከዛ በኋላ በቀድሞው ባለቤቱ አሻራ አይከፈትም ማለት ነው። መኪናው አልነሳም ሊልም ይችላል።
ዛሬ ስልኮች ሳይቀሩ በአሻራ መክፈትና መዝጋት በሚቻልበት ጊዜ ይህንን ማድረግ በጣም ቀላል ነው።

5፣ ብሎክቼይንን በመጠቀም የምርጫ ድምጽ መስጠት ይቻላል። በብሎክ ቼይን የተደረገ ምርጫን መስረቅ አይቻልም። ይህ ማለት ዲሞክራሲ….

6፣ የብሎክ ቼይንን ጥቅም ላይ የሚያውል ድርጅት መዝገቡ ሊሰረቅበት አይችልም፣ ጉልበተኛ ሊዘጋው አይችልም፣ ሌቦች፣ ሙሰኞች ሊበሉት አይችሉም…

ዘላለማዊ ይሆናል ማለት ነው።

What is The political fate of the people of mixed ethnic heritage in Ethiopia

By Solomon Regassa

Views may differ about the nature and magnitude of the problems we are facing, but everybody agrees that this is no ordinary time in Ethiopia. Changes of varying depth and width are being proposed and promised by different actors. Some of the propositions stand on opposite ends of the spectrum. The Government has promised to introduce electoral and administrative reforms and to answer the demands of the youth through job creation. Much of the opposition at home demands more progressive reforms such as re-instituting the Electoral Board, releasing political prisoners, and reforming civil society, media and security laws that are used to constrict the political space. The opposition and activists based abroad would like to see more radical changes that include the resignation of the government and even the dismemberment of the country.

Despite their opposing views, most of the above political actors have one thing in common, i.e., ethnic nationalism is their main organizing factor. The ruling party has been promoting what it calls “democratic ethnic nationalism” for a long time now. With its democratic credentials highly questioned, it has had relative success in the promotion of ethnic nationalism. The groups that are alleged or have claimed to be organizing the on-going protests, especially in Oromia, are pronounced ethnic nationalists. Most of the opposition parties at home are organized along ethnic lines. National or multi-ethnic political agenda has been under attack and some earlier promoters of such agenda are re-aligning themselves with ethnic-based organizations. In this context, it becomes important to ponder over the political fate of Ethiopians of mixed ethnic heritage – a large group of people who are not duly recognized by the Constitution of Ethiopia and fully accommodated by the various political movements in and outside the country.

The Constitution

The Constitution of Ethiopia is an expression of the interests and resolve of the “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” of the country, which represent groups of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory (preamble, and article 39). All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples and they have the right to use and promote their language and culture, the right to full measure of self-government and an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession (articles 8 and 39). The Constitution does not define what constitutes “nations”, “nationalities” and “peoples” separately, but their combination is depicted as a solid entity with rights and obligations. Looking at the provisions of article 39 and the constituent elements of the Federal State under article 46 of the Constitution, it is observable that Nations, Nationalities and People are ethnic entities.

Despite some questions as to the fulfilment of the cumulative (cultural, linguistic, identity, psychological and territorial) criteria laid out under articles 39 and 46, the Afar, the Amhara, the Gambela, the Benshangul/Gumuz, the Harari, the Oromo, the Somali, and the Tigre people emerged as the people or ethnic entities that formed the States of the Federation. States such as Gambela and Benishangul/Gumuz combine more than one ethnic group, whereas there are differences of culture and custom within the people constituting other regional states (e.g., between the Oromos of Wellega and Hararge). There are also a large number of people living outside the areas where their ethnic group constitutes a state. It is the challenge of giving ethnic identity to the populations of the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa that resulted in their special/federal status. The same difficulty led to the unfitting nomenclature of a conglomeration of a number of ethnic groups by their geographical location, i.e., the State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples.

The designation of ethnic groups as the owners and pillars of the Constitution is a direct result of the way the political forces that overthrew the preceding regime were organized. Those who were invited to the transitional period charter were also organized along ethnic lines. The ethnic question was mooted decades earlier (cf. Walleligne Mekonnen’s 1969 piece), and many agree that there were group cultural and political questions that needed to be addressed. Although there were also religion-based claims of political marginalization, the powers that be steered clear from the difficulty that it could have caused and shaped the transition in their own image (the resulting Constitution made a single fleeting reference to “religious communities” by the side of ethnic constituencies, under article 3). Since the entry into force of the Constitution with its guarantees of the befitting rights to full cultural expressions and self-government, ethnicity has increasingly gone farther to occupy a central place in the political, social and even economic spheres of life in the country. Political parties are organized along ethnic lines, ethnicity appears on identity cards (ID) and businesses and academic institutions assumed ethnic bases or names. While the ethnic foundation of the state and its politics has been challenged by those who pointed to the dangers of division and proposed inclusive national political agenda instead, the very determination of how the members of ethnic groups are to be identified attracted comparatively less attention.

Determination of ethnicity

While it became a must to have one’s ethnicity written on our ID, the determination of which ethnic group one belongs to primarily followed the criteria of self-identification or assumption based on patriarchal lineage. One would either claim or be considered to be belonging to an ethnic group (we often hear of contested claims of ethnicity especially of politicians). In any case, the lineage basis of identity in practice overrides the cultural, linguistic, psychological and territorial criteria. A person who descended from parents or grandparents, for that matter paternal predecessors, that claim to have Amhara heritage would be considered as an Amhara even if s/he or his/her parents were born and live in a village town in Oromia and hence do not fulfil any of the other criteria. Some people that lived on the borders between regions predominated by two different groups, e.g. between the now Tigray and Amhara, were ‘assigned’ ethnicity without a chance to determine it by themselves (the current dispute about Wolkayit relates to this). The issue of determination of ethnicity becomes more complicated where a person has mixed ethnic heritage.

If I take myself as an example, I was born in a small village in the Oromia region and grew up speaking Oromifa. My paternal grandfather reportedly came from the now Amhara region and my grandmother was an Oromo from Showa. My mother lost her parents when she was a kid and I lost her when ethnicity was not an issue worth investigating. I had a five-year battle with the Kebelle authorities of Addis Ababa who insisted that I must choose one ethnicity or that they would ‘assume’ one based on my paternal lineage. I argued that they should either leave the ethnicity section blank because I do not know my full ethnic heritage or that they should recognize that I am ‘a mix’. In the first Kebelle where I lived, I was told that the computerized ID system does not allow printing the document unless they write one ethnicity, whereas in the one I moved to later, I was informed that they can only hand-write one ethnic identity on the ID. Despite my best efforts, my argument was seen as a rejection of the contemporary politics and the related policy of the government.

Despite the raging disagreement about how old Ethiopia is, nobody disputes the fact that its people have lived together or closely interacted for centuries. During this period, there have been migrations and intermarriages, especially among people with mixed and adjacent settlement patters. The reasons for this state of affairs include population growth, expansionist aspirations, military expeditions, the creation of political alliances and the movement of people from one area to another simply in search of better livelihood opportunities. The latter is true especially in the last century. One result and testament of this history is the existence of people of mixed ethnic heritage. Mainly because of the attachment of minor importance to the ethnic question under previous regimes and the assumption that everybody has one (mostly paternal) ethnicity under the current one, official statistics do not capture the number of people of mixed ethnic origin. However, the historically progressive level of movement and interaction of the people and the absence of strict cultural norms against inter-marriages in most ethnic groups of the country point to the existence of persons of mixed ethnic heritage that may count in millions. The number would definitely increase as the aggregate population increases and as we go up the ladder of generations or ancestors to determine our ethnicity.

Incidentally, it is intriguing that some of the familiar faces of the diaspora Oromo ethnic nationalist movement, whom we hear denouncing the Ethiopian national identity and political agenda, have some form of mixed heritage. A self-styled ‘leader’ of the movement once chose to just mention the Christianity of his mother and whether she is an Amhara often attracts raging social media debate despite the fact that he takes Oromo nationalism to a new level. Considering the area he comes from, the chances of an orthodox Christian woman to be a non-Oromo is 99.99 per cent. Another leading voice who comes across as a Doctor although he is still a doctoral student was married to a Gondere Amhara, who abandoned him with his kid of obviously mixed heritage. These acolytes of ethno-nationalism may have settled for the self-identification doctrine, but following the lineage formula that is more in use indicates the extent to which even the unlikeliest of people could have mixed ethnic heritage.

Ethnic political positioning

The question of whether the existing constitutional architecture accommodates the identity of people of mixed ethnicity has been raised in some political discussions, especially in recent years. However, it has never received the response it deserves, particularly from the political forces that designed the Constitution as well as those with mandate to interpret it. In fact, the legitimacy of the views of these entities on the issue would be questionable because of their foundation in the assumption of clear ethnic divides (or one ethnicity per person). The question of mixed ethnicity may not have also been a really big issue so far, either because the practice of self–identification took care of it or the people concerned did not care to be recognized as such. Even if they wanted to be recognized as people of mixed ethnic heritage for any practical reason, there has been no appropriate forum for the articulation and entertainment of such a question.

In the last 25 years, ethnicity has become the most favoured feature of political organization in Ethiopia – to the extent that a multi-ethnic or national political model has been considered a facade to a political agenda that does not recognize ethnic diversity. As indicated earlier, the promotion of ethnic nationalism has been the linchpin of political mobilization on both sides of the aisle. By all reasonable standards, we have reached a stage in our nation’s history where the ethnic form of political organization seems to be a norm we will have to live with for the foreseeable future. When one juxtaposes the heightened ethno-nationalist discourse with the culture of polarized political debates or positions in our country, it becomes hard to imagine what comes out of the current political impasse in which the country is caught up. At least for now, the ball appears to be in the Government’s court. However, despite its apparent reckoning with the magnitude of the problems, it does not seem to be on course to taking the level of reforms that would at least placate the opposition and protestors in the home front and put the country on a path to democratic development. The measures under the State of Emergency may calm the situation down and buy the Government more time, but they do not settle the underlying political demands.

On the other hand, despite the acrimony emerging among the various groups, the opposition based abroad seems to have gained steam. Many have indicated that they will battle it to the fall of the incumbent regime. The talk of ethnic-based freedom charter (despite its unbecoming association with the anti-apartheid movement’s Freedom Charter in South Africa) and ethnic army makes the situation even more complicated. In the unfortunate eventuality of power vacuum at the centre, the proposed scenario of ethno-nationalist groups with their respective armies reaching an agreed political architecture that represents the whole population and moves the country forward becomes difficult to fathom. This is more so when one considers the failure of the proponents of such an agenda to consider the incumbent regime with its military and possible supporting ethnic constituency as a force to reckon with at any time in the future. Political negotiations and settlements among forces with their respective agenda have often been more a result of leverage and trade-offs rather than a meeting of minds on democratic ideals that equally benefit all people. The latter possibility cannot be counted out, but it would be very difficult to achieve at a stroke of pen among elites leading various ethnic and national political groupings with their respective demands, armies and ambitions. In fact, if there is anything that we can learn from the experience of countries such as Libya, the “charter and army per ethnic group” proposal, if it succeeds, my just turn out to be a perfect recipe for disaster.

What are the options?

By all standards, Ethiopia is at a crossroads and one can see dark clouds on the horizon. All people of the country need to be represented in the reform processes the Government may implement or in the transition that may follow its downfall. The prevailing mode of representation is ethnic and most of the existing national political groups both at home and abroad are associated with certain ethnic groups. In this context, articulating the political fate and potential role of the millions of Ethiopians with mixed ethnic heritage becomes a quintessential issue. In terms of political organization, there are basically three options for this group of people:

1. Aligning with the favoured mode of ethnic-based political organization based on patriarchal lineage or self-identification: There could be many citizens of mixed heritage who would go for this option based on their cultural association to one of their ethnic groups particularly by virtue of the place where they were born and/or live. There could also be many who either do not buy the determination of ethnicity based on patriarchal values or have difficulty getting at one ethnic choice even following that bloodline. Many may also identify more or live with one group, but find it difficult to ‘abandon’ the other heritage by aligning themselves to the first. Especially, where the polarization of the political views features actual or assumed tension or animosity between two groups to which a person of mixed ethnicity is related, the choice becomes more complicated. Even if one chooses one lineage over the other either comfortably or for lack of options, there are relatively high chances of his/her voice being overshadowed by other members of the ethno-nationalist groups. Such chances become even higher when one considers the existence of competitions among sub-groups within one ethnic group that are classified along clan, religious and other lines. When the ethnic question took a front seat in the socio-political discourse in the 1990s, there were distinctions such as ‘pure’ and ‘tainted’ Oromo (callaa and girddii) depending on whether one is a Muslim or a Christian, respectively, in the Hararge region of Oromia.

2. Opting a national (multi-ethnic) political agenda: This appears to be a viable option in the light of the challenges and risks of joining a single ethnic grouping. Urban-based people of mixed heritage have largely demonstrated a tendency to go for this choice. However, the option may pose danger in terms of the genuine accommodation of ethnic diversity within national political groups. It is the actual and supposed failure of such political organizations to acknowledge group-specific historical injustices, cultural expressions and self-government that increasingly made them less favoured models. The huge gains of the national and multi-ethnic political coalitions in the 2005 elections, which probably received the support of most people of mixed ethnic heritage, have been countered over the last decade by the ruling party’s propaganda that it would have rolled back the gains of federalism. This was exacerbated by the general clamp down on civil and political society in the last decade, which effectively decimated such political parties. The national political groupings have since been associated with certain ethnic groups or political agenda that could make them a relatively less preferred choice for people of mixed ethnicity.

3. Establishing a political organization representing citizens of mixed ethnic heritage: this is another viable option that has not been seriously pursued so far. Such a political organization would represent the interests of and/or invite the membership mainly of Ethiopians who identify themselves as having two or more ethnic heritages that they may determine based on either or both of the patriarchal and matriarchal lineage. Such a political organization is both ethnic and national. It is ethnic because it represents the interests of people of mixed ethnic heritage and it is national because it is multi-ethnic.

One cannot be certain about the extent to which the possibly millions of people of mixed ethnic heritage will come out and seek representation by such a political party, but the model of organization should be perused for varying reasons. In the first place, such organization will represent the interests of the people with mixed ethnicity in the ethnic-based constitutional architecture and political negotiations that may happen in peaceful or chaotic reforms. In peace, it may promote ideals that extend to the constitutional recognition of the existence and rights of such a group of people. People of mixed ethnicity also need to stand for their rights and interests as they may be abandoned by the growing ethno-nationalist political discourse, which may even take a dangerous turn of imposing ones views and culture on others.

The organization of Ethiopians of mixed ethnicity could better accommodate different ethnic-based views without necessarily being structurally opposed to single ethnic-based or national political organizations. It may consequently become the all-important middle ground political platform that is now absent within the otherwise polarized political landscape. The national aspect of the mixed ethnic grouping could also make it the choice of the urban-based and often educated citizenry who do not want to identify with ethno-nationalist political groupings. Minority ethnic groups and people who live in areas predominated by other ethnic groups are also likely to find comfort in the mixed grouping rather than a party claiming to represent another ethnicity with which they may not have cultural practice and/or settlement cohesion. This is more so considering the attitude that has been forming about national or unifying political agenda.

The writer can be reached at fisehasolomonregassa@gmail.com

Legal Analysis of Ethiopia’s State of Emergency

Summary

On October 9, 2016, the Ethiopian government announced a country-wide six-month state of emergency. This followed a year of widespread protests against government policies that state security forces violently suppressed, killing hundreds of people and detaining tens of thousands. [1]   Protesters also committed a number of attacks on government buildings and private businesses perceived to be close to the ruling party.[2]

Government officials sought to justify the announced state of emergency, and corresponding directives that were issued on October 15, by contending that they were necessary in response to the threat posed by “anti-peace groups in close collaboration with foreign elements.”[3] Officials said they needed to “put an end to the damage that is being carried out against infrastructure projects, health centers, [and] administration and justice buildings.”[4] However, damaging property is a crime under Ethiopia’s criminal law and the authorities could prosecute such acts without invoking a state of emergency.

The state of emergency directive prescribes sweeping and vaguely worded restrictions on a broad range of actions that undermine basic rights, including freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, and go far beyond what is permissible under international law.[5] Human Rights Watch has documented serious rights violations and the curtailing of freedom of assembly and expression since the protests began in November 2015. [6]  To some extent, the sweeping provisions effectively codify measures that security forces have been committing unlawfully in response to the protests. Under the state of emergency, the army will be further deployed country-wide for at least six months — this signifies a greater willingness by the government to use the armed forces in what should be a law enforcement role.

The Ethiopian government is empowered to declare a state of emergency under the constitution, “should an external invasion, a breakdown of law and order which endangers the Constitutional order and which cannot be controlled by the regular law enforcement agencies and personnel, a natural disaster, or an epidemic occur.”[7] Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), certain rights may be derogated under a state of emergency but must be tailored to the “exigencies of the situation,” while other rights may not be derogated under any circumstances.[8] Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, no derogation of charter rights is allowed during a time of emergency.[9]

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the international expert body that interprets the ICCPR, has said in its General Comment No. 29 on states of emergency that governments need to “provide careful justification not only for their decision to proclaim a state of emergency but also for any specific measures based on such a proclamation.”[10]Whether a specific measure is consistent with the “exigencies of the situation” depends on its “duration, geographical coverage and material scope,” which must be tailored to a particular situation.[11] To restore a “state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective.”[12]

Human Rights Watch has grave concerns that Ethiopia’s state of emergency directive permits vague and overbroad restrictions beyond those permitted under the ICCPR that threaten basic rights to free expression, assembly, and association and may encourage violations of the rights to the security of the person, including arbitrary detention and torture. For example, violence has occurred in only two of Ethiopia’s nine regions, affecting less than half the country, yet the geographic coverage of the state of emergency is country-wide. As to duration, the state of emergency is for six months, the maximum permissible under the Ethiopian constitution, yet the government has not explained why the current situation warrants the longest possible period allowed by law.  Regarding material scope, the restrictions on free expression rights, which include both content and forms of speech and protest, go are well beyond the “exigencies of the situation” to permit the silencing of peaceful expression and denial of access to information.

Human Rights Watch takes the position that for as long as the state of emergency is lawfully in place, all provisions of the directive inconsistent with the derogation provisions of the ICCPR should promptly be repealed or revised. Ethiopia should also recognize that it remains obligated to uphold all articles of the African Charter, which has no derogation provisions. Individuals arbitrarily detained under the provisions or otherwise subject to violations of their human rights should receive redress, including prompt release and appropriate compensation.

  1. Restrictions on freedom of expression
    1. Access to information

The directive:

  • restricts the writing or sharing of material on social media, radio, or internet that “could create misunderstanding between people or unrest.” [13]
  • prohibits access to diaspora television stations and other “similar linked terrorist media” [US-based Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) and Oromia Media Network (OMN) are named].[14]
  • enables government to “censor and block” radio and television.[15]
  • prevents political parties from speaking to local or foreign media that has the potential to disrupt “the security, sovereignty and the constitutional order.”[16]

The directive, by obstructing or limiting platforms for communication and banning the expression of anything that can “create misunderstanding between people or unrest,” renders virtually all communication as potentially criminal. The vague and overly-broad ban is ambiguous as to which conduct could run afoul of the directive. This not only makes the directive highly discretionary and prone to abusive and partisan implementation, but, as may have been intended, also casts a severe chilling effect on speech, and promotes self-censorship.

These restrictions also give legal backing to practices undertaken by Ethiopian security forces to limit access to information since the protests began in November 2015. The government has used various means to restrict access to OMN and ESAT, including with attempts to jam those stations, destroy satellite dishes on private homes, and arrest business owners who broadcast these channels.[17] OMN has reported being jammed 15 times since its March 2014 inception, and ESAT has been intermittently jammed since 2010. International radio stations broadcasting in one of Ethiopia’s languages including Voice of America and Deutsche Welle have also reported increased incidence of jamming of their broadcast signals in recent months. Several Ethiopian journalists, bloggers, and fixers have been arrested since the protests began. [18]

The Ethiopian government has long committed abuses against media professionals, including harassment and intimidation of journalists, trumped-up prosecutions of journalists under the antiterrorism law, and harassment of sources, printers, publishers, and others.[19] In Africa, only Eritrea has more journalists in detention than Ethiopia. Since the protests began, international journalists have reported more difficulties than usual in acquiring visas, in accessing areas of protest, and some have been detained.[20]

Social media, particularly Facebook, has played a key role in the dissemination of information throughout the protests, particularly among young Ethiopians. There have been various restrictions on social media since protests began including the complete shutdown of the internet, and since October 5, the blocking of mobile phone internet access.[21] Security forces have also regularly searched smartphones for videos or social media posts, and there have been regular arrests of those accused of filming or sharing videos. Armed soldiers have searched students’ phones in and out of schools in some locations. The government has stated that social media is being used by “anti-peace elements” to coordinate property destruction and incite people to violence.[22] Incitement to violence is covered by existing Ethiopian laws and any one can be prosecuted for such a crime.

  1. Limits on communication to NGOs, foreign governments, and other entities

The directive prohibits any communication with undefined “terrorists and anti-peace groups” and communications to foreign governments and NGOs that could affect “security, sovereignty and the constitutional order.”[23] These sweeping restrictions are both vague and overbroad and curtail free expression rights well beyond the scope of the situation.

“Terrorist and anti-peace groups” are not defined in the directive. The government has commonly used these terms to include the activities of peaceful protesters, civil society and political activists, including those in the diaspora, and media stations, including OMN and ESAT. Terrorism is loosely defined in the problematic antiterrorism law, and has been broadly applied in criminal cases to anyone who expresses dissent with government policies, including journalists, opposition politicians, and activists.[24] There is little independence of the judiciary in terrorism cases under Ethiopia’s antiterrorism law, rarely acquittals, and numerous due process concerns. [25]

Historically, many of those that express contrary views to government policies are arrested and accused of providing support or taking direction from one of the five designated terrorist organizations, which includes the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot 7.  Many are released without charge following detention, which often includes ill-treatment and torture during interrogations.[26] Since 2009, the few who are charged are usually charged under the antiterrorism law. Alleged communication or a connection with these “terrorist groups” is often the basis for charges, even though credible evidence of communication with those groups is rarely, if ever, provided.

Given the long-time use of similarly overly broad language in the antiterrorism law to crack down on peaceful expressions of dissent, this provision of the directive could be used as a pretext to target anyone lawfully communicating about diverse topics, including or expressing or sharing criticism of the government.

The government has gone to great lengths to restrict the flow of information on human rights abuses to foreign governments and to domestic and international NGOs. Directive provisions restricting communication with NGOs further erodes the role of civil society groups that has already been severely curtailed since the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation was passed.[27] This law limits foreign funding of domestic NGOs working in good governance and human rights to 10 percent of its budget, effectively closing or restricting the activities of all NGOs working in those areas. International human rights NGOs already face significant restrictions, are denied access to Ethiopia for research, and there are regular arrests of those suspected of sharing information with those NGOs. Recently, some government officials have sought to blame unrest on human rights groups[28] documenting security force abuses and calling for credible investigations.

Limitations on communications with foreign governments, combined with restrictions on diplomats[29]  traveling more than 40 kilometers outside of Addis Ababa, will severely curtail the ability of foreign governments to access independent information that is needed to formulate coherent and timely responses to events as they unfold. It is not clear what impact this measure could have on the provision of much needed humanitarian assistance and development projects that are funded and in some cases implemented by foreign governments.

  1. Restrictions on freedom of assembly and protest
    1. Country-wide protest ban

According to the directive “any assembly or protest without authorization from command post is prohibited.”[30] There are also further measures prohibiting protests or activities that could “prevent education institutions from carrying out their mandate, closing their institutions, or causing any damage to their infrastructure.”[31] There are also prohibitions on protests at sporting events and on public holidays it is prohibited to “show any slogan or agenda unrelated” to that holiday.[32] While some restrictions on assembly may be justified under a state of emergency, a blanket ban on protests country-wide is overly broad. Any criminal acts committed during a protest should be prosecuted under Ethiopian law. The vast majority of the hundreds of protests since November 2015 have been peaceful, and most of the violence that occurred after Irreecha was not done as part of a protest.[33] A blanket ban on protests further reduces outlets for the peaceful expression of grievances.

Protests have not been expressly outlawed since November 2015, but the government has taken various steps to restrict protests. The government has repeatedly stated that protests were “illegal”[34] because permission had not been sought from authorities. [35]  Domestic law requires authorities to be “notified” of protests. Some protesters told Human Rights Watch they were arrested when they sought permission from local authorities or were denied permission for no particular reason. In some locations in Oromia, protests were allowed to proceed but were quickly broken up by security forces using teargas, live ammunition, beatings, and arrests. In Amhara region in August, security forces used live ammunition to break up protests. Other strategies to restrict protests since November 2015 included pre-emptive arrests of perceived protest leaders, confiscation of tools used to mobilize for protests including phones, security forces occupying schools, and arrests of teachers, parents, local government officials and others as punishment for student protests.

b.      Criminalization of forms of protest

The directive prohibits:

  • “Closing any licensed businesses or shops or government bodies that give service to the public, [or] disappearing from business premises for no particular reason.”[36]
  • “Closing or blocking of any roads, [or] disrupting transport services.[37]

Over the last year, some protesters have engaged in forms of non-violent protest that protesters feel make them less prone to security force abuses including blocking of roads, general strikes, and closing of businesses.

Prohibiting the closure of businesses is not related to stemming violence and the property destruction that has occurred since Irreecha. Business owners should be able to open and close their business as they see fit. These measures are a further attempt to close off other avenues for peaceful protest, particularly those that may have actual or perceived negative impact on Ethiopia’s economy.

  1. Arbitrary detention and lack of due process

Under the directive, those who do not comply with its measures can be arrested without a “court order” and detained “in a place assigned by the command post until the end of the state of emergency.”[38] Government can “decide whether to teach the necessary rehabilitation and release or present them before court when necessary.”[39]

While some measure of detention is permitted during a state of emergency, the widespread detention that is enabled under the directive and has occurred since November 2015 is not permitted under international law. Prohibitions on torture and arbitrary detention are not derogable under any condition.[40] According to General Comment 29, the prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation [emphasis added].[41] Fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.[42]

These measures effectively codify unlawful government actions that have largely been used since November 2015, particularly in Oromia. There have been tens of thousands of individuals detained since the protests began. Some are charged, some are held in detention indefinitely, and others undergo a short “rehabilitation” and then are released. Many of those detained over the last year were held in military camps and family members were often not aware of their whereabouts until they were released. Many of those released report torture in detention, including in military camps but very few are ever charged.

The “rehabilitation” program referred to in article 28 of the directive has been in place in Ethiopia for some years and is a strategy used by security forces during crackdowns. They typically involve large scale arrests, detention for several days or weeks, ill-treatment and sometimes torture, and release on conditions of future compliant behavior. Conditions of release vary, including the requirement to regularly report to police stations to limit movement, suspension from school, or prohibition on attending protests. There is no due process or formal record of these detentions. The goal is to punish and “rehabilitate” offenders in a short period of time. Rehabilitation has occurred regularly since November 2015, particularly in Oromia.

Torture continues to be a serious problem in Ethiopia, particularly in military camps. Human Rights Watch has documented torture in detention throughout the protests and more broadly. Many individuals detained during the protests never appeared in court, but those that have and have reported torture or mistreatment have not had their complaints adequately addressed by the judiciary.

  1. Right to education

The directive bans protests at schools, permits security officials access to schools to maintain “peace and security” and enables institutions “to take administrative measures on students and staffs protesting and instigating violence in education institutions.”[43]Instigating violence is a criminal act and can be prosecuted under Ethiopian law, but peaceful protesting is not a criminal act and students should not face sanction for doing so.

These measures effectively codify and increase restrictions on access to education that have been in place in Oromia since November 2015. Throughout the protests, access to education has been restricted through school closures, detention of teachers, occupation of school grounds by security forces, and arrests of students. [44] School and universities have also taken administrative measures including suspension of students from university for participating in protests. [45] This has frequently been reported in Oromia and elsewhere. In addition, many of those detained during periods of intense crackdowns, including crackdowns since November 2015 are often released on the condition that they do not attend school for periods of months or years.

  1. Freedom of movement of refugees

The directive prohibits individuals “leaving a refugee camp without the necessary authorization.”[46]

Under international law, Ethiopia must formally justify any prohibition on free movement as the least restrictive measure necessary to protect national security, public order, or public health, which it has not done.[47] The directive, and Ethiopia’s National Refugee Proclamation unlawfully limit refugees’ movement and without basis distinguishes between Ethiopian citizens and foreign nationals.[48]

Ethiopia host over 650,000 refugees, the largest in Africa. Most of these refugees are from Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea, however there are no refugee camps under the authority of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Oromia and Amhara, where recent unrest has occurred. [49]

The country-wide ban on the freedom of movement of refugees is both overly broad and discriminatory.

[1] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown”: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests, June 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and….

[2] “Dutch farmers on Ethiopia violence: ‘I was terribly scared,’” Yahoo News, October 22, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/dutch-farmer-ethiopia-violence-terribly-scare…(accessed October 23, 2016).

[3] Tesfaye Wolde, “Ethiopia’s State of Emergency Will Work,” Washington Post, October 16, 2016, (accessed October 23, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ethiopias-state-of-emergency-wil….

[4] “Ethiopia declares state of emergency after months of protests,” CNN, October 11, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/09/africa/ethiopia-oromo-state-emergency/ (accessed October 23, 2016).

[5] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 1966; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 59, U.N. Doc.A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 23, 1976. Ethiopia ratified the ICCPR in 1993.

[6] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown.”

[7] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, art 93(1)(a).

[8] ICCPR, art. 4

[9] African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/.  Ethiopia ratified the African Charter in 1998.

[10] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 5.

[11] Ibid., para. 4.

[12] Ibid., para. 1.

[13] State of Emergency Directive, 2016, art. 1 [translated from Amharic].

[14] State of Emergency Directive, art. 2 [translated from Amharic].

[15] State of Emergency Directive, art. 28(5) [translated from Amharic].

[16] State of Emergency Directive, art. 16(2) [translated from Amharic].

[17] Human Rights Watch, “Journalism is not a Crime”: Violations of Media Freedom in Ethiopia, January 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/journalism-not-crime/violations-me…, p. 38.

[18] “Ethiopia Arrests Second Journalist in a Week, Summons Zone 9 Bloggers,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) alert, December 27, 2015, https://www.cpj.org/2015/12/ethiopia-arrests-second-journalist-in-a-week… (accessed October 23, 2016 and “Police Arrest Prominent Ethiopian Blogger,” CPJ alert, October 3, 2016, https://cpj.org/2016/10/police-arrest-prominent-ethiopian-blogger.php (accessed October 23, 2016).

[19] Human Rights Watch, “Journalism is Not a Crime” and “Ethiopia: Terrorism Law Used to Crush Free Speech,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 27, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/ethiopia-terrorism-law-used-crush-fr….

[20] Conor Gaffey, “Ethiopia Detains Journalists Covering Oromo Protests,” Newsweek,March 7, 2016, (accessed October 23, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/ethiopia-oromo-protests-press-freedom-434307.

[21] Susmita Baral, “Ethiopia Protest August 2016: Amid Internet Ban, Rally Against Government Leaves at Least 33 Dead,” International Business Times, August 8, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/ethiopia-protest-august-2016-amid-internet-ban-ra… (accessed October 23, 2016) and “Ethiopia declares state of emergency after months of protests,” CNN.

[22] Matthew Tempest, “Ethiopian Ambassador: ‘Anti-peace elements’ Took Advantage of Oromia, Amhara Protests,” Euractiv.net, October 5, 2016, http://www.ethiopianembassy.be/en/2016/10/05/ethiopian-ambassador-anti-p… (accessed October 23, 2016).

[23] State of Emergency Directive, arts. 2(1), 16(1) [translated from Amharic].

[24] Human Rights Watch, “Journalism is Not a Crime.”; “Dispatches: Using Courts to Crush Dissent in Ethiopia,” May 9, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/09/dispatches-using-courts-crush-dissen… ; “Dispatches: Ethiopian Pastor Pays the Penalty for Speaking Out,” March 15, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/15/dispatches-ethiopian-pastor-pays-pen…

[25] “Dispatches: Ethiopia’s Zone 9 Bloggers Acquitted, Free Speech Still on Trial,” Human Rights Watch, October 16, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/16/dispatches-ethiopias-zone-9-bloggers….

[26] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown.”

[27] “Ethiopia: Human rights Work Crippled by Restrictive Law,” Amnesty International press release, March 12, 2012,  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/03/ethiopia-human-rights-wor… (accessed October 23, 2012).

[28] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ethiopia, “Human Rights Watch encourages opposition violence in Ethiopia,” post to “The Official Blog of MFA Ethiopia” (blog), October 22, 2016, https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2016/10/22/human-rights-watch-enco…

[29] State of Emergency Directive, art. 18. [translated from Amharic]

[30] State of Emergency Directive, art. 3. [translated from Amharic]

[31] State of Emergency Directive, art. 5. [translated from Amharic]

[32] State of Emergency Directive, art. 6,9. [translated from Amharic]

[33] Irreecha is an important cultural event for the Oromo ethnic group and draws millions of people each year to Bishoftu. On October 2, 2016, an unknown number of people, possibly hundreds, died during a stampede after security forces used teargas and gunfire to control the tense crowd.

[34] William Davison, “Deaths Reported as Protests Flare in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region,” Bloomberg.com, August 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-06/ethiopian-security-for… (accessed October 23, 2016).

[35] William Davison, “Deaths Reported as Protests Flare in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region,” Bloomberg.com, August 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-06/ethiopian-security-for… (accessed October 23, 2016).

[36] State of Emergency Directive, art. 4(1). [translated from Amharic]

[37] State of Emergency Directive, art. 7. [translated from Amharic]

[38] State of Emergency Directive, art. 28(1) & (2). [translated from Amharic]

[39] State of Emergency Directive, art. 28(3). [translated from Amharic]

[40] ICCPR, art. 4(2)

[41] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, para. 13(b).

[42] Ibid., para. 16. The Human Rights Committee is of the opinion that “the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.  Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence.  The presumption of innocence must be respected.  In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.” Ibid.

[43] State of Emergency Directive, arts. 5, 28(7), 30. [translated from Amharic]

[44] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown,” p.21

[45] Ibid.

[46] State of Emergency Directive, art. 17. [translated from Amharic]

[47] Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 1954, art. 26; ICCPR, art. 12(1). Article 12(3) provides that the only exceptions permitted to this right are those “provided by law … and necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”

[48]  Ethiopia’s National Refugee Proclamation, No. 409/2004, art. 21(2).

[49] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Ethiopia: Registered Persons of Concern by Camp and Locations, as of 31 January 2015,” Map, http://reliefweb.int/map/ethiopia/ethiopia-registered-persons-concern-ca… (accessed October 23, 2016).

Region / Country

Legal Analysis of Ethiopia’s State of Emergency

Summary

On October 9, 2016, the Ethiopian government announced a country-wide six-month state of emergency. This followed a year of widespread protests against government policies that state security forces violently suppressed, killing hundreds of people and detaining tens of thousands. [1]   Protesters also committed a number of attacks on government buildings and private businesses perceived to be close to the ruling party.[2]

Government officials sought to justify the announced state of emergency, and corresponding directives that were issued on October 15, by contending that they were necessary in response to the threat posed by “anti-peace groups in close collaboration with foreign elements.”[3] Officials said they needed to “put an end to the damage that is being carried out against infrastructure projects, health centers, [and] administration and justice buildings.”[4] However, damaging property is a crime under Ethiopia’s criminal law and the authorities could prosecute such acts without invoking a state of emergency.

The state of emergency directive prescribes sweeping and vaguely worded restrictions on a broad range of actions that undermine basic rights, including freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, and go far beyond what is permissible under international law.[5] Human Rights Watch has documented serious rights violations and the curtailing of freedom of assembly and expression since the protests began in November 2015. [6]  To some extent, the sweeping provisions effectively codify measures that security forces have been committing unlawfully in response to the protests. Under the state of emergency, the army will be further deployed country-wide for at least six months — this signifies a greater willingness by the government to use the armed forces in what should be a law enforcement role.

The Ethiopian government is empowered to declare a state of emergency under the constitution, “should an external invasion, a breakdown of law and order which endangers the Constitutional order and which cannot be controlled by the regular law enforcement agencies and personnel, a natural disaster, or an epidemic occur.”[7] Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), certain rights may be derogated under a state of emergency but must be tailored to the “exigencies of the situation,” while other rights may not be derogated under any circumstances.[8] Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, no derogation of charter rights is allowed during a time of emergency.[9]

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the international expert body that interprets the ICCPR, has said in its General Comment No. 29 on states of emergency that governments need to “provide careful justification not only for their decision to proclaim a state of emergency but also for any specific measures based on such a proclamation.”[10]Whether a specific measure is consistent with the “exigencies of the situation” depends on its “duration, geographical coverage and material scope,” which must be tailored to a particular situation.[11] To restore a “state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective.”[12]

Human Rights Watch has grave concerns that Ethiopia’s state of emergency directive permits vague and overbroad restrictions beyond those permitted under the ICCPR that threaten basic rights to free expression, assembly, and association and may encourage violations of the rights to the security of the person, including arbitrary detention and torture. For example, violence has occurred in only two of Ethiopia’s nine regions, affecting less than half the country, yet the geographic coverage of the state of emergency is country-wide. As to duration, the state of emergency is for six months, the maximum permissible under the Ethiopian constitution, yet the government has not explained why the current situation warrants the longest possible period allowed by law.  Regarding material scope, the restrictions on free expression rights, which include both content and forms of speech and protest, go are well beyond the “exigencies of the situation” to permit the silencing of peaceful expression and denial of access to information.

Human Rights Watch takes the position that for as long as the state of emergency is lawfully in place, all provisions of the directive inconsistent with the derogation provisions of the ICCPR should promptly be repealed or revised. Ethiopia should also recognize that it remains obligated to uphold all articles of the African Charter, which has no derogation provisions. Individuals arbitrarily detained under the provisions or otherwise subject to violations of their human rights should receive redress, including prompt release and appropriate compensation.

  1. Restrictions on freedom of expression
    1. Access to information

The directive:

  • restricts the writing or sharing of material on social media, radio, or internet that “could create misunderstanding between people or unrest.” [13]
  • prohibits access to diaspora television stations and other “similar linked terrorist media” [US-based Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) and Oromia Media Network (OMN) are named].[14]
  • enables government to “censor and block” radio and television.[15]
  • prevents political parties from speaking to local or foreign media that has the potential to disrupt “the security, sovereignty and the constitutional order.”[16]

The directive, by obstructing or limiting platforms for communication and banning the expression of anything that can “create misunderstanding between people or unrest,” renders virtually all communication as potentially criminal. The vague and overly-broad ban is ambiguous as to which conduct could run afoul of the directive. This not only makes the directive highly discretionary and prone to abusive and partisan implementation, but, as may have been intended, also casts a severe chilling effect on speech, and promotes self-censorship.

These restrictions also give legal backing to practices undertaken by Ethiopian security forces to limit access to information since the protests began in November 2015. The government has used various means to restrict access to OMN and ESAT, including with attempts to jam those stations, destroy satellite dishes on private homes, and arrest business owners who broadcast these channels.[17] OMN has reported being jammed 15 times since its March 2014 inception, and ESAT has been intermittently jammed since 2010. International radio stations broadcasting in one of Ethiopia’s languages including Voice of America and Deutsche Welle have also reported increased incidence of jamming of their broadcast signals in recent months. Several Ethiopian journalists, bloggers, and fixers have been arrested since the protests began. [18]

The Ethiopian government has long committed abuses against media professionals, including harassment and intimidation of journalists, trumped-up prosecutions of journalists under the antiterrorism law, and harassment of sources, printers, publishers, and others.[19] In Africa, only Eritrea has more journalists in detention than Ethiopia. Since the protests began, international journalists have reported more difficulties than usual in acquiring visas, in accessing areas of protest, and some have been detained.[20]

Social media, particularly Facebook, has played a key role in the dissemination of information throughout the protests, particularly among young Ethiopians. There have been various restrictions on social media since protests began including the complete shutdown of the internet, and since October 5, the blocking of mobile phone internet access.[21] Security forces have also regularly searched smartphones for videos or social media posts, and there have been regular arrests of those accused of filming or sharing videos. Armed soldiers have searched students’ phones in and out of schools in some locations. The government has stated that social media is being used by “anti-peace elements” to coordinate property destruction and incite people to violence.[22] Incitement to violence is covered by existing Ethiopian laws and any one can be prosecuted for such a crime.

  1. Limits on communication to NGOs, foreign governments, and other entities

The directive prohibits any communication with undefined “terrorists and anti-peace groups” and communications to foreign governments and NGOs that could affect “security, sovereignty and the constitutional order.”[23] These sweeping restrictions are both vague and overbroad and curtail free expression rights well beyond the scope of the situation.

“Terrorist and anti-peace groups” are not defined in the directive. The government has commonly used these terms to include the activities of peaceful protesters, civil society and political activists, including those in the diaspora, and media stations, including OMN and ESAT. Terrorism is loosely defined in the problematic antiterrorism law, and has been broadly applied in criminal cases to anyone who expresses dissent with government policies, including journalists, opposition politicians, and activists.[24] There is little independence of the judiciary in terrorism cases under Ethiopia’s antiterrorism law, rarely acquittals, and numerous due process concerns. [25]

Historically, many of those that express contrary views to government policies are arrested and accused of providing support or taking direction from one of the five designated terrorist organizations, which includes the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot 7.  Many are released without charge following detention, which often includes ill-treatment and torture during interrogations.[26] Since 2009, the few who are charged are usually charged under the antiterrorism law. Alleged communication or a connection with these “terrorist groups” is often the basis for charges, even though credible evidence of communication with those groups is rarely, if ever, provided.

Given the long-time use of similarly overly broad language in the antiterrorism law to crack down on peaceful expressions of dissent, this provision of the directive could be used as a pretext to target anyone lawfully communicating about diverse topics, including or expressing or sharing criticism of the government.

The government has gone to great lengths to restrict the flow of information on human rights abuses to foreign governments and to domestic and international NGOs. Directive provisions restricting communication with NGOs further erodes the role of civil society groups that has already been severely curtailed since the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation was passed.[27] This law limits foreign funding of domestic NGOs working in good governance and human rights to 10 percent of its budget, effectively closing or restricting the activities of all NGOs working in those areas. International human rights NGOs already face significant restrictions, are denied access to Ethiopia for research, and there are regular arrests of those suspected of sharing information with those NGOs. Recently, some government officials have sought to blame unrest on human rights groups[28] documenting security force abuses and calling for credible investigations.

Limitations on communications with foreign governments, combined with restrictions on diplomats[29]  traveling more than 40 kilometers outside of Addis Ababa, will severely curtail the ability of foreign governments to access independent information that is needed to formulate coherent and timely responses to events as they unfold. It is not clear what impact this measure could have on the provision of much needed humanitarian assistance and development projects that are funded and in some cases implemented by foreign governments.

  1. Restrictions on freedom of assembly and protest
    1. Country-wide protest ban

According to the directive “any assembly or protest without authorization from command post is prohibited.”[30] There are also further measures prohibiting protests or activities that could “prevent education institutions from carrying out their mandate, closing their institutions, or causing any damage to their infrastructure.”[31] There are also prohibitions on protests at sporting events and on public holidays it is prohibited to “show any slogan or agenda unrelated” to that holiday.[32] While some restrictions on assembly may be justified under a state of emergency, a blanket ban on protests country-wide is overly broad. Any criminal acts committed during a protest should be prosecuted under Ethiopian law. The vast majority of the hundreds of protests since November 2015 have been peaceful, and most of the violence that occurred after Irreecha was not done as part of a protest.[33] A blanket ban on protests further reduces outlets for the peaceful expression of grievances.

Protests have not been expressly outlawed since November 2015, but the government has taken various steps to restrict protests. The government has repeatedly stated that protests were “illegal”[34] because permission had not been sought from authorities. [35]  Domestic law requires authorities to be “notified” of protests. Some protesters told Human Rights Watch they were arrested when they sought permission from local authorities or were denied permission for no particular reason. In some locations in Oromia, protests were allowed to proceed but were quickly broken up by security forces using teargas, live ammunition, beatings, and arrests. In Amhara region in August, security forces used live ammunition to break up protests. Other strategies to restrict protests since November 2015 included pre-emptive arrests of perceived protest leaders, confiscation of tools used to mobilize for protests including phones, security forces occupying schools, and arrests of teachers, parents, local government officials and others as punishment for student protests.

b.      Criminalization of forms of protest

The directive prohibits:

  • “Closing any licensed businesses or shops or government bodies that give service to the public, [or] disappearing from business premises for no particular reason.”[36]
  • “Closing or blocking of any roads, [or] disrupting transport services.[37]

Over the last year, some protesters have engaged in forms of non-violent protest that protesters feel make them less prone to security force abuses including blocking of roads, general strikes, and closing of businesses.

Prohibiting the closure of businesses is not related to stemming violence and the property destruction that has occurred since Irreecha. Business owners should be able to open and close their business as they see fit. These measures are a further attempt to close off other avenues for peaceful protest, particularly those that may have actual or perceived negative impact on Ethiopia’s economy.

  1. Arbitrary detention and lack of due process

Under the directive, those who do not comply with its measures can be arrested without a “court order” and detained “in a place assigned by the command post until the end of the state of emergency.”[38] Government can “decide whether to teach the necessary rehabilitation and release or present them before court when necessary.”[39]

While some measure of detention is permitted during a state of emergency, the widespread detention that is enabled under the directive and has occurred since November 2015 is not permitted under international law. Prohibitions on torture and arbitrary detention are not derogable under any condition.[40] According to General Comment 29, the prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation [emphasis added].[41] Fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.[42]

These measures effectively codify unlawful government actions that have largely been used since November 2015, particularly in Oromia. There have been tens of thousands of individuals detained since the protests began. Some are charged, some are held in detention indefinitely, and others undergo a short “rehabilitation” and then are released. Many of those detained over the last year were held in military camps and family members were often not aware of their whereabouts until they were released. Many of those released report torture in detention, including in military camps but very few are ever charged.

The “rehabilitation” program referred to in article 28 of the directive has been in place in Ethiopia for some years and is a strategy used by security forces during crackdowns. They typically involve large scale arrests, detention for several days or weeks, ill-treatment and sometimes torture, and release on conditions of future compliant behavior. Conditions of release vary, including the requirement to regularly report to police stations to limit movement, suspension from school, or prohibition on attending protests. There is no due process or formal record of these detentions. The goal is to punish and “rehabilitate” offenders in a short period of time. Rehabilitation has occurred regularly since November 2015, particularly in Oromia.

Torture continues to be a serious problem in Ethiopia, particularly in military camps. Human Rights Watch has documented torture in detention throughout the protests and more broadly. Many individuals detained during the protests never appeared in court, but those that have and have reported torture or mistreatment have not had their complaints adequately addressed by the judiciary.

  1. Right to education

The directive bans protests at schools, permits security officials access to schools to maintain “peace and security” and enables institutions “to take administrative measures on students and staffs protesting and instigating violence in education institutions.”[43]Instigating violence is a criminal act and can be prosecuted under Ethiopian law, but peaceful protesting is not a criminal act and students should not face sanction for doing so.

These measures effectively codify and increase restrictions on access to education that have been in place in Oromia since November 2015. Throughout the protests, access to education has been restricted through school closures, detention of teachers, occupation of school grounds by security forces, and arrests of students. [44] School and universities have also taken administrative measures including suspension of students from university for participating in protests. [45] This has frequently been reported in Oromia and elsewhere. In addition, many of those detained during periods of intense crackdowns, including crackdowns since November 2015 are often released on the condition that they do not attend school for periods of months or years.

  1. Freedom of movement of refugees

The directive prohibits individuals “leaving a refugee camp without the necessary authorization.”[46]

Under international law, Ethiopia must formally justify any prohibition on free movement as the least restrictive measure necessary to protect national security, public order, or public health, which it has not done.[47] The directive, and Ethiopia’s National Refugee Proclamation unlawfully limit refugees’ movement and without basis distinguishes between Ethiopian citizens and foreign nationals.[48]

Ethiopia host over 650,000 refugees, the largest in Africa. Most of these refugees are from Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea, however there are no refugee camps under the authority of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Oromia and Amhara, where recent unrest has occurred. [49]

The country-wide ban on the freedom of movement of refugees is both overly broad and discriminatory.

[1] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown”: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests, June 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/16/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and….

[2] “Dutch farmers on Ethiopia violence: ‘I was terribly scared,’” Yahoo News, October 22, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/dutch-farmer-ethiopia-violence-terribly-scare…(accessed October 23, 2016).

[3] Tesfaye Wolde, “Ethiopia’s State of Emergency Will Work,” Washington Post, October 16, 2016, (accessed October 23, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ethiopias-state-of-emergency-wil….

[4] “Ethiopia declares state of emergency after months of protests,” CNN, October 11, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/09/africa/ethiopia-oromo-state-emergency/ (accessed October 23, 2016).

[5] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 1966; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 59, U.N. Doc.A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 23, 1976. Ethiopia ratified the ICCPR in 1993.

[6] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown.”

[7] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, art 93(1)(a).

[8] ICCPR, art. 4

[9] African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/.  Ethiopia ratified the African Charter in 1998.

[10] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 5.

[11] Ibid., para. 4.

[12] Ibid., para. 1.

[13] State of Emergency Directive, 2016, art. 1 [translated from Amharic].

[14] State of Emergency Directive, art. 2 [translated from Amharic].

[15] State of Emergency Directive, art. 28(5) [translated from Amharic].

[16] State of Emergency Directive, art. 16(2) [translated from Amharic].

[17] Human Rights Watch, “Journalism is not a Crime”: Violations of Media Freedom in Ethiopia, January 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/journalism-not-crime/violations-me…, p. 38.

[18] “Ethiopia Arrests Second Journalist in a Week, Summons Zone 9 Bloggers,” Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) alert, December 27, 2015, https://www.cpj.org/2015/12/ethiopia-arrests-second-journalist-in-a-week… (accessed October 23, 2016 and “Police Arrest Prominent Ethiopian Blogger,” CPJ alert, October 3, 2016, https://cpj.org/2016/10/police-arrest-prominent-ethiopian-blogger.php (accessed October 23, 2016).

[19] Human Rights Watch, “Journalism is Not a Crime” and “Ethiopia: Terrorism Law Used to Crush Free Speech,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 27, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/ethiopia-terrorism-law-used-crush-fr….

[20] Conor Gaffey, “Ethiopia Detains Journalists Covering Oromo Protests,” Newsweek,March 7, 2016, (accessed October 23, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/ethiopia-oromo-protests-press-freedom-434307.

[21] Susmita Baral, “Ethiopia Protest August 2016: Amid Internet Ban, Rally Against Government Leaves at Least 33 Dead,” International Business Times, August 8, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/ethiopia-protest-august-2016-amid-internet-ban-ra… (accessed October 23, 2016) and “Ethiopia declares state of emergency after months of protests,” CNN.

[22] Matthew Tempest, “Ethiopian Ambassador: ‘Anti-peace elements’ Took Advantage of Oromia, Amhara Protests,” Euractiv.net, October 5, 2016, http://www.ethiopianembassy.be/en/2016/10/05/ethiopian-ambassador-anti-p… (accessed October 23, 2016).

[23] State of Emergency Directive, arts. 2(1), 16(1) [translated from Amharic].

[24] Human Rights Watch, “Journalism is Not a Crime.”; “Dispatches: Using Courts to Crush Dissent in Ethiopia,” May 9, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/09/dispatches-using-courts-crush-dissen… ; “Dispatches: Ethiopian Pastor Pays the Penalty for Speaking Out,” March 15, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/15/dispatches-ethiopian-pastor-pays-pen…

[25] “Dispatches: Ethiopia’s Zone 9 Bloggers Acquitted, Free Speech Still on Trial,” Human Rights Watch, October 16, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/16/dispatches-ethiopias-zone-9-bloggers….

[26] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown.”

[27] “Ethiopia: Human rights Work Crippled by Restrictive Law,” Amnesty International press release, March 12, 2012,  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/03/ethiopia-human-rights-wor… (accessed October 23, 2012).

[28] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ethiopia, “Human Rights Watch encourages opposition violence in Ethiopia,” post to “The Official Blog of MFA Ethiopia” (blog), October 22, 2016, https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2016/10/22/human-rights-watch-enco…

[29] State of Emergency Directive, art. 18. [translated from Amharic]

[30] State of Emergency Directive, art. 3. [translated from Amharic]

[31] State of Emergency Directive, art. 5. [translated from Amharic]

[32] State of Emergency Directive, art. 6,9. [translated from Amharic]

[33] Irreecha is an important cultural event for the Oromo ethnic group and draws millions of people each year to Bishoftu. On October 2, 2016, an unknown number of people, possibly hundreds, died during a stampede after security forces used teargas and gunfire to control the tense crowd.

[34] William Davison, “Deaths Reported as Protests Flare in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region,” Bloomberg.com, August 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-06/ethiopian-security-for… (accessed October 23, 2016).

[35] William Davison, “Deaths Reported as Protests Flare in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region,” Bloomberg.com, August 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-06/ethiopian-security-for… (accessed October 23, 2016).

[36] State of Emergency Directive, art. 4(1). [translated from Amharic]

[37] State of Emergency Directive, art. 7. [translated from Amharic]

[38] State of Emergency Directive, art. 28(1) & (2). [translated from Amharic]

[39] State of Emergency Directive, art. 28(3). [translated from Amharic]

[40] ICCPR, art. 4(2)

[41] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, para. 13(b).

[42] Ibid., para. 16. The Human Rights Committee is of the opinion that “the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency.  Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence.  The presumption of innocence must be respected.  In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.” Ibid.

[43] State of Emergency Directive, arts. 5, 28(7), 30. [translated from Amharic]

[44] Human Rights Watch, “Such a Brutal Crackdown,” p.21

[45] Ibid.

[46] State of Emergency Directive, art. 17. [translated from Amharic]

[47] Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 1954, art. 26; ICCPR, art. 12(1). Article 12(3) provides that the only exceptions permitted to this right are those “provided by law … and necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”

[48]  Ethiopia’s National Refugee Proclamation, No. 409/2004, art. 21(2).

[49] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Ethiopia: Registered Persons of Concern by Camp and Locations, as of 31 January 2015,” Map, http://reliefweb.int/map/ethiopia/ethiopia-registered-persons-concern-ca… (accessed October 23, 2016).

Region / Country

WikiLeaks: Why Sheikh Mo Agreed to Pay Bill Clinton Foundation $2 Million Per Trip to Ethiopia?

Clinton Foundation aide says ‘unless Sheikh Mo has sent us a $6 million check, this sounds crazy to do’

By Brendan Kirby 

A top Clinton Foundation official expressed reservations about former President Bill Clinton contacting a Saudi Arabian and Ethiopian billionaire to thank him for offering a plane ride to Ethiopia — unless it would mean a seven-figure donation.

According to a briefing memo contained in an email chain released by WikiLeaks, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Al-Amoudi of Midroc had pledged to donate $20 million over 10 years to the Clinton Health Access Initiative. But an economic downturn caused the sheikh to delay payments. The health program did not receive payments in 2010 or 2011.

“Unless Sheikh Mo has sent us a $6 million check, this sounds crazy to do.”

In an email released by WikiLeaks Monday, Clinton Health Access Initiative CEO Ira Magaziner suggested in November 2011 that Clinton call the sheikh.

“CHAI would like to request that President Clinton call Sheikh Mohammed to thank him for offering his plane to the conference in Ethiopia and expressing regrets that President Clinton’s schedule does not permit him to attend the conference,” he wrote.

WikiLeaks released more of the email chain on Tuesday. Amitabh Desai, director of foreign policy at the foundation, expressed reservations — unless the sheikh had caught up with his financial commitment.

“Unless Sheikh Mo has sent us a $6 million check, this sounds crazy to do,” he responded.

But Bruce Lindsey, chairman of the Clinton Foundation’s board of directors, argued in favor of the plan.

“I think they are hopeful if we do this it will help us get the $6 million,” he wrote. “I think he [Clinton] should call.”

The sheikh was born in Ethiopia to an Ethiopian mother and Saudi father. He later moved to Saudi Arabia and made a fortune in construction and real estate before buying oil refineries in Sweden and Morocco. He approached the Clinton Foundation in 2006 and proposed donating $2 million to the health program for every year that Clinton visited Ethiopia. The final agreement the parties struck mentioned a payment schedule but did not tie the money to Clinton’s visits to the African country.

In 2008, the sheikh donated rooms at a Sheraton hotel in Ethiopia and meals for Clinton and a large party for four days — two days longer than originally planned because of aircraft problems.

According to Clinton Foundation documents, the sheikh contributed $5 million to $10 million, though it is unclear how much of that came after the email exchange.

The memo laid out strategies for getting the sheikh to cough up the money he owed and detailed discussions with George Salem, the sheikh’s Washington-based lawyer, and Irvin Hicks, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and one of the sheikh’s representatives in Washington.

“George Salem, Ambassador Hicks, and CHAI feel that it would be helpful if you would call the sheikh and thank him for offering the plane and saying you are sorry you can’t attend ICASA,” the memo stated, referring to the International Conference on AIDS and STIs in Africa. “We don’t think it is necessary for YOU to bring up the payment issue directly.”

Charles Ortel, a Wall Street analyst and critic of the Clinton Foundation, told The Daily Caller on Monday that accepting free travel and other benefits without declaring them for the Clinton Foundation could run afoul of tax law.

“It’s highly illegal and it’s likely that the owners of these aircraft took tax deductions as a gift to the Clinton Foundation,” he told the news site.